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viiEditorial Preface
Editorial Preface
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, whose effects can still be 
felt today, member states of the European Union proceeded to re-examine their 
domestic legislation and in many cases introduced new procedures to cope with 
financial institution indebtedness and the consequent impact this has on confidence 
in the banking sector and on the lending environment more generally. Emphasis 
also began, more or less concurrently, to be placed on how the institutions of the 
European Union itself, particularly those involved in ensuring the stability of the 
Eurozone, would cope with any future financial crisis.
The subsequent history of financial institution-related initiatives is complex and 
is not simply an insolvency-related story, although of course insolvency and the 
risks of financial failure have loomed high in the thoughts of legislators and policy-
makers keen to avoid a repeat of events after 2008. As measures are introduced 
to ensure systemic integrity and that financial institutions can withstand strains 
placed upon them, through periodic “stress-testing”, the latest exercise having been 
carried out in mid-2016, the foundations of a strong Capital Markets Union are 
being systematically laid down. Alongside this, other insolvency-related measures 
targeted at the general economy and, in particular, business are emerging, not least 
the work that began in 2012 that has seen the adoption in 2015 of a Recast European 
Insolvency Regulation. At time of writing, work by the European Commission’s 
Experts’ Group in Restructuring and Insolvency, constituted in 2015, is likely to 
lead to a number of draft instruments emerging in the course of 2016-2017 which 
will further accentuate the need for member states to review their domestic rules 
in the insolvency field.
The intention behind the present text, consisting of papers delivered at the Annual 
Conference of the INSOL-Europe Academic Forum in Berlin, Germany on 30 
September-1 October 2015, is that it will form an up to date account of viewpoints 
on measures taking place in the financial sector and the reform process. It is 
particularly noteworthy that members of both INSOL Europe and the Academic 
Forum have been engaged in the process by which various texts have been 
elaborated, from the Recast European Insolvency Regulation to the texts that are 
likely to emerge as a result of the most recent Experts’ Group. Furthermore, many 
members have also added their voices to the deliberations and studies looking into 
how the legal and regulatory environments for banking and financial institutions 
have been developed across the European Union. The skills and talent of members 
of the Academic Forum have played a more than modest role in shaping the texts 
that have emerged and those that are forthcoming.
As such, the papers here are truly cutting edge and will increase awareness of the 
impact of European insolvency law within domestic, regional and global contexts. 
Submissions for this collection have come from prominent academics, researchers 
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and doctoral students in the field representing a number of jurisdictions from 
common law, civilian and mixed traditions within Europe and further afield. This 
has ensured that the contents of the research and analyses included in this text are 
of the highest quality and will be useful and thought-provoking. It is hoped that this 
will render the contributions here as well as the further references they contain of 
great value for researchers in the field.
In summary, we would like to express our appreciation to all those who have 
assisted in making the project a success, not least the contributors themselves, but 
also the administrative staff members of INSOL-Europe, particularly Caroline 
Taylor and Wendy Cooper, together with other members of the team. Special 
thanks go to Myriam Mailly and Emmanuelle Inacio, INSOL Europe Technical 
Officers, and Jennifer Gant, Chair of the Young Academics’ Network in Insolvency 
Law, who helped organised the submission of conference papers by members of 
the network. If not otherwise noted by the contributors, the law is stated as at 30 
April 2016.
Rebecca Parry 
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Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University 
Email: rebecca.parry@ntu.ac.uk
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A Note on the Academic Forum
The INSOL Europe Academic Forum, founded in 2004, is a constituent body 
of INSOL Europe, a Europe-wide association of practitioners in insolvency. 
The Academic Forum’s primary mission is to engage in the representation of 
members interested in insolvency law and research, to encourage and assist in 
the development of research initiatives in the insolvency field and to participate 
in the activities organised by INSOL Europe. The membership of the Academic 
Forum includes insolvency academics, insolvency practitioners with recognised 
academic credentials as well as those engaged in the research and study of 
insolvency. The Academic Forum meets annually in conjunction with the 
main conference of INSOL Europe and also arranges half-yearly conferences 
around suitable themes of interest to the practice and academic communities. 
Previous meetings have taken place in Prague (2004), Amsterdam (2005), 
Monaco (2007), Leiden and Barcelona (2008), Brighton and Stockholm (2009), 
Leiden and Vienna (2010), Milan, Venice and Jersey (2011), Nottingham and 
Brussels (2012), Trier and Paris (2013), Leiden and Istanbul (2014) as well as 
Trier, Nottingham and Berlin (2015). A number of smaller events, including 
University seminars and colloquia, are also co-hosted by the Academic Forum 
with institutions across Europe.
At Paris, Professor Christoph Paulus (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany) 
was elected Chair of the Academic Forum for a three-year term. Anthon Verweij 
(Leiden University, the Netherlands) serves as Secretary to the Board, while 
Florian Bruder (Max Planck Institute, Germany), Jessica Schmidt (University of 
Bayreuth, Germany), Jennifer Gant (Chair of the Young Academics’ Network 
in Insolvency Law), Emmanuelle Inacio and Myriam Mailly (INSOL Europe 
Technical Officers), Rolef de Weijs (Amsterdam University, the Netherlands) 
and Michael Veder (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands) are 
ordinary members of the Board. Professor Rebecca Parry (Nottingham Trent 
University, the United Kingdom) is the Editor of the Conference Proceedings 
series and ex	officio a member of the board. A Supervisory Committee has also 
been established as a consultative board for Academic Forum projects whose 
membership includes senior insolvency academics and practitioners.
With sponsorship made available by Edwin Coe LLP over a seven-year 
period from 2007-2014 and Shakespeare Martineau from 2015 onwards, the 
Academic Forum has been able to offer young scholars travel grants to attend 
its conferences. The sponsorship has also permitted for an annual lecture to be 
given by a scholar of international repute. These have included Professor Jay 
Westbrook (University of Texas, the United States), Gabriel Moss QC (3/4 South 
Square, Gray’s Inn, the United Kingdom), The Hon Mr Justice Ian Kawaley 
(Supreme Court of Bermuda), Professor Karsten Schmidt (President of the 
Academic Forum
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Bucerius Law School, Germany), Professor Bob Wessels (Leiden Law School, 
the Netherlands), Professor Ian Fletcher QC (University College London, United 
Kingdom), Professor Rosalind Mason (Queensland University of Technology, 
Australia) and Professor Axel Flessner (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany).
These lectures and many of the presentations at the Academic Forum conferences 
have been collected in the conference proceedings booklets that have been 
regularly published since the publications series arising from conferences was 
inaugurated in 2009 by reports from the 2008 Leiden and Barcelona events. 
The intention is that conference proceedings booklets will be published from 
all of the conferences listed above and will accompany other publications in the 
Technical Series produced by INSOL Europe and the Judicial Wing. Overall, the 
publications are intended to form a comprehensive report of the conferences and 
contain accounts of recent research in the insolvency field useful for academics, 
judges, policy-makers and practitioners alike.
The Academic Forum’s next meeting is scheduled to take place in conjunction 
with the INSOL Europe conference in Portugal on 21-22 September 2016, with 
further conferences being planned for 2017 and beyond. Details of academic 
conferences will be posted at the Academic Forum website at: www.insol-
europe.org/academic/ as and when available. An on-line registration facility 
for academic conferences as well as further information about the work of the 
Academic Forum can also be obtained via the website as well as a dedicated 
Facebook page.
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3Chapter 1
Bank Insolvency: How can Ring-Fencing 
ensure the Continuity of Banking Services in 
an Insolvent Banking Group?
Andrew Campbell and Paula Moffatt
Introduction*
In November 2014, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of 
the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) stated that:
“Globally systemic banks that fail will, in future, be resolved without 
recourse to the taxpayer and without jeopardising financial stability.”1
His assessment was based on the fact that, since 2007 when the financial crisis 
began, much work had been done by banks to improve their stability. First, 
these so called G-SIBs (global, systemically important banks) had been largely 
recapitalised so were less likely to fail; second, their balance sheets were now 
more transparent so that contingent liabilities were more clearly accounted for; 
and third, the introduction of bail-in (whereby shareholders and specified classes 
of subordinated creditors would absorb losses in the event that a bank was failing) 
would mean that there would be no need to seek financial help from governments.
Perhaps surprisingly, there was no mention of ring-fencing banks in this speech, so 
where does ring-fencing fit in to the new financial world order? Despite Governor 
Carney’s lack of reference to this aspect of the regulatory regime, the necessary 
legislation is in place and the Bank of England has been building a model for ring-
fencing banks for some years. In January 2016, the Bank of England published 
what it describes as “the last element of its bank ring-fencing framework”, which 
is a consultation document entitled “The Financial Policy Committee’s Framework 
for the Systemic Risk Buffer”.2 The proposed date for implementation of 
1 M. Carney, “The Future of Financial Reform” (17 November 2014), available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications (last viewed 17 June 2015).
2 Bank of England (2016, London), available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/
news/2016/026.aspx (last viewed 6 February 2016).
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ring-fencing is the beginning of 2019 and the Bank of England appears to be well 
on track to meet this deadline. Not everyone, however, agrees that ring-fencing is 
the best way forward and there has been significant opposition from many in the 
banking industry and their criticisms will be considered.
This paper will seek to define ring-fencing and explore it from the UK perspective, 
since the UK has taken the decision to adopt a ring-fencing regime for banks that 
will be implemented, as already noted, by January 2019. The development of ring-
fencing in the UK through the Report of the Independent Commission on Banking, 
chaired by Sir John Vickers, and generally referred to as the Vickers Report 
(“Vickers”) 3 and its translation into the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013 (“FSBRA”) will be considered. The adoption (or not) of ring-fencing beyond 
the UK will be examined briefly and its relationship with bank resolution explored.
Defining Ring-Fencing
Schwarcz has defined ring-fencing as:
“legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate 
and reduce risk.”4
What does this mean in the context of banks? A consideration of the term requires 
the concept of the universal bank to be re-visited. A universal bank is one which 
undertakes a full range of banking activities.5 It incorporates retail banking (being 
banking that involves individuals and small businesses and the taking of deposits), 
as well as commercial banking, investment banking and wholesale banking. These 
latter forms of banking activity are necessary for universal banks in order to raise 
loans that cannot be obtained purely from deposits. Universal banks are, inevitably, 
linked to the shadow-banking world through their dealings with securities, 
securitisations and derivative products. Shadow banking has been defined by 
the FSB as:
“credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or 
partial) outside the regular banking system.”6
3 Report of the Independent Commission on Banking (Final Report, September 2011), available at: http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk (last viewed 25 June 2015). Note that only the ring-fencing aspects are 
considered here.
4 S. Schwarcz, “Ring Fencing” (2014) 87 Southern California Law Review 69, at 72.
5 Some universal banks offer services which go beyond what would be considered normal banking activities.
6 “Transforming Shadow Banking”, available at: www.fsb.org (last viewed 5 February 2016).
5The connection between shadow banking entities and investment banks through 
a multiplicity of contractual obligations can pose significant risks for investment 
banks in the event that these entities are not “good for the money”. Shadow banks 
have not, traditionally, had to retain capital in the way that banks are required 
to, so investment banks dealing with shadow banks are exposed to the risk of 
their insolvency.7
In this instance, ring-fencing is then, the legal separation of the retail banking arm of a 
universal bank from that bank’s higher risk investment banking activities. Schwarcz 
describes ring-fencing as a regulatory tool that can be used to minimise systemic 
risk. In this context, the separation of high risk functions from low risk functions (by 
re-allocating risk to specified arms of the bank) should reduce systemic risk.8
The idea of ring-fencing is not new and there is some history associated with it; 
in the US, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prevented deposit-taking banks from 
undertaking trading activities. Some, including Senator Elizabeth Warren, have 
argued that this separation under Glass-Steagall was responsible for the prolonged 
period of financial stability in the US that lasted until it was repealed by the Clinton 
administration in 1999.9 While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine 
this argument in detail it is undoubtedly the case that it does provide considerable 
ammunition for supporters of ring-fencing. However, we would argue that many 
other factors were involved in this prolonged period of financial stability.
The discussion could lead to the perception that all investment banking activities are 
“bad” but this is not, in fact, the case. There are a number of important investment 
banking activities that are carried out that will be of use to retail bank customers, 
such as foreign exchange and interest rate swaps. This begs the question as to what 
activities should be separated if ring-fencing is to be pursued.
The UK Perspective
The UK work on ring-fencing banks began shortly after the financial crisis and 
culminated in the publication of the final Vickers Report in September 2011. 
7 Ibid.
8 There is much scope for discussion about the effect of ring-fencing on systemic risk but it is beyond the scope of 
this article to consider this in detail.
9 E. Warren. See: http://elizabethwarren.com/blog/glass-steagall and sec 2 of ‘Findings and Purpose’ of the 21st 
Century Glass Steagall Act of 2013 (her Senate Bill) reintroduced on 7 July 2015 and available at: http://www.
warren.senate.gov/files/documents/21stCenturyGlassSteagall.pdf. See also: http://www.doddfrankupdate.com/
DFU/ArticlesDFU/Senators-reintroduce-bill-with-GlassSteagall-prote-64276.aspx and J. Authers, “Markets 
make best case for Glass-Steagall” (14 July 2013), at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14e08822-eb04-11e2-9fcc-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3gLjC8WaM (all last viewed 18 July 2015).
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Vickers and his committee members proposed the introduction of a form of ring-
fencing for certain banks in the UK and the UK banks affected by the proposal 
agreed to accept this, albeit with a degree of reluctance. Vickers identified the 
following purposes of a ring-fence: first, to isolate essential retail banking activities 
and insulate them from shocks within the financial system so that essential services 
could be maintained in a crisis; and second, to curtail reliance on government 
guarantees and enable banks to be resolved without having to use taxpayers’ funds.
Vickers considered how to establish the ring-fence; that is, what activities should 
it cover (the location of the fence) and how far should it extend (the height of the 
fence)? There has since been considerable discussion as to how its implementation 
can be enforced (the so-called electrification of the fence). He identified some 
principles which are outlined below.
The Location of the Fence
Principle 1 stated that only ring-fenced banks should be granted permission by the 
UK regulator to provide “mandated” services. These were defined as taking retail 
deposits and providing overdrafts and payment services. Under principle 2, ring-
fenced banks should not be allowed to undertake activities, to the extent that they 
were, broadly, ‘high risk’ or might make it difficult to resolve the bank in a crisis 
situation. Principle 3 established that ring-fenced banks should only participate in 
non-prohibited activities.
These three principles have been largely adopted under FSBRA 2013 and its 
supporting secondary legislation. FSBRA introduces the concepts of “core 
activities” and “core services”. The only core activity under FSBRA is deposit-
taking, while core services are those that are linked to the deposit-taking activity 
and are essentially deposit, overdraft and payment services. There is an exemption 
for small deposit-takers.
Under FSBRA, a ring-fenced body cannot deal in investments as principal, but 
could undertake some derivatives activity. There is, therefore, a nuanced approach 
in recognition of the fact that some investment banking activities will be necessary 
for retail clients.
How Effective are these Provisions likely to be?
It is unclear how effective these provisions are likely to be. It will depend on how 
rigorous the scrutiny of the UK bank regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(“PRA”) will be. The PRA is a subsidiary of the Bank of England and has replaced the 
7Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) which was perceived to have failed to monitor 
the banks sufficiently in the period leading up to the financial crisis. It is difficult to 
know whether the PRA is likely to be any better than the FSA at this stage.
It is possible for HM Treasury to relax the rules relating to prohibited activities 
in relation to specific banks. It seems unlikely that there will be any relaxation of 
the ring-fencing rules in the short term, but it is a possibility. As memories of the 
crisis fade, could there be a rise in the number of relaxations which could lead to a 
re-exposure of retail banks to risky investment bank activities?
The Height of the Fence
Principle 4 stated that ring-fenced banks should be separate legal entities within 
their corporate groups and their subsidiaries limited to ring-fenced activities. 
Universal banking therefore remains a possibility, but the ring-fenced bank 
functions would be legally and operationally separated so that the ring-fenced 
bank could continue to provide core functions in a crisis situation. This model is 
therefore distinguishable from the Glass-Steagall model.
Principle 5 addressed the question of economic separation; a ring-fenced bank 
should have to meet its regulatory requirements on a standalone basis. In addition, 
any relationships between the ring-fenced bank and other entities within the group 
would have to be managed on an arm’s length basis.
In effect the UK has opted for a “sibling” structure within a banking group for 
implementing ring-fencing. A non-ring-fenced UK holding company can cluster 
its subsidiaries into two chains; one is a ring-fenced group of companies and the 
other is a non-ring-fenced group of companies. As a ring-fenced body can only 
undertake ring-fenced activities, all its subsidiaries must also be ring-fenced bodies 
so that there is no crossing-over of risk from the non-ring-fenced part of the group 
into this ring-fenced part of the group. This also requires that a ring-fenced body 
must have direct access to the payment system without going through a non-ring-
fenced body.
A partial geographical ring-fence is also established under the new regime, as a 
ring-fenced body cannot have a branch or participating interest in an undertaking 
carrying on a regulated activity outside the European Economic Area.
Electrifying the Fence
The PRA is in the process of drafting rules to help to ensure that the board of 
directors of a ring-fenced body remains truly independent of the board of its UK 
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holding company. This immediately raises matters of conflict and tension. Will the 
board of the ring-fenced body be able to resist pressure from the board of its parent 
if it is asked to relax its approach to ring-fencing? Why would a parent company 
want to own a company that it cannot control? 10 The latter question is more easily 
resolved since the ultimate holding company can simply decide to sell the ring-
fenced part of the business if it becomes too difficult to manage.
The PRA rules also envisage establishing and recruiting individuals to specified 
Senior Manager positions for the purpose of ensuring that the ring-fence is 
maintained. Directors and Senior Managers cannot work across the ring-fence; 
they can only work within the ring-fenced part of the bank and so could not have a 
separate directorship of a non-ring-fenced entity within the bank. There are some 
concerns that the pool of people available for these roles will be small.
Managing the Capital
Generally, banks are evaluated on a consolidated basis. Ring-fencing presumes, 
however, that the ring-fenced bodies will be separately capitalised. The PRA is in 
the process of developing the prudential requirements for ring-fenced bodies on the 
basis of the sibling structure, which would allow capital and liquidity requirements 
to be “sub-consolidated”. This would allow the ring-fenced part to be distinguished 
from the non-ring-fenced part.
The View of the Banks
The UK banks have committed to implementing ring-fencing within the time frame 
set out by the legislature.11 For those banks with a global reach, such as HSBC, the 
costs are much greater than for those banks with a more local UK presence, such 
as Lloyds. For HSBC, the costs are viewed as wasted costs as the capital used to 
implement ring-fencing could be better used elsewhere, for example, in its work 
on changing the culture. Perhaps surprisingly the Chief Executive of Lloyds Bank, 
Antonio Horta-Osorio, argues that the principle behind ring-fencing is right and he 
does not view the proposed ring-fencing rules as overly burdensome.12 This view is 
not shared by Barclays Bank former Chairman, Sir David Walker, who is quoted 
as saying it is “actively harmful to the UK”.13
10 Questions discussed by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee on 30 June 2015. See video recording 
of session available at: Parliamentlivetv http://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/2019e0ca-4235-4853-8c17-
af30b00f3ee3?in=15:36:33 (last viewed 29 July 2015).
11 Ibid.
12 Financial Times (20 June 2015).
13 Ibid.
9Regardless of whether or not the introduction of ring-fencing is supported there is 
no doubt that the financial costs will be extremely large, both for implementation 
and on an annual basis thereafter. Some estimates have been as high as GBP 
5 billion to implement, although HM Treasury’s estimates are lower at GBP 3 
billion to implement and thereafter up to GBP 4 billion a year.14 For Vickers, the 
presumption is that whatever the costs are, they are likely to be less than the costs 
that would be imposed on the taxpayer in the event of another banking crisis.
Beyond the UK
While considerable work on ring-fencing has been undertaken by the EU with the 
publication of the Liikanen Report in 2012 and the preparation of draft legislation, 
little seems to be happening at present. The Liikanen Report had much in common 
with Vickers and would have led to ring-fencing throughout the EU. However, 
work on this across the EU has stalled.15 But within the EU, both France and 
Germany have instigated a form of ring-fencing which means that, in effect, the 
three largest banking markets have gone ahead with ring-fencing in any event 
without waiting for the EU.
In response to the financial crisis, the US introduced the “Volcker Rule” under 
which deposit-taking institutions are prohibited from proprietary trading.16 
Interestingly, however, Australia has actively decided not to introduce ring-
fencing. Following the Australian Government’s Financial System Inquiry Report 
of November 2014, it was concluded that it would be sufficient for the Australian 
banks to work towards international best practice with regard to the capitalisation 
and regulation of banks.17
Ring-Fencing and Bank Resolution
The UK and EU regulators have claimed that ring-fencing will assist in the 
resolution of failing banks. Will this be achieved? In theory, ring-fencing may 
14 Ibid.
15 The Proposal was rejected by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 26 May 2015 ECON_PV 
(2015) 0527_1, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu (last viewed 6 September 2015). On 19 June 2015, 
the European Council agreed its position but is waiting for the EU Parliament to respond. See Press Release 
474/15 available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/19-restructuring-risky-
banks-council-agrees-negotiating-stances (last viewed 5 August 2015).
16 Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (US).
17 See the Australian Government (The Treasury) Financial Systems Inquiry “Themes of Report” at “Resilience”, 
available at: http://fsi.gov.au/publications/final-report/overview/themes-of-this-report (last viewed 5 August 
2015) and also the Response of the Australian Government to the Financial Systems Inquiry (20 October 2015), 
available at: http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/Govt-response-to-the-FSI 
(last viewed 20 October 2015).
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help with the resolution of banks. First, it is hard to see how a fully capitalised 
ring-fenced entity would fall to be the subject of a resolution procedure. Second, 
the legal and operational separation of ring-fenced bodies within a banking group 
must be of help when creating Recovery and Resolution Plans (“RRPs”) under the 
Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive and Single Resolution Mechanism.18 
In the event that an RRP required implementation, much of the work of separating 
core activities would already be in place.
Other Issues
Maintaining core functions across borders requires a great deal of international 
co-operation. Despite the best laid plans, it may be the case that, in a future crisis, 
regulators will come under pressure from governments to hang on to the capital 
in their own jurisdictions to benefit local bank customers (being the people who 
would vote them into or out of office) and not allow it to be transferred into another 
jurisdiction to help to serve the interests of depositors there. This has been a problem 
in the past with the authorities in the US in particular refusing to adopt a universalist 
approach to a bank insolvency where there are assets situated in the US.
It is also recognised that simply moving risk from one place to another does not 
necessarily eliminate or even reduce it. And if banks are not allowed to undertake 
universal functions, how will a purely deposit-taking business ever generate 
sufficient capital from interest either to grow or to sustain itself? Is it the case that 
there are some non-core functions that are necessary to generate growth to enable 
credit intermediation in that sector to continue? The Vickers Report presupposes 
that all the risks lie in the investment banking sector. Is this in fact the case?
Concluding Thoughts
It is not entirely clear that ring-fencing is necessary as there are other possible ways 
of providing protection as the Australians have demonstrated. Also, ring-fencing 
has not been identified by the FSB as something which is necessary and a number 
of jurisdictions have actively decided not to take it up. On the other hand there is 
undoubted support from many quarters for various approaches which represent 
some form of ring-fencing and this may create a level of uncertainty about the 
regulation and supervision of banks globally. Instead of a unified approach to 
international best practice we are witnessing considerable divergence which is 
arguably a backward step.
18 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive [2014] OJ 2 173/190; Single Resolution Mechanism [2014] OJ 2 225/1.
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As has been seen the proposed UK approach is likely to go some way towards 
achieving the Vickers objectives and is likely to facilitate the bank resolution 
process. Nonetheless, ring-fencing is going to be expensive to implement in 
practice, as has already been seen in the UK where those banks which have to 
ring-fence have had to draw up detailed proposals as to how they will achieve 
this. Those bankers who are critical of ring-fencing point to the expense and the 
duplication of activities it will cause.
The UK government was enthusiastic in its support of the Vickers proposals 
and the Bank of England appears also to provide its backing. The latest Bank of 
England consultation demonstrates that we are still on course for the introduction 
of ring-fencing for the UK’s largest banks on 1 January 2019. The jury is out over 
whether ring-fencing is the best way forward and it is far from clear whether there 
will eventually be an EU proposal for ring-fencing. In the UK, however, it is going 
to happen in any event.
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Chapter 2
The Changing Role of the Judiciary in 
Insolvency: The Case of Bank Resolution
Matthias Haentjens
Introduction1
“Judge-made law has played its part. To statute-law belongs the 
future. Let us pray for well-drawn statutes.”
Augustine Birrell (1850-1933), who was Chief Secretary for Ireland, but also the 
author of humorous essays, an academic and a lawyer, reportedly said so. It was 
Eduard Maurits Meijers, the main draftsman of the current Dutch Civil Code, who 
attributed the saying to him, and he cited it on several occasions.2 One can easily 
see why Meijers was so fond of this saying, for he interpreted it as meaning that 
civil law should be based on a well-drawn civil code, instead of being based on 
case law.
In this contribution, I will show that in insolvencies, more specifically in bank 
insolvencies, judge-made law has indeed played its part. Current bank insolvency 
law must be found in administrative law statutes, and the role of the bankruptcy 
judge is taken over by government authorities who act on the basis of those 
administrative law statutes. Thus, if any court is involved, it is the administrative 
court. But this administrative court can play but a minimal role, which entails 
dramatic consequences for legal protection of any relevant stakeholder.3
1 Parts of this contribution have been based on lectures held at the yearly IEEI colloquium on 12 June 2015 (Lisbon) 
and at the EBA proportionality workshop on 3 July 2015 (London). I am grateful to the audiences of both lectures 
for their comments.
2 At least in the following three lectures: lecture of 30 June 1922, lecture of 8 May 1948 and lecture of 16 May 
1951, printed in Verzamelde	privaatrechtelijke	opstellen	van	prof.	mr.	E.M.	Meijers,	Eerste	deel, Leiden (1954), 
at 24, 158 and 189 (continued at 193), respectively.
3 Indeed, the new regime represents a dramatic shift for those countries where bank insolvencies were previously 
governed by civil law. These countries include, as will be discussed, the Netherlands, but also France, Germany 
and the UK. Other countries, including the US, Japan and Switzerland, already had an administrative bank 
insolvency regime, and for those countries, the new regime is less revolutionary in this respect. See C. Hendren, 
“Judicial and Administrative Approaches to Bank Resolution: Prospects for International Harmonization” 
(Huntsman Program, Wharton Papers 2011), available at: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-73.pdf 
(last viewed 16 December 2015).
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The development just referred to is very recent, for it was in reaction to the last 
global financial crisis that many jurisdictions have drastically overhauled their 
rules governing bank insolvencies. In short, previous bank insolvency regimes 
mainly consisted of, either direct or indirect application of general insolvency 
law, and have been replaced with an administrative resolution regime. In this 
administrative regime, wide-ranging powers have been conferred to government 
authorities to resolve banks in financial distress.
Also general corporate distress law is undergoing a process of overhaul in many 
countries so as to enhance the possibility of rescue of viable businesses and 
to streamline the liquidation of unviable ones. The changes in both fields just 
discussed share a remarkable common characteristic: the minimization of the 
role of the judiciary – traditionally omnipresent in insolvency. On the one hand, 
corporate insolvencies are ever more subjected to prearranged restructurings, out 
of court workouts and (partial) out of court liquidations. On the other hand, crisis 
management in the banking sector has been taken away from the insolvency judge 
and laid in the hands of government agencies. In this contribution, I will focus on 
the role of the judiciary in the new European bank resolution regime, which has 
dramatically changed as of 1 January 2016.
Background4
In the financial and economic crisis that ensued since 2008, a large number of 
banks and, more generally, of financial institutions, suffered from grave financial 
difficulties. The relevant governments most often believed a bankruptcy of the 
larger ones of those institutions would have caused serious consequences for the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, and they therefore chose to prop these 
institutions up with taxpayer money, sometimes by means of nationalization. These 
institutions were, in other words, perceived to be too-big-to-fail. Between 2008 
and 2012 in Europe alone, the European Commission approved EUR 591.9 billion 
(equivalent to 4.6% of the GDP of the EU) of state aid for financial institutions.5 
Thus, bankruptcy law as it then existed was perceived to be inadequate to cope 
with the insolvency of financial institutions.
More specifically, traditional bankruptcy law proved to be antiquated and inadequate 
when having to deal with financial institution insolvencies in two respects. First, 
4 This paragraph has been based, in part, on M. Haentjens, “Bank Recovery and Resolution: An Overview of 
International Initiatives” (2015) 24 International Insolvency Law Review 255-270.
5 See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html (last viewed 28 
April 2014).
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traditional bankruptcy law has always been directed at the maximization of a 
debtor’s liquidation value so as to satisfy his creditors’ claims. In the instance of 
financial institutions that are deemed to be systemically important, this approach 
may result in severe disruptions of the stability of the global financial system – and 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers proved to be a case in point. Moreover, the 
application of traditional bankruptcy law to banks may cause social unrest even 
if payment services become unavailable to consumers only locally – of which the 
Dutch DSB Bank bankruptcy proved to be an example.
Consequently, various international organizations have called for the modernization 
of bankruptcy law, so as to tailor it to the needs of systemically important financial 
institutions and banks in general. The authoritative Financial Stability Board 
(“FSB”) has argued that these new bank insolvency rules should be directed at the 
preservation of crucial functions, at the preservation of financial stability, at the 
minimization of (the need for utilization of) tax payer money and at the protection 
of, in short, retail clients.6
Second, the 2008 global financial crisis has shown that where internationally 
operating banking groups may have been international in life, they proved to be 
national in death.7 In other words, they were usually resolved along national lines, 
which did not always yield the most optimal result. A tragic example may be 
found in the demerger and nationalisation of the Belgian/Dutch conglomerate 
Fortis after its acquisition of ABN AMRO. The bank was eventually split up along 
national lines, which was partly the result of different assessments of the bank’s 
predicament by the relevant Dutch and Belgian authorities.8
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (“BCBS”) has therefore argued 
that a harmonized regime would help to address such cross-border inefficiencies by 
creating compatible national bank insolvency frameworks. In the BCBS’s analysis, 
international compatibility would facilitate the continuity of key functions across 
borders and thus the maintenance of financial stability.9 I believe the BCBS was 
right where it stated that while coordination between the national processes remains 
6 See FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2011); Recitals (1) and (27), 
Article 26(2), BRRD.
7 Saying attributed to both Bank of England Governor Mervyn King and economist Charles Goodhart. See R. 
Epstein and M. Rhodes, “International in Life, National in Death? Banking Nationalism on the Road to Banking 
Union” (KFG Working Paper Series No. 61, December 2014).
8 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements, Report and Recommendations of 
the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group (2010), at 11 (“BCBS Report”).
9 Ibid., at 5.
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a necessary condition to achieve this result, such coordination may be helped by 
a harmonized regime.10
A vicious bond between sovereign and bank industry finances emerged as a 
specifically European consequence of the global financial crisis. In Greece, for 
instance, the banking sector had taken on large amounts of local government 
bonds so that when it became evident that government finances were deplorable 
and government bonds were downgraded to junk status, the government took the 
banking sector with it in its financial downfall. Conversely, in Spain and Ireland, 
banks broke the government. Spanish and Irish banks had taken on large real estate 
portfolios and were therefore most vulnerable to any serious downturn of the real 
estate market. When that happened, their governments had to bail them out at 
enormous costs.11 To break this doom-loop between European sovereigns and 
banks and, even more ambitiously, prevent a future crisis, several initiatives have 
been taken under the title “Banking Union”. This Banking Union was aimed, in 
part, to achieve a truly modernized and harmonized bank insolvency regime. It was 
originally intended to consist of three legs or pillars.
First, a Single Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”) has been put in place, under 
which the European Central Bank (“ECB”) acts as the single prudential supervisor 
responsible (directly or indirectly) for all 6,000 banks in the Eurozone. The ECB 
has become directly responsible for, in short, systemically important and cross-
border operating banks, whilst it supervises indirectly, i.e. through the local 
supervisory authorities, all other banks. The ECB thus supervises, for instance, 
Dutch banks ABN AMRO, BNG, Rabobank, ING Bank, NWB, RBS N.V. en SNS 
Bank, while all other Dutch banks continue to be supervised by the Dutch Central 
Bank (De	Nederlandsche	Bank, “DNB”).12 Certain supervisory powers, such as 
the granting of a banking licence, have been conferred on the ECB irrespective of 
the bank’s size and operations. The basis of this SSM is a Regulation that has been 
enacted on 1 November 2013. The ECB has performed its operational tasks since 
4 November 2014.
Yet, as Yves Mersch, member of the ECB executive board, has explained, this 
single supervisor cannot give objective verdicts on the viability of banks if they 
cannot be resolved in an orderly way without the risk of contagion.13 In other 
10 Ibid., at 25 and Recommendation 3.
11 See, e.g., M. Lewis, Boomerang:	The	Biggest	Bust	(2011, Penguin,	London), at 83 et seq.
12 Cf. https://www.nvb.nl/contentpagina-s/3434/bankenunie-single-supervisory-mechanism-ssm.html (last viewed 
11 December 2015).
13 Y. Mersch, “Europe’s Ills Cannot Be Healed Only by Monetary Innovation” (Financial Times, 25 April 2013).
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words, a modernized and harmonized bank insolvency regime is a necessary 
condition for the common supervisor to function properly and to be able to show 
its teeth. Such a modernized and harmonized bank insolvency regime therefore 
forms the Banking Union’s second leg. This leg is based on the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (“BRRD”), which applies to all EU Member States, and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (“SRM Regulation”), which is a 
uniform mechanism that applies to the Eurozone only. The SRM Regulation uses 
the same division of powers as the SSM, so that the Single Resolution Board 
(“SRB”) manages the resolution of so-called significant banks and banks with 
cross-border operations, while national resolution authorities (in the Netherlands: 
DNB) manage the resolution of non-significant or purely domestic banks. The 
BRRD has been adopted on 15 May 2014 and should have applied as of 1 January 
2015.14 The SRM Regulation had been adopted on 19 December 2014 and applies 
as of 1 January 2016.
Finally, any bank insolvency needs funding. Initially, the Commission proposed 
to create a common European deposit guarantee scheme (“DGS”) as the third leg 
of the Banking Union, so as to provide funding and protect EU’s depositors in 
the newly created bank insolvency framework. But this plan has proven – at the 
moment at least – too ambitious politically.15
Next to these three “legs” stands the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), 
which is based on a Treaty concluded between the Member States of the Eurozone, 
but which does not form part of the constitutional framework of the EU. The ESM 
is intended to support Member States that experience financial difficulties and it 
provides for a fund with a EUR 500 billion lending capacity.16
Previous Regime (NL)
As just explained, the 2008 global financial crisis led various jurisdictions to enact 
modernized bank insolvency regimes. While such a regime has been proposed and 
enacted in the EU in the form of the Banking Union’s second leg, it has also been 
accomplished in the US. Both regimes have in common that they aim to facilitate 
14 In the Netherlands, however, its implementation legislation has been enacted only on 26 November 2015, while 
the Commission had already initiated an infringement proceeding.
15 Some economists, however, have argued that one should start with the introduction of the common fund – and 
then work backwards, via a common insolvency regime to a single supervisor. See, e.g., D. Schoenmaker, 
“Banking Union: Where We’re Going Wrong” in T. Beck (ed.), Banking	Union	for	Europe,	Risks	and	Challenges 
(2012, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London), at 95 et seq.
16 See: http://www.esm.europa.eu/press/releases/esm-reaches-target-level-of-80-billion-in-paid-in-capital1.htm (last 
viewed 11 December 2015).
The	Changing	Role	of	the	Judiciary	in	Insolvency:	The	Case	of	Bank	Resolution
18 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
expeditious measures to resolve a failing bank, and these measures are taken in an 
administrative process rather than in a judicial one.17 
In this paragraph, I will illustrate some of the changes the new bank insolvency 
regime has brought for judicial protection by taking the laws of the Netherlands as 
an example. I will compare the Netherlands bank insolvency regime as it existed 
prior to the implementation of the BRRD and the SRM with the current situation. 
For this exercise, I will use three points of comparison, viz. three different 
instruments that can be used when a bank experiences severe financial difficulties:
1) bankruptcy or liquidation;
2) reorganization in the form of an asset or share transfer to another entity; and
3) bail-out, i.e. government support through nationalization.
First, under the Netherlands law (as under virtually any other legal system), 
bankruptcy has been the traditional means of resolving a failing bank and, more 
generally, of any insolvent company. As stated above, bankruptcy is an instrument 
directed at the maximization of the failing company’s liquidation value with an 
aim to satisfy creditors’ claims, and it involves the sale of the insolvent’s assets 
and distribution of the proceeds amongst creditors. Bankruptcy law has been 
codified in the Dutch bankruptcy code in 1893. As an iconic historic example of 
the application of bankruptcy law to a failing Dutch bank, the Teixeira de Mattos 
bank was declared bankrupt in 1966, with Messrs H.M. Burghardt and R. Korthals 
Altes having been appointed as liquidators (curatoren). As a more recent (but 
no less iconic) example, the Dirk Scheringa Bank was declared bankrupt on 16 
October 2009.
Critical elements of the instrument of bankruptcy are, first, that the state 
of bankruptcy follows from a court decision (art. 1(1) Bankruptcy Code 
(Faillissementswet, “Fw”)). For this court decision the debtor may have been 
heard ex ante (Article 6 Fw). All stakeholders, i.e. any creditor, other interested 
party (belanghebbende) and the debtor itself may challenge the court decision ex 
post (Articles 10 and 8 Fw, respectively). Since the enactment of the so-called 
Intervention Act in 2012, however, creditors, nor other interested parties are 
allowed to challenge the bankruptcy declaration of a bank, while the debtor may 
17 For the EU, see, e.g., BRRD Impact Assessment, at 8 et seq. and for the US, see, e.g., R. Bliss and G. Kaufman, 
“U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation” (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 2006-01), at 28-30.
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challenge the court decision ex post only if no transfer plan has been approved 
(Articles 114hi Fw, see on such transfer plan immediately below).
Nonetheless, the entire bankruptcy proceedings take place under court supervision. 
This means a dedicated magistrate or supervisory judge (rechter-commissaris) 
needs to approve all material issues (Article 64 Fw), and chairs creditors meetings 
(Article 80 Fw). Virtually all decisions taken by this judge are open to appeal 
with the bankruptcy court (Article 67 Fw), and ultimately with the Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad) (Article 426(1) Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek	van	Burgerlijke	
Rechtsvordering)). Any interested party has standing to initiate such appeal 
proceedings.
Since 1970-1971, “emergency proceedings” (noodregeling) have been introduced 
as a stand-still regime specifically for failing banks. Also this regime follows from 
a (bankruptcy) court declaration (Article 3:162d(1) Financial Markets Supervision 
Act (Wet	 op	 het	 financieel	 toezicht, “Wft”)). As in the case of a bankruptcy 
declaration, the emergency proceedings declaration includes the appointment 
of a supervisory judge (rechter-commissaris). Importantly, the court empowers 
administrators (bewindvoerders) to either reorganize, or liquidate the failing 
bank (Article 3:163 Wft) under supervision of the supervisory judge. In practice, 
however, emergency proceedings are virtually always followed by bankruptcy, as 
was the case, for instance, with DSB Bank.
Since the enactment of the Intervention Act in 2012, a (bankruptcy) court may 
also declare a failing bank or insurance company subject to a so-called “transfer 
regime” (Article 3:159v Wft). This means the shares or assets of a failing bank or 
insurance company are transferred to another entity by means of the same court’s 
declaration. As for the bankruptcy declaration just discussed, the court may decide 
to hear ex ante the debtor, i.e. the failing bank itself, but also any shareholder 
holding more than 5% of the outstanding capital (Articles 3:159x and 3:159w Wft, 
respectively). Ex post, other shareholders may challenge the decision before the 
relevant court, which is the Amsterdam District Court.
Third, the Intervention Act has codified the Minister of Finance’s power to 
nationalize a failing bank or insurance company, i.e. his power to expropriate all 
shareholders and creditors of the bank or insurance company (Article 6:2 Wft). 
The Dutch Minister of Finance has used this power for the first – and until now: 
last – time within a year after enactment of the Intervention Act when he decided 
to nationalize SNS REAAL N.V. on 1 February 2013. This decision is not open 
to any ex ante hearing.
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In a nationalization scenario, court involvement is limited to two types of ex post 
proceedings. First, the legality of the expropriation decision itself may be challenged 
with the judicial wing of the Council of State (Afdeling	Bestuursrechtspraak	van	
de Raad van State) (Article 6:7(5) Wft). Any interested party (belanghebbende) 
has standing to challenge the decision, but must do so within 10 days (Article 
6:7(1) Wft). Additionally, separate proceedings must be initiated to have the 
court determined the damages that the Minister has to award to compensate the 
expropriated shareholders and creditors. These proceedings must be brought before 
the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals (Ondernemingskamer) 
(Article 6:10(1) Wft), are open to any expropriated party (rechthebbende) and are 
not time barred as the proceedings before the Council of State.
New Regime (EU)
Now let us take a look at what has happened to these three instruments of bank 
insolvency (i.e. bankruptcy, transfer regime and nationalization) under the new 
European bank insolvency regime, which now applies throughout the EU and 
the Eurozone – including the Netherlands – on the basis of the BRRD and the 
SRM Regulation.
Formally, the new European regime has not affected bankruptcy as an instrument 
of bank resolution. Moreover, as a matter of principle, the BRRD states that
“a failing institution should in principle be liquidated under normal 
insolvency proceedings” (Recital 45),18
while “normal insolvency proceedings” are meant to include, most notably, 
bankruptcy.19 On the other hand, BRRD provides that bank bankruptcy proceedings 
can only be initiated by the relevant resolution authority (Article 86(1) BRRD20). 
Moreover, they may not be opened parallel to resolution measures that have been 
introduced by the new EU regime (Article 86(2) BRRD).
Additionally and perhaps even more importantly, bankruptcy proceedings may 
only be opened if such proceedings would not result in a threat to critical functions, 
18 Cf. also Recital 46, BRRD: “The winding up of a failing institution through normal insolvency proceedings should 
always be considered before resolution tools are applied.” and the almost identical Recital 59, SRM Reg.
19 More precisely, Article 2(47), BRRD, which provides: “‘normal insolvency proceedings’ means collective 
insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator 
or an administrator normally applicable to institutions under national law and either specific to those institutions 
or generally applicable to any natural or legal person”.
20 Implemented in Article 212ha, Fw. Before implementation, this article provided that bankruptcy could – beside 
the Dutch Central Bank as the relevant resolution authority – be requested by the failing institution itself. This 
possibility has now been removed.
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have adverse effects on financial stability, cause reliance on extraordinary public 
financial support or endanger the position of depositors and investors, client funds 
and client assets (cf. Recital 45 BRRD/58 SRM Reg.21). This is important, for 
– as I have argued elsewhere22 – it would only be in very rare cases that these 
requirements would be met in ‘normal insolvency proceedings’, considering that 
the purpose of normal insolvency proceedings such as bankruptcy is liquidation so 
as to maximize creditor value.
It may therefore be safely assumed that as a matter of principle, the BRRD and 
SRM Regulation require the application of its new bank resolution regime, and 
that only in exceptional circumstances a traditional bankruptcy can be declared. 
As I see it, such circumstances could only be either in the instance of the failure 
of a very local bank or a bank with a small client and investor base (when 
bankruptcy can safely be applied instead of the new bank resolution regime), or so 
as to complement the exercise of the new resolution regime.23 In all other cases, 
resolution of a failing bank is managed by the relevant resolution authority, which 
means, in short, DNB for non-significant or purely national banks, and the SRB 
for significant and cross-border banks. The role of traditional bankruptcy and the 
bankruptcy court has therefore been marginalized.
The new EU bank insolvency rules have significantly amended the previously 
existing transfer instrument. Other than under the previous regime, it is not upon 
a court decision that the transfer regime is declared and transfers are effectuated. 
Under the new EU bank insolvency rules, it is the relevant resolution authority, 
i.e. DNB or the SRB, that has become empowered to effectuate a transfer of any 
assets and shares of a failing bank. Such a transfer can form part of either the “sale 
of business tool”, the “bridge institution tool” or the “asset separation tool”.24
In short, under the “sale of business tool”, resolution authorities may effectuate 
the sale of the shares and any other assets (including liabilities) of the failing 
bank to a private purchaser, i.e. any purchaser willing to buy those assets. Under 
the “bridge institution tool”, the authorities may transfer shares and assets to a 
21 Cf. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC 
and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (‘BRRD Proposal Text’), n. 11: “If authorities assess that financial stability and 
taxpayers are not threatened, a bank (or parts of it) may be allowed to fail in the ordinary way.”
22 M. Haentjens, “National Insolvency Law in International Bank Insolvencies” in B. Santen and D. van Offeren (eds.), 
Perspectives	on	International	Insolvency	Law:	A	Tribute	to	Bob	Wessels (2014, Kluwer,	Deventer), at 69 et seq.
23 Normal insolvency law could apply, for instance, to specific parts of the bank when certain bank resolution tools 
have been used. See, more extensively, Haentjens, above note 22, at paragraph 3.1.
24 Articles 37 et seq. BRRD; Article 22 et seq., SRM Reg.
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bridge institution, which is a government-controlled entity, if no private party can 
be found willing to purchase these assets. Under the “asset separation tool”, the 
resolution authorities may transfer non-performing assets, rights or liabilities to an 
asset management vehicle in a so-called “bad bank construction”. Thus, the loss 
generating operations are insulated from the failing bank so that this institution 
may survive.25
All of the resolution tools just discussed are employed by the relevant resolution 
authorities, and none requires the consent from the owners of the assets transferred, 
i.e. from shareholders or management of the failing bank. Also, and other than 
under the previous regime, the resolution authority’s decision to effectuate a 
transfer is not open to a judicial hearing ex ante for any party.26 Ex post, on the 
other hand, the decision to employ any of the tools may be challenged. But such a 
challenge must be under administrative law rather than under civil law, as was the 
case in the previous regime. Moreover, the administrative proceedings are far from 
straightforward. They must be initiated either under national administrative law 
or under European administrative law, and it is not always immediately apparent, 
which of those two would be the appropriate route.
The appropriate route to challenge ex post the application of a resolution tool 
depends on the resolution authority employing the tool, and therefore on the 
category of bank subjected to the tool. In case of significantly important and cross-
border operating banks, the tools are to be employed by the SRB by means of the 
adoption of a resolution scheme, while for other banks, the national resolution 
authority is empowered to take resolution measures directly (Articles 18(6)(b) 
SRM Regulation, and 63 and 82 BRRD, respectively).
If the national resolution authority has employed a resolution tool, appeal must be 
lodged under national administrative law (Article 85(2) BRRD). Under common 
Dutch administrative law, such national administrative proceedings would mean, 
first, administrative appeal with DNB. Appeal against the ensuing DNB decision 
must be lodged with the Rotterdam District Court, while appeal in second (and 
last) instance can be initiated with the Administrative High Court for Trade and 
Industry (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven). As a derogation from this 
25 Article 36(4)(ii), BRRD. Under Article 36(4)(i) and (iii), BRRD, the asset separation tool may also be used to 
prevent market disturbance that might result from the liquidation of the assets transferred, or to maximise the 
liquidation proceeds of those assets.
26 Pursuant to Article 86(1), BRRD, the decision to employ any of these tools may be challenged ex ante in court 
provided the relevant Member State has opted in to that possibility. Pursuant to Recital (92), BRRD, such a 
challenge should be adjudicated within 24h of the resolution authority decision. The Netherlands has not opted 
in. In as far as the SRM Regulation applies (i.e. in case of significantly important and cross-border banks) there 
is not even an option.
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regime, an appeal against DNB’s decision to employ a resolution tool resulting in 
a forced share or asset transfer can only be directly lodged with the Administrative 
High Court for Trade and Industry, and the appeal is time-barred after 10 days 
(Articles 8:1 General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) and 
3a:64(1) Wft). Ultimately, preliminary questions could be posed to the CJEU so 
as to obtain a decision on the application of EU law.
For the first category of cases, i.e. for cases where resolution tools are to be 
employed through the adoption of an SRB resolution scheme, appeal against the 
(adoption of the) scheme itself can probably not be lodged with the SRB Appeal 
Panel, but may be admissible directly at the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU.27 A 
resolution scheme contains instructions to the national resolution authority to carry 
out certain (resolution) measures regarding the failing bank. Where and under 
what law should the bank in question challenge the subsequent measures taken 
by the national authority, i.e. DNB? The answer would probably depend on the 
margin of discretion the scheme’s instruction has left for DNB. If the scheme’s 
instruction to DNB does not leave much margin of discretion for DNB, appeal 
against it must probably be lodged with the CJEU directly.28 If, conversely, the 
scheme’s instruction to DNB would leave DNB a substantial margin of discretion, 
DNB would probably be the appropriate forum to challenge it.29 In all, the 
complexity of this structure in itself may already severely impede an affected 
party’s judicial protection. 
The nationalization instrument as it existed before 1 January 2016 is probably not 
affected by the new EU regime. Not only does the BRRD itself allow national 
governments to temporarily nationalize a failing bank (Article 58 BRRD), but 
the Dutch Government has also considered that the Minister of Finance’s power 
to nationalize a failing bank would not be contrary to (the purpose of) the SRM 
Regulation.30 Consequently, also the existing ex post court proceedings with the 
Council of State and the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals 
have remained possible.
27 See Recital 120, SRM Reg. Article 18 is not included in the list of articles under which administrative appeal 
with the SRB Appeal Board is admissible (Article 85(3), SRM Reg.). Also, such a scheme would be addressed 
to the national resolution authority (rather than to the failing bank in question). See S. Nuyten, “Legal protection 
against actions under the Single Resolution Mechanism – or the lack of it” (NautaDutilh paper 2015), at 18-19 
and 21, available at: http://www.nautadutilh.com/ (last viewed 15 December 2015).
28 T. Arons, “Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the European Banking Union” in D. Busch and 
G. Ferrarino (eds), European	Banking	Union (2015, OUP, Oxford), at 459-460.
29 Parliamentary Proceedings, Tweede	Kamer,	2014–2015, 34 208, nr. 3, at 31-33. See also Nuyten, above note 27, 
at 20 et seq.; Arons, above note 28, at 433 et seq.
30 Parliamentary Proceedings, Tweede	Kamer,	2014–2015, 34 208, nr. 3, at 50-51.
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In sum, the role of the bankruptcy court has been marginalized, while administrative 
appeal proceedings are terribly complex and judicial protection may, already for 
that reason alone, be hampered.
Arguments for and against the Paradigm Shift
As stated above and illustrated with the example of the Netherlands law, the 
modernized bank insolvency regimes enacted around the globe as a consequence 
of the global financial crisis have resulted in bankruptcy courts having had to cede 
their place to government authorities and administrative law courts.31 This shift – 
which I consider nothing less than dramatic – is a reflection of the minimisation of 
the role of private creditors and commercial law in favour of a preeminent role for 
government authorities and administrative law. Various arguments have been put 
forward to substantiate this change.
First, it has been argued that where banks perform functions that are critical to the 
functioning of society at large (such as payment functions), government authorities 
should manage their resolution, because government authorities serve the public 
interest. Bankruptcy courts, on the other hand, traditionally are focused on private 
creditors who would serve only their own interests.32
Second, banks in the form as we know them today borrow short from the public to 
lend long. This means that bank debt (such as deposits) is commonly immediately 
payable, whereas bank claims (such as bank loans) may not be payable for 
decades. Moreover, depositors have no preference amongst each other and their 
claims on the bank rank pari passu. In addition, banks lend almost everything they 
borrow, which phenomenon is called “fractional banking”. Consequently, there is 
an inherent risk that all the bank’s customers reclaim their deposits at once, which 
claims the bank must, but cannot honour because of its fractional banking model. 
It is therefore rational for depositors to try to out-run fellow-depositors so as to 
withdraw their money from the bank when they believe it may be insolvent. In 
such instance, a bank-run ensues, which can take place within hours as modern 
technologies allow customers to electronically withdraw their deposits in the blink 
of an eye. This means that when it becomes public that a bank is suffering from 
financial difficulties, time is of the essence.
31 But see above note 3.
32 Cf., e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Study on the Resolution of Financial Companies 
under the Bankruptcy Code (July 2011), at 7, and all the references there given.
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It has been argued that the lengthy negotiations between private creditors that 
commonly take place in a traditional bankruptcy scenario are ill suited to the 
severely constricted time frame of a bank insolvency. Consequently, the argument 
goes, bank resolution should be managed by government authorities that need not 
cater for negotiations with private creditors, and are therefore in a better position 
to act expeditiously.33
Third, it has been argued that modern banking has become an increasingly complex 
business and that modern banks, especially the systemically important ones, are 
very complex structures. Courts would not have the ability or the capacity to handle 
such complex structures and businesses, so that their resolution should be left to 
specialized agencies, viz. government authorities with a specific banking expertise.
Finally, as stated in the beginning, the global financial crisis has stressed the 
importance of harmonized insolvency regimes so that cross-border operating 
banks may be effectively resolved in multiple jurisdictions. Traditional bankruptcy 
law, it is argued, is ill suited for such harmonization, for bankruptcy law often is an 
expression of fundamental choices of public policy.34 Therefore, bank resolution 
should be taken away from bankruptcy courts and traditional bankruptcy law, and 
laid in the hands of government authorities under administrative law, which would 
be more susceptible to amendment so as to achieve international harmonization.35
Against all of these arguments, both individually and collectively, counter 
arguments could be formulated. It has been argued, first, that bank resolution 
managed by government authorities would become influenced by undue political 
considerations, which are largely absent where bankruptcy courts oversee a 
resolution process that is driven by private parties.36 This argument is evidenced 
by several recent examples of bank resolutions across Europe that have proven to 
be highly politically charged, as was the case with the resolutions of Banca Etruria 
(Italy), Alpe Adria Bank (Austria), and Banco Espírito Santo (Portugal), which all 
happened in 2015.37
33 Idem.
34 E.g., P. Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (2011 reprint of 2008 University Edition, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London), at 536.
35 Hendren, above note 3.
36 P. Wallison, “The Meaning of the Lehman Bankruptcy”, paper given to the American Bankruptcy Institute (5 
November 2009, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), as quoted by T. Jackson, “Chapter 
11F: A Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to Resolve (Restructure, Sell or Liquidate) Financial Institutions”, 
available at: http://www.southbaylawfirm.com/blog/upload/bankingbailoutschapter11f.pdf (last viewed 16 
December 2015), at note 8.
37 See, e.g., “Renzi faces political backlash over Italian banks’ rescued” (Financial Times, 10 December 2015); 
“Austrian court rejects Hypo bondholders case” (Financial Times, 29 July 2015); “‘Sócrates effect’ looms large 
in Portugal poll; Corruption claims: General election” (Financial Times, 29 September 2015) respectively.
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Second, private creditors, unlike government authorities, have a personal stake 
in the remaining value of a failing bank as well as in its ability to (continue to) 
generate profits. Consequently, they are incentivized to monitor ex ante the bank’s 
risk taking activities, and work ex post towards a swift and optimal reorganization 
of the same bank.
Also, it has been argued that as bankruptcy judges have the greatest expertise 
as regards an efficient and fair organization of insolvency proceedings, they 
should be responsible for the same, also where it concerns banks and (other) 
financial institutions.
Finally, the argument has been made that unlike the new bank insolvency regime 
under administrative law, traditional bankruptcy law has been applied for decades, 
if not centuries. Consequently, bankruptcy law would provide legal certainty based 
on a large body of established jurisprudence especially with respect to creditor 
priorities, which certainty is absent for administrative resolution measures.38
Example: Judicial Protection re: Resolvability
In this paragraph, I will investigate by way of an elaborate example what room 
has been left for the courts to deliver justice in individual cases, i.e. to provide 
judicial protection. The example I have chosen concerns an invasive power that 
the new EU bank insolvency regime has conferred upon resolution authorities, and 
against the application of which the relevant EU instruments themselves require 
that judicial protection be provided.
Under both the BRRD and the SRM Regulation, the relevant national resolution 
authority and the SRB, respectively, have been granted wide-ranging powers to 
“remove impediments” to a bank’s “resolvability” (Articles 10 BRRD and 17 SMR 
Regulation). A bank is deemed “resolvable” if it is reasonably feasible to liquidate 
or restructure the bank under normal insolvency proceedings (such as bankruptcy) 
or administrative resolution (Articles 15(1) BRRD and 10(3) SMR Regulation). On 
an on-going basis,39 the resolution authorities must assess whether the banks under 
its remit are indeed “resolvable”. If a bank is deemed not resolvable, the relevant 
resolution authority will require the bank in question to propose measures to 
address the impediments to resolvability. If the measures proposed are inadequate 
in the resolution authority’s opinion, it will take a decision:
38 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Study on the Resolution of Financial Companies under the 
Bankruptcy Code (July 2011), at 6.
39 More accurately, any time the relevant resolution authority drafts or updates a so-called resolution plan (Articles 
10(3), BRRD and 10(1), SMR Reg.).
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(a) establishing that the bank in question is deemed not “resolvable”; and
(b) either (in the case of the SRB) instructing the relevant national resolution 
authority, or (in the case of a national resolution authority) directly requiring 
the bank to remove the impediments to resolvability (Articles 10(10) SRM 
Regulation, and 15(1) and 17(1) and (4) BRRD, respectively).
More specifically, the authorities thus have the power to require a bank to 
divest specific assets, to require the institution to limit or cease specific existing 
or proposed activities, and to require changes to legal or operational structures 
of the institution or any group entity, so that critical functions may be legally 
and operationally separated from other functions through the application of 
the resolution tools (Articles 17(5) BRRD and 10(11) SRM Reg.). This list is 
certainly not exhaustive. A resolution authority’s decision to deem a bank not 
resolvable and to require it remove impediments to its resolvability may therefore 
have significant consequences for the bank in question. Consequently, the BRRD 
and SRM Regulation require that the decision just referred to be open to appeal 
(Articles 17(6)(c) BRRD and 85(3) SRM Regulation).
Let us assume the SRB has taken a resolvability decision as just discussed 
regarding a systemically important Dutch bank, and instructed DNB to require 
the institution in question to take certain measures, amongst which to divest 
certain assets. Especially if these measures are invasive enough, they are likely 
to be challenged by the institution. The SRB resolvability decision itself is to be 
challenged with the SRB Appeal Panel first, and ultimately with the CJEU. The 
national resolution authority’s request to implement the measures may probably 
be challenged with the relevant national administrative court, viz. the Rotterdam 
District Court, and ultimately with the CJEU. But, as discussed earlier in the context 
of judicial protection against a forced share or asset transfer, this route would only 
be appropriate if the SRB’s instruction to DNB leaves DNB a substantial margin of 
discretion. In other cases, DNB’s request may also have to be challenged with the 
SRB Appeal Panel. In any event, it may be prudent litigation strategy for the bank 
to initiate both proceedings in parallel, and it may be reiterated that the complexity 
of the structure severely impedes the institution’s judicial protection.
As the challenge to the SRB’s resolvability decision, but also to the national 
resolution authority’s implementation request may ultimately be decided by the 
CJEU, is seems logical to consider how the CJEU would have to decide on such 
a challenge. Before turning to the elements the CJEU must consider when having 
to decide on a challenge of a resolvability decision, it must be noted that the new 
European bank resolution regime sets out several general restrictions to any judicial 
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appeal. First, an appeal against any decision of the resolution authorities does not 
(automatically) suspend the effects of the challenged decision, and the decision 
is immediately enforceable (Article 85(4) and recital 90 BRRD and Article 85(6) 
SRM Regulation). On the other hand, summary proceedings may be initiated to 
achieve temporary suspension ex post (Recital 92 BRRD).
Second, Member States must have explicitly opted-in to the possibility of ex ante 
judicial control of a national resolution authority decision. When opted-in, such 
an ex ante challenge should be adjudicated within 24h of the resolution authority 
decision (Article 85(1) BRRD and recital (92) BRRD). As indicated above, the 
Netherlands has not opted-in. Moreover, in as far as the SRM Regulation applies, 
i.e. in case of significantly important and cross-border banks, there is not even an 
option, so that judicial control is always limited to ex post redress.
Third, when reviewing crisis management measures taken by resolution authorities, 
national courts must use:
“the complex economic assessments made by national resolution 
authorities”
as a basis. On the other hand:
“the complex nature of those assessments should not prevent 
national courts from examining whether the evidence relied on by 
the resolution authority is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, 
whether that evidence contains all relevant information which 
should be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation 
and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn 
therefrom.” (Recital (89) BRRD).
Back to our example. Let us assume the SRB’s resolvability decision has been 
challenged on the basis of the claim that the “proportionality principle” has been 
violated. This ground is often invoked as it represents a “key stone of EU law”,40 and 
its violation can be classified as an infringement of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Consequently, the European Banking Authority systematically investigates 
whether the instruments it issues conform to the principle.41
40 Arons, above note 28, at 467.
41 See, e.g., EBA Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability, EBA/GL/2014/11 
(19 December 2014), at 6 and 10, and EBA’s Proportionality Workshops, latest edition held on 3 July 2015, see: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/ (last viewed 16 December 2015).
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For a proportionality challenge to succeed, the court must be convinced the 
challenged authority’s decision does not meet a “suitability and necessity” test, 
and that it has not been proportionate stricto sensu to the desired goal.42 More 
specifically and applied to the case at hand, the court must deem the SRB’s 
resolvability decision and the requested measure not suitable and necessary to 
remove the apparent resolvability impediments, and thus not to fit the purpose(s) 
of the BRRD and the SRM Regulation. Also, it will assess whether the relevant 
resolution authority has taken into account all relevant elements. Finally, it will 
determine how much discretion the relevant resolution authority had to take the 
resolvability decision and select the requested measure, and whether its decision 
has been adequately reasoned.
As regards the “suitability and necessity” test, the court will consider, from the 
outset, that the purposes of the BRRD and SRM Regulation are the avoidance of 
the use of public funds and the safeguarding of bank critical functions, and thus 
the avoidance of a destabilization of financial markets (Recitals 1 and 5 BRRD). I 
think these purposes are so broadly drafted that most authority decisions will pass 
this test.
More specifically, the court may consider whether the requested measure would be:
“able to reduce or remove the relevant impediment in a timely 
manner” (suitability)
and whether the measure would be required for:
“the feasible or credible implementation of a resolution strategy (…) 
and (…) there are no less intrusive measures which are able to achieve 
the same objective to the same extent” (necessity).43
These specific assessments require complex economic investigations, which 
must have been carried out by the resolution authority in question per the EBA 
Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability. 
Consequently, the court will have to use them:
“as a basis (…) when reviewing the crisis management measures 
concerned” (Recital 89 BRRD)
and will, more generally, refrain from making its own assessment.
42 Cf. Arons, above note 28 at 467.
43 EBA Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability, EBA/GL/2014/11 (19 
December 2014), at 10.
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When having to establish whether the SRB has taken all relevant elements into 
account so as to decide whether the requested measure had been proportionate 
stricto sensu to the desired goal, viz. the removal of impediments to resolvability, 
the court will probably consider the following elements. First, it will consider 
whether the relevant resolution authority, i.e. the SRB, has adequately taken into 
account the threat to financial stability of the impediments to resolvability in 
question and the effect of the required measures on the business of the institution, 
its stability and its ability to contribute to the economy, on the internal market for 
financial services and on the financial stability in other Member States and the 
Union as a whole (cf. Articles 10(10) SRM Regulation and 17(4) and (7) BRRD).
Second, when considering the relevant resolution authority’s assessment of the 
resolvability of the institution in question,44 the court may refer to 28 criteria, which 
the BRRD requires the national resolution authority to examine (“as a minimum”!) 
to base its resolvability decision on (Article 15(2) and Annex, Section C BRRD).45 
These criteria include, amongst others, the extent to which the resolution of the 
institution could have a significant direct or indirect adverse effect on the financial 
system, market confidence or the economy, and the extent to which the resolution 
of the institution could have a significant effect on the operation of payment and 
settlement systems (Annex, Section C, nos. 26 and 27 BRRD).
Again, as all these elements just discussed are complex and economic in nature, 
the court will have to use them:
“as a basis (…) when reviewing the crisis management measures 
concerned” (Recital 89 BRRD)
and will, more generally, refrain from making its own assessment.
Finally, the court will have to determine how much discretion the relevant 
resolution authority had to take its resolvability decision and to select the requested 
measure, and whether its decision has been adequately reasoned. The resolution 
authorities’ discretion in this regard has been limited by the specific EBA 
Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability and 
the Regulatory Technical Standards (“RTS”) on the Content of Resolution Plans 
and the Assessment of Resolvability.46 Consequently, the court will assess closely 
44 See also EBA Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability, EBA/GL/2014/11 
(19 December 2014), at 7.
45 See also Recital 14, BRRD.
46 Contra: EBA Guidelines on Measures to Reduce or Remove Impediments to Resolvability, at 3.
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whether these guidelines and RTS have been complied with. Also, it will closely 
assess the adequateness of the reasoning of the resolvability decision.
In conclusion, national resolution authorities and the SRB have been granted wide-
ranging powers to remove impediments to a bank’s resolvability, and the BRRD 
and SRM Regulation have justly opened the resolution authority’s resolvability 
decisions to appeal. However, such an appeal is severely restricted. First, the 
complexity of the procedural structure impedes the affected bank’s judicial 
protection. Second, judicial redress is limited to appeals ex	post.	Third, when 
considering a case in which the CJEU is requested to review an SRB resolvability 
decision on the ground of proportionality, it has been seen that virtually any 
resolution authority’s decision will pass the broad suitability and proportionality 
test. On the other hand, the court will be confronted with complex economic 
assessments, which the court will not redo itself. The court will probably only 
assess closely whether the relevant guidelines and RTS have been complied with, 
and whether the resolvability decision has been adequately reasoned.
Final Remarks and Conclusion
The above analysis begs the more normative question what the (remaining) 
involvement of the court in bank insolvencies should be. To this question, different 
answers are possible, and it has indeed been answered differently. The CJEU, for 
instance, has held that:
“The review by the European Union judicature (…) is necessarily 
limited and confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure and 
on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the 
facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any 
manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers.”47
The Dutch Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held, when considering the 
damages the State should award in the context of the SNS REAAL nationalization:
“the court (…) independently determines the amount of damages, and 
can ground that decision on all facts and circumstances proven in the 
proceedings as well as on testimony it has ordered to be given [rather 
47 Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 2 March 2012, in cases T-29/10 and T-33/10 
(ECLI:EU:T:2012:98), nr. 103.
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than merely assess the Government’s proposal for damages].”48 
(my translation)
Certainly, the difference in the approach both courts have taken may be attributed 
to their different nature; in the cases cited, the CJEU administered administrative 
EU law, while the Dutch court administered tort law/civil law. However, this 
is not an answer to the question what the (remaining) involvement of the court 
should be. To the contrary, it shows the variety of possible answers and stresses 
the importance of formulating one.
In conclusion, I think I have shown that in bank insolvencies, judge-made law has 
played its part and that bank insolvency law is now administered by government 
agencies. These agencies act on the basis of administrative law statutes and the 
role of the administrative court has been marginalized. This may be the result of a 
recent preference for public welfare over individual justice in bank insolvencies. I 
therefore concur with Meijers when he approvingly quoted Birrell as having said:
“Judge-made law has played its part. To statute-law belongs the 
future. Let us pray for well-drawn statutes.”
But where Meijers added:
“let us pray also for judges (…) clever men with an independent spirit 
and who can stand the weight of honours”,
our prayers must be trained on the government agencies administering bank 
insolvency law. Let us pray for their fair and equitable judgment.
48 Hoge Raad 20 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:661 (Minister of Finance vs. VEB et al.), nr. 4.8.2. In the original: 
“(…) dat de ondernemingskamer – ongeacht of verweer is gevoerd en binnen de grenzen van art. 6:8 en 6:9 
Wft – de hoogte van de schadeloosstelling zelfstandig vaststelt, en dat zij zich daarbij kan baseren op alle in de 
procedure gebleken feiten en omstandigheden of op een door haar zelf bevolen deskundigenbericht.”
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Chapter 3
Directors’ Duties to Consider Creditor 
Interests: A Solution in Search of a Problem?
Anil Hargovan
1. Introduction
The genesis of the fiduciary duty of directors to consider creditor interests is 
credited to the oft-quoted dictum of Mason J in Walker	v	Wimborne made over a 
quarter of a century ago in Australia.1 The jurisprudence however, on the nature 
of the directors’ duties to creditors, has remained largely undeveloped since the 
expression of the imprecise dicta. Unsurprisingly, much ink has been spilt on the 
topic of directors fiduciary duties to creditors in the Commonwealth countries2 
and North America3 – including a spirited debate amongst commentators on the 
doctrinal question of whether such a duty is independent and enforceable by 
1 (1976) 137 CLR 1, at 6-7: “...it should be emphasised that the directors of a company in discharging their duty to 
the company must take account of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to 
take into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them.” 
Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2012) 89 ACSR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [2034] 
per Drummond JA: “This obligation cannot now be described as a “so-called duty” ... the principle [concerning 
directors fiduciary duties to creditors] ... is now firmly entrenched in company law jurisprudence in Australia.”
2 For instance in the UK, see Winkworth	v	Edward	Baron	Development	Co	Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512; West Mercia 
Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250; Facia Footwear v Hinchcliffe [1998] 1 BCLC 218; MDA Investment 
Management Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 217; Ultraframe	(UK)	Ltd	v	Fielding	[2005] EWHC 1638. See Hellard & Anor 
(liquidation	of	HLC	Environmental	Project	Ltd)	v	Carvolho [2013] EWHC 2876 for collection of UK authorities. 
For New Zealand authorities, see Nicholson	v	Permakraft	(NZ)	Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 242; Hilton International Ltd 
v Hilton [1989] 1 NZLR 442. For Australian authorities, see above note 1 and below note 4.
3 For example, in Canada, see Peoples	Department	Stores	Inc	(Trustee	of)	v	Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461; in Delaware 
(USA), see N.Am.Catholic	Educ.	Programming	Fund	Inc.	v	Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007); Quadrant 
Structured Products Company Ltd v Vertin 115 A.3d535 (2015); in California (USA), see Berg & Berg 
Enterprises,	LLC	v	Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020 (2009).
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creditors4 and, if so, whether it is dead or alive in Australia.5 The directors’ duty to 
consider creditor interests during corporate financial distress is a misnomer to the 
extent it suggests an independent duty owed directly to creditors. To the extent that 
there is uniformity in this area of law,6 courts in North America,7 UK8 and Australia9 
are unanimous in the view that individual creditors of an insolvent company have 
no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors.
The broad formulation of the directors’ duty to consider creditors interests during 
insolvency faces many unresolved issues resulting in a legal “conundrum”10 which 
has plagued this are of law in Australia for over three decades. The duty arises 
when the company enters into that “ill-defined sphere”11 known as the zone or 
vicinity of insolvency, which, as recognised by US Appellate Courts, is:
“even less objectively determinable than actual solvency.”12
When a company is in financial distress, and directors’ duties to consider creditors 
intrude, it creates a “challenging framework”13 within which decisions must be 
made to comport with the overarching duty to act in the company best interests. 
4 For judicial authorities supporting the proposition that the obligation of the insolvent company not to prejudice 
creditors is an imperfect obligation incapable of enforcement directly by creditors, see Re New World Alliance 
Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 531; Spies v R (2000) 201 CLR 603; [2000] HCA 43; International Swimwear Logistics 
Ltd v Australian Swimwear Company Pty Ltd [2011] NSW 488. For supporting academic commentary, see R. 
Austin and I. Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (15th ed) (2013, LexisNexis, Sydney), at [8.100]. 
Cf section 588G, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which, unlike the general law, permits creditors to recover their 
debts in certain circumstances from the directors for insolvent trading.
5 See the scholarly debate between J. McConvill, “Directors’ Duties towards Creditors in Australia after Spies 
v The Queen” (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 4; in reply A. Hargovan, “Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors in Australia after Spies v The Queen – Is the Development of an Independent Fiduciary Duty Dead or 
Alive?” (2003) 21 Company and Securities Law Journal 390; J. McConvill, “Geneva Finance and the “Duty” 
of Directors to Creditors: Imperfect Obligation and other Imperfections” (2003) 11 Insolvency Law Journal 7; 
in reply A. Hargovan, “Geneva Finance and the “Duty” of Directors to Creditors: Imperfect Obligation and 
Critique” (2004) 12 Insolvency Law Journal 134. The weight of judicial authority firmly rejects the existence of 
an independent duty to consider creditors interests. See above note 4 and below notes 7 and 8.
6 Cf Harlequin	Property	 (SVG)	Ltd	&	Ors	 v	O’	Halloran	&	Anor [2013] IEHC 362 which reflects judicial 
uncertainty on this issue in Ireland.
7 For example, see N.Am.Catholic	Educ.	Programming	Fund	Inc.	v	Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007); 
Peoples	Department	Stores	Inc	(Trustee	of)	v	Wise [2004] 3 SCR 461.
8 Kuwait	Asia	Bank	EC	v	National	Mutual	Life	Nominees	Ltd [1991] AC 187; Yukong	Lines	Ltd	of	Korea	v	
Rendsburg Investments Corp [1998] 4 All ER 82; West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250. For 
collection of judicial authorities, see Jetivia	SA	&	Anor	v	Bilta	(UK)	Ltd	&	Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 968.
9 See above note 4.
10 See R. Baxt, “Just to Whom do Directors Owe their Duties? Will This Conundrum Ever be Satisfactorily 
Resolved?” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 455; “The Conundrum Thrown Up by the Bell Group 
Decision in the Western Australian Court of Appeal: To Whom Do Directors Owe their Duties?” (2012) 30 
Company and Securities Law Journal 534.
11 Berg	&	Berg	Enterprises,	LLC	v	Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1020 (2009), at 1037.
12 Ibid., at 1041.
13 C. Mallon and S. Waisman (eds), The	Law	and	Practice	of	Restructuring	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	United	States 
(2011, Oxford University Press, New York NY), at 27.
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The reason for the challenge is that judicial authorities in the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions to date, until the recent Appellate Court decision in the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia in Westpac	Banking	Corporation	v	Bell	Group	Ltd	
(in	liq)	(No	3)	2012, have not gone much beyond simply articulating a need to 
consider creditor interests when the company is insolvent to nearly insolvent14- 
save for confirmation by the High Court in Spies v R that directors do not owe 
an independent duty to creditors capable of enforcement by the creditors in their 
own right.15 It is through the mechanism of liquidation that the creditors’ interests 
are protected.
This valuable development aside, the law on this significant issue is remarkably 
short of specific judicial guidance as to how directors should discharge their duties, 
without harming the interests of creditors, when engaged in commercial risk-
taking with a view to corporate rescue. It is for such reasons that a commentator 
has labelled the doctrine a “mess”,16 noting that:
“it is extraordinarily difficult to slice the world into categories of 
solvency, insolvency, and the vicinity of insolvency.”17
Notwithstanding such practical difficulties,18 courts in the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions have, for better or worse, adopted this wide formulation which, indeed, 
has led to the current doctrinal mess in Australian company law arising from the 
decision in Westpac	Banking	Corporation	v	Bell	Group	Ltd	(in	liq)	(No	3)	2012 
which appears to have elevated the directors duty from one of consideration to 
one of protection of creditors interests during a failed attempt at corporate rescue.
The conventional wisdom based on the seminal judicial authorities,19 prior to the 
appellate decision in Bell, is that the duty requires directors of insolvent or nearly 
insolvent companies to have regard to the interests of the company creditors – the 
duty is not pitched any higher, for example, to ensure that directors acted to the 
14 See judicial authorities above notes 2 and 4.
15 (2000) 201 CLR 603. For a similar position in the UK, see Yukong	Lines	Ltd	of	Korea	v	Rendsburg	Investments	
Corp [1998] 4 All ER 82.
16 J. Lipson in R. de Barondes et	al., “Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled 
Companies – History & Background” (2007) 1 Journal of Business & Technology Law 229, at 238.
17 Ibid., at 239.
18 Peoples	Department	Store	Inc.	(Trustee	of)	v	Wise	[2004] 3 SCR 461 at 505-506: “The directors’ fiduciary duty 
does not change when a corporation is in the nebulous “vicinity of insolvency”. That phrase has not been defined; 
moreover, it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning. What it is obviously intended to convey is a 
deterioration in the corporation’s financial stability.”; Berg	&	Berg	Enterprises,	LLC	v	Boyle, 178 Cal. App. 4th 
1020 (2009) at 1041: “[there are] practical problems with creating such a duty, among them a director’s ability 
to objectively and concretely determine when a state of insolvency actually exists such that his or her duties to 
creditors have been triggered.”
19 See authorities cited above notes 2 and 4.
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best advantage of creditors,20 nor is it impermissible for a director to advance the 
interests of a particular creditor so long as he or she believes in good faith that this 
action will be in the interests of creditors as a class.21
In light of this, there is a key proposition espoused in the majority judgment in 
Bell that forms the central focus of this chapter. The proposition is that directors 
have an elevated duty at general law to ensure that creditor interests are properly 
protected during commercial decisions taken prior to insolvency to ensure a pari 
passu outcome,22 as opposed to having their interests merely considered as one 
of a number of stakeholder groups.23 Absent self-dealing and/or shirking, the 
juridical basis of such a wide interpretation of the law by the majority in Bell is 
highly questionable.
This chapter considers the context of the Bell decision and comments on the legal 
and policy basis of this key proposition underpinning the majority judgment. It 
will be submitted that the majority view is arguably out of touch with commercial 
realities and will cause numerous practical problems for companies attempting to 
restructure their affairs during times of financial distress.
The discussion in Part 2 of this chapter centers on the theoretical and legal 
framework concerning the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company 
before proceeding to discuss the facts and result in the Bell case. The chapter 
thereafter, in Part 3, examines the litigation history in Bell and discusses the 
directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the company during the context of 
insolvency. Part 4 of the chapter critiques the novel application of directors’ duties 
to creditors by Drummond AJA in the Appellate judgment in Bell. The chapter 
concludes in Part 5 by offering reasons as to why a future High Court should reject 
any move towards a direct duty by directors to consider the interests of individual 
classes of creditors.
The potentially adverse consequences such a duty is likely to have on corporate 
rescue efforts involving distressed companies is a key reason. A more fundamental 
objection, however, rests on the superfluous need for such a duty. Existing statutory 
provisions under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)24 in Australia adequately 
20 See Re Welfab Engineers Ltd [1990] BCC 60.
21 GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61.
22 (2012) 89 ACSR 1, 335; [2012] WASCA 157, [2031] (Drummond AJA).
23 Walker	v	Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1; Kinsela	v	Russell	Kinsela	Pty	Ltd	(in	liq) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722; Spies v 
R (2000) 201 CLR 603.
24 See Parts 2D (directors duties), 5.7B (voidable transactions and the duty to prevent insolvent trading) and 2H.5 
(prohibits payment of dividends that would materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its creditors).
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covers the potential mischief directors may cause to harm creditor interests. It is 
submitted that gaps in the regulatory protection of creditor interests, particularly 
for involuntary tort creditors, can instead be addressed by the legislature. Before 
commenting on these issues, it is essential to briefly examine the nature and 
rational for directors fiduciary duties to the company, including creditors.
2. Nature and Rationale of Fiduciary Duties to Creditors
Directors’ fiduciary duties, underpinned by biblical principles,25 include the duties 
to act in good faith in the best interests of the company, to act for proper corporate 
purposes and to avoid conflicts of interest. At general law, when a company 
is solvent, directors owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders as well as to the 
company. There is an expectation that creditors’ interests, during solvency, will 
protect their interests by contractual means.
From an economic perspective, shareholders in a solvent company are viewed as 
the residual claimants of the company’s assets and as the residual risk bearers. 
In the event of corporate insolvency, however, the dynamics may change. 
Shareholder value can become greatly diminished and, more often than not, can 
become worthless. In such circumstances, shareholders are no longer viewed as the 
residual claimants. The following rationale for the imposition of fiduciary duties 
on the directors of a financially distressed company is offered by Street CJ in 
Kinsela	v	Russell	Kinsela	Pty	Ltd	(in	liq):26
“In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders 
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when 
questions of the duty of directors arise ... But where a company is 
insolvent the interests of creditors intrude. They become prospectively 
entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power 
of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company’s assets. It 
is in a practical sense their assets and the not the shareholder’s assets 
that, through the medium of the company, are under the management 
of the directors pending either liquidation, return to solvency, or the 
imposition of some alternative administration.”
25 For the genealogy of fiduciary duties, see M. Steel, “The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware’s Modern Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties” (2012) 26 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public Policy 3.
26 (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 at 730, affirmed by the High Court in Spies v R (2000) 201 CLR 603; [2000] HCA 43. For 
collection of UK judicial authorities adopting this view, see Madoff Securities International Ltd v Raven [2013] 
EWHC 3147.
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The fact of insolvency, as noted by the judiciary:
“places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the 
shareholders – that of residual risk-bearers.”27
Legal theory states that the alteration of incentives upon corporate distress requires 
legal principles to restrain self-dealing. When directors and shareholders no longer 
have any equity in the company, it is said that they have little or nothing to lose and 
all to gain by increasing their appetite for risk. During this time, directors may feel 
compelled to gamble and roll the dice preferring highly risky strategies that may 
be no longer aligned with the company’s interests.
There is thus a moral hazard problem where the directors are accountable to 
shareholders but the shareholders may encourage the directors to take increasingly 
risky bets with the company’s assets to the detriment of creditors. Accordingly, the 
rationale for the doctrine of directors’ duties to creditors is underpinned by the ‘at-
risk theory”, alternatively known as the “slot machine hypothetical”, is explained 
below with reference to the following scenario:28
“... where the stockholders are clearly out of the money and the 
creditors maybe are going to get seventy-five cents on the dollar as 
the company goes into bankruptcy or winds down. If you only have 
the interests of the stockholders in mind, zero is no different from 
zero is no different from zero in any circumstance. So why not take 
the remaining assets of the company, throw then into a slot machine 
and see if you hit the jackpot?”
The interests of shareholders and creditors can be “starkly divergent”29 under such 
circumstances, thus the fiduciary relationship is modified or expanded to include 
directors duties to the company’s creditors at a time when the company is insolvent 
or near insolvency. The law addresses this problem by a range of statutory measures 
such as insolvent trading30 and voidable transactions.31 The duty to consider creditor 
interests also has a role to play, but is not the only regulatory tool, as evidenced by 
27 Prod.	Res.	Grp.,	LLC	v	NCT	Grp.,	Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-791 (Del. Ch. 2004).
28 R. Silberglied in de Barondes et	al., above note 16, at 233.
29 Prod.	Res.	Grp.,	LLC	v	NCT	Grp.,	Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del. Ch. 2004).
30 Part 5.7B Divisions 3 and 4, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
31 Ibid, Part 5.7B Division 2.
39
the mixed judicial reaction to this broad formulation of directors fiduciary duties to 
creditors in North America32 and in the Commonwealth jurisdictions.33
3. The Bell Litigation34
A The Facts
The Bell litigation35 concerned a refinancing arrangement to reorganise the debt 
obligations owed by The Bell Group Ltd and its offshore fundraising entity to 
separate groups of banks. At the time of the refinancing (known as a “workout”), 
the loans were unsecured and several subsidiaries in the Bell group of companies 
had assets that were not exposed to the parent company’s debt obligations. The key 
feature of the workout was to convert the unsecured loans into secured obligations 
and to bring all the companies in the group into the security agreement so that their 
assets could be used to pay down the secured debts. The workout contained a cash 
sweep provision that required all free cash generated by the group companies to be 
paid to the banks to pay off the restructured secured loans. The banks did, however, 
allow some of these funds to be used for general operating expenses.
The central company involved in the case was The Bell Group Ltd (“BGL”), which 
was a listed holding company for the Bell. BGL had a significant interest (39 
per cent) in another listed company, Bell Resources Ltd (BRL). Both BRL and 
BGL were controlled and managed by persons associated with Bond Corporation. 
There were more than 100 companies in the domestic and international group that 
comprised the Bell group.
The major assets of BGL consisted of the controlling interest in BRL and a 
publishing division that centred on West Australian Newspapers. The shares in 
BRL had generated significant funds to BGL over the years, but in 1989, close to 
AUD 1 billion was taken out of BRL by Bond Corporation via a series of loans. 
Complications with the loan transactions caused Bond Corporation to convert 
32 See, for example, the California Court of Appeal decision in Berg	&	Berg	Enterprises,	LLC	v	Boyle, 178 Cal. 
App. 4th 1020 (2009), at 1041: “...there is no broad, paramount fiduciary of due care or loyalty that directors of 
an insolvent corporation owe the corporation’s creditors solely because of a state of insolvency ... we decline 
to create any such duty ... we also perceive practical problems with creating such a duty ... the scope of any 
extracontractual duty owed by corporate directors to the insolvent corporation’s creditors is limited in California, 
consistent with the trust fund doctrine, to the avoidance of actions that divert, dissipate, or unduly risk corporate 
assets that might otherwise be used to pay creditors claims.”
33 See judicial authorities above notes 2 and 4.
34 The following discussion draws upon A. Hargovan and J. Harris, “For Whom the Bell Tolls: Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors after Bell” (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 433.
35 Bell	Group	Ltd	(in	liq)	v	Westpac	Banking	Corporation	(No	9) (2008) 39 WAR 1 (trial) (“Bell	Group	(No	9)”); 
Bell (2012) 270 FLR 1 (appeal).
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them into a deposit for the acquisition by BRL of Bond Corporation’s brewery 
assets, which were valuable assets that were later sold for a significant amount. The 
stock market crash of 1987 had caused the Bell group of companies to engage in 
a program of asset sales to help pay down debt. This left the group with valuable 
and income producing assets aside from the publishing division, shares in BRL and 
the deposit in the brewery assets.
Prior to being taken over by Bond Corporation, the Bell group had engaged in 
large external financing programs both from bank loans and by issuing bonds in 
both domestic and overseas markets. The group had a treasury subsidiary (Bell 
Group Finance Pty Ltd) and had an offshore company (Bell Group NV) that issued 
European bonds from the Netherlands Antilles. The group’s British operations 
were controlled by BGUK. The funds from these bond issues were then lent to 
BGL and Bell Group (Finance), although the transactions were not formally 
documented. One of the major legal issues in the case was whether the intra-group 
loans from Bell Group NV were subordinated or not. This went to the heart of 
what prejudice the bondholders (as creditors) suffered as a result of the workout.
After the stock market crash of 1987, the Bell group’s banks became increasingly 
concerned about the repayment of the unsecured loans. While Bell group executives 
initially believed that the asset sale program would generate sufficient funds to pay 
off the Australian bank debt and had advised the banks of this, by mid-1989 it was 
clear to the Bell group executives that there were would not be sufficient funds 
to clear the debts. This left the banks opposed to providing any further funding 
to the group. All of the Australian loan facilities at this time were operating “on 
demand” so that any of the banks could call for full repayment. If any bank pressed 
a demand for repayment it would have been likely that others would follow suit 
and the company would have to enter liquidation. This left the group little choice 
but to pursue workout negotiations.
During the time of the workout negotiations (December 1989) the banks received 
internal financial information from the Bell group companies and were also 
advised that their debts might rank equally with bondholders if the bonds were not 
subordinated. At the same time, receivers were appointed over Bond Corporation’s 
brewery assets which complicated their transfer to BRL, although this was 
subsequently completed when the court overturned the receiver’s appointment.
At the time of the debt refinancing the financial position of the group was poor 
and several companies in the UK division of the Bell group were in the process 
of being liquidated. The banks did not enforce their new security for a further 16 
months, although they received some proceeds of asset sales during that time. 
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It should be noted that had the banks enforced their security within six months 
of its creation the security may have been rendered void.36 It was clear that the 
purpose of the workout was simply to give the group time to restructure its affairs, 
as no new funds were provided by the banks to support the workout. When no 
viable restructuring developed, the companies in the group were placed into 
liquidation and the banks realised their security and recovered AUD 283 million 
from asset sales.
B The Proceedings
The liquidators commenced proceedings against the banks and the directors 
(although the actions against the directors were discontinued) claiming that the 
refinancing was a breach of directors’ duties because the directors knew the 
companies were insolvent and knew that the refinancing benefited the banks to the 
prejudice of the companies’ other creditors. Importantly, the liquidators claimed 
that the banks had knowledge of these matters and therefore were liable to disgorge 
the proceeds gained from realising their security over the group companies’ assets. 
This was the main claim for relief and was based on:
• Knowing participation by the banks in breaches of directors’ duties and 
knowing receipt of assets resulting from these breaches;
• Equitable fraud; and
• Voidable transactions in the Bankruptcy	Act	1966 (Cth), which applied to 
companies at the time of the events, and other statutes.
The banks responded that they had no knowledge of the insolvency or of any 
breaches of duty. Further, the banks claimed that the directors could have 
reasonably believed that the refinancing was in the best interests of the companies 
because it gave the group time to develop a long-term rescue proposal.
C Judicial Findings
The Bell case has been subject to four separate sets of judicial reasons: the trial 
judge (Owen J) and on appeal (Lee, Drummond and Carr AJJA).
36 See section 588FJ,	Corporations	Act	2001	(Cth).
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1 The Trial Judge
The trial judge (Owen J) held that the companies in the Bell group were insolvent at 
the time of the refinancing.37 The directors’ duties arguments centered on whether 
the directors of the Bell group companies acted in the best interests of their particular 
company, or rather acted to promote the other interests, namely the interests of the 
holding company (BGL) or the ultimate controller Bond Corporation.
Justice Owen applied the long-established rule that the duties of company 
directors are owed to the company.38 In considering what were the interests of the 
company, his Honour noted that while the interests of the company (as a separate 
legal entity) may intersect with the interests of members, the two interests are still 
distinct. Similarly, when the company is insolvent, the interests of the creditors 
may intersect with the interests of the company but the two sets of interests are 
not one and same.39 His Honour went on to state that while the content of the 
duty will usually include consideration of the interests of shareholders, there may 
be other considerations that should also be included.40 His Honour held that the 
Australian directors were aware of the financial problems faced by the companies 
in the group but:
“looked at the problem of solvency from a group perspective and said 
something to the effect: “We all survive or we all go down”. They did 
not look at the circumstances of each individual company that was to 
enter into a Transaction.”41
The UK-based directors were in a different situation. They seemed to be acting 
diligently and were actively engaged in trying to ensure that the refinancing 
transaction would benefit their company. However, they identified that the ongoing 
solvency of BGL was critical to the success of the refinancing and they did not have 
sufficient financial information available to determine its future prospects. They 
relied upon assurances as to the company’s solvency from the Australian directors 
(Bond and Mitchell).42 His Honour found that the actions of Bond and Mitchell 
were primarily concerned with promoting the interests of Bond Corporation.
37 See Bell	Group	(No	9) (2008) 39 WAR 1, Chapters 9 (in particular the summary of findings at [9.20]) and 10.
38 Bell	Group	(No	9) (2008) 39 WAR 1, at 533-534 [20.3.2].
39 Ibid., at 534 [4393].
40 Ibid., at 534 [4395]. See further Teck	Corp	Ltd	v	Millar	[1973] 33 DLR (3d) 288.
41 Ibid., at 658 [6040].
42 Ibid., at [26.13].
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Owen J held that the conduct of the directors had failed to demonstrate consideration 
of the interests of the creditors of the group companies that were pledging 
their otherwise unsecured assets for the benefit of the parent company (BGL). 
Importantly, his Honour stated the assessment constituted a balancing exercise 
where the risk to creditors could be included as one of several considerations to 
be taken by management. The greater the risk to creditors, the more directors and 
executive officers should take those considerations into account.
His Honour noted that the relevance of creditor interests will wax and wane 
depending upon the circumstances and the significance of the risk to creditors. He 
stated that:
“It may be, therefore, that in particular circumstances the only 
reasonable conclusion to draw, once the interests of creditors have 
been taken into account, is that a contemplated transaction will 
be so prejudicial to creditors that it could not be in the interests of 
the company as a whole. But that will be because of the particular 
circumstances and not because a general principle has mandated that 
the treatment of the creditors’ interests is paramount.”43
The balancing exercise that directors must undertake to include the interests of 
different stakeholders that make up the interests of the company does not mean 
that creditor interests must necessarily be paramount, however. Owen J held that 
such a view was “going too far” as it would come perilously close to substituting 
for the duty to act in the interests of the company, a duty to act in the interests 
of creditors.44
2 Appeal Decision
All of the banks appealed to the Western Australian Court of Appeal, originally 
on 144 grounds.45 The appeal judgments, by a 2:1 majority (Lee and Drummond 
AJJA; Carr AJA), confirmed the banks’ liability but for slightly different reasons 
to the trial judge. Significantly for the banks, the appeal court determined that a 
different measure of calculating the compensation should be used which effectively 
doubled the banks’ liability (to as much as AUD 3 billion).
While accepting that the duty to act in good faith was subjectively assessed, Lee 
AJA agreed with the trial judge that the court must analyse the assertions of the 
43 Ibid., at 545 [4440].
44 Ibid., at 545 [4439].
45 Westpac	Banking	Corp	v	Bell	Group	Ltd	(in	liq) [2009] WASCA 223, at [14].
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directors that they acted in good faith and genuinely believed that the company’s 
best interests would be served by their conduct in the surrounding circumstances. 
His Honour held that directors could not have genuinely acted in the interests of the 
company where it was clear that the creditors’ interests would be prejudiced.46 His 
Honour went further and held that the duty to act in the interests of the company 
would necessarily be breached by conduct during a time of insolvency that would 
prejudice creditor interests.47
In this case, the directors made no enquiries as to how the refinancing would 
affect the group companies’ non-bank creditors and hence had failed to consider 
their interests. Lee AJA also placed considerable emphasis on the conduct of the 
banks and the directors as constituting equitable fraud because the directorsacted 
to prefer one group of creditors (the banks) over another (the bondholders and the 
ATO).48 In his Honour’s view, the equitable fraud case supported the breaches 
of directors’ duties because it demonstrated the failure even to consider how the 
transaction would affect the non-bank creditors of each company.
Drummond AJA took a different approach and focussed primarily on the ability 
of the court to assess objectively whether creditor interests had been adequately 
considered by the directors. His Honour went beyond the trial judge’s focus on 
balancing by holding that:49
“[t]he duty will not ordinarily be satisfied by directors who consider 
the impact that entry into a particular transaction by the company will 
have on its creditors but proceed with the transaction even though 
it causes significant prejudice to those creditors. By doing that, the 
directors will usually, in my opinion, be in breach of their fiduciary 
duty to the company to exercise their powers for proper purposes 
and the transaction will be voidable at the election of the company 
or its liquidator.”
Drummond AJA’s reasoning showed readiness to depart from the deference courts 
usually give to the decisions of directors when involving judgments on matters of 
business or management.50 Such an approach was considered necessary in order to 
ensure that creditor interests are properly protected.51 His Honour viewed the test 
46 Bell (2012) 270 FLR 1, at 188 [1092].
47 Ibid., at 176 [993].
48 Ibid., at 171 [953].
49 Ibid., at 363 [2042].
50 Ibid., at 360 [2029].
51 Idem.
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for breach of the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company as subjective 
and the test for breach of the duty to act for proper purposes as objective.52 This 
allowed his Honour to review the directors’ decisions, and supports a more 
interventionist approach in commercial decision-making.
In a detailed dissenting judgment, Carr AJA treated the duty to act in good faith 
and for a proper purpose as a composite duty and therefore applied a subjective 
test. Such an approach, absent dishonesty and irrationality, means less judicial 
interference with commercial decision-making. His Honour observed that directors 
are not trustees and recognised that the law gives greater latitude to business people 
to conduct their company’s affairs.53
His Honour viewed the role of law as facilitating, rather than stifling, the exercise 
of business skills and did not see the need for any legal intervention if directors 
acted honestly and not irrationally in making their business decisions.54 His Honour 
expressed the concern, in relation to the facts of the Bell case, that directors would 
be limited in their choices and take the easy option of liquidation rather than 
exploring possibilities corporate rescue if the law was otherwise.55
Significantly, Drummond AJA held that Owen J had misconstrued the seminal 
cases on directors’ duties to creditors,56 with his Honour going so far as to suggest 
that the directors’ duties included a duty to protect creditor interests, as opposed 
to giving consideration to creditors’ interests.57 This goes even further than Lee 
AJA’s judgment, which stated that entering into decisions that prejudiced creditors 
during times of insolvency would result in no rational belief that the conduct was 
in the interests of the company.
4. Critique
There are strong jurisprudential arguments to support overturning the majority 
decision in the Bell appeal. It is respectfully submitted that the approach of 
Drummond AJA in Bell on the nature of directors’ duties to creditors adds yet 
another layer of gloss58 to the classical dicta in Walker	v	Wimborne59 and should 
52 Ibid., at 351 [1988].
53 Ibid., at 539 [2797].
54 Idem.
55 Ibid., at [2797].
56 Walker	v	Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1; Spies (2000) 201 CLR 603.
57 Bell (2012) 270 FLR 1, at 544 [2819].
58 See L. Sealy, “Directors Duties — An Unnecessary Gloss” (1988) 47 Cambridge Law Journal 175.
59 (1976) 137 CLR 1.
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not be adopted by the High Court. This conclusion is aided by the instructive 
judicial remarks made by the High Court in Spies60 on the nature of directors’ 
duties to creditors, discussed below.
It is appropriate, at the outset, to repeat the influential and oft-quoted dictum of 
Mason J in Walker	v	Wimborne before analysing its conventional meaning:
“it should be emphasised that the directors of a company in discharging 
their duty to the company must be taken into account the interests of 
its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to take 
into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences 
for the company as well as for them.”61
Walker	v	Wimborne cautions that directors must remember that creditors may also 
be affected by a particular management decision. The case indicates that when 
a company is in financial difficulty, directors must ensure that they balance the 
interests of various affected persons. The High Court majority in Spies endorsed 
the dicta in Walker	v	Wimborne and recognised that insolvency alters the relative 
weight that directors should give to shareholder interests as opposed to creditor 
interests, while rejecting the idea of directors’ independent fiduciary to creditors. 
In offering insight on the meaning of the dictum in Walker	 v	Wimborne, the 
majority judgment in Spies62 supported the quote of Professor Sealy who offered 
the following rationale for the dicta of Mason J:
“[these] were words of censure directed at conduct which … comes 
within some well-established rule of law, such as the law imposing 
liability for misfeasance, the expropriation of corporate assets or 
fraudulent preference.”63
Against this legal framework and judicial understanding, the approach adopted by 
Drummond AJA in Bell towards the issue of directors’ duties to creditors warrants 
attention. In particular, the following sweeping statement by Drummond AJA in 
Bell invites further scrutiny:
“Directors, in discharging their fiduciary duties to their company 
must, if the company is sufficiently financially distressed, have 
regard and give proper effect to the interests of creditors ... courts 
60 (2000) 201 CLR 603. For detailed analysis, see Hargovan, above note 5.
61 (1976) 137 CLR 1, at 7.
62 (2000) 201 CLR 603, at 636.
63 Sealy, above note 58.
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will now intervene in an appropriate case, irrespective of the 
directors’ beliefs and business judgments, to ensure that creditors are 
properly protected.”64
The thrust of this judicial statement is problematic for two main reasons. First, 
it represents a radical departure from orthodox authorities.65 Drummond AJA’s 
approach unreasonably shifts the directors’ duty to creditors away from its 
traditional focus of consideration (a balancing exercise), to become a positive duty 
to protect their interests when a company is in financial distress. In the authors’ 
view, the balancing approach taken by the trial judge, and also adopted by Carr 
AJA in dissent, is preferable because it recognises the practical difficulties that 
directors face during times of financial distress. As noted above, if the workout 
had resulted in the Bell group being able to enter into a long term refinancing 
arrangement, all stakeholders would have been better off.
Second, the approach undertaken by Drummond AJA seems to elevate the duty 
to a direct one to creditors, or at a minimum makes them the sole stakeholder 
group, rather than including their interests as merely one of a number that must 
be considered by corporate managers. The obligation to have regard to creditors’ 
interests, as espoused in Walker	v	Wimbourne, arises as part of the process of 
acting in the best interests of the company. The ultimate goal of the duty is to 
benefit the company, and through it the creditors.66 The interests of the company, 
in the context of impending insolvency and corporate rescue attempts, should not 
be subordinated to the interests of sharing pari passu between unsecured creditors.
The pari passu rule is one that is aimed at distributional equity where claims 
are of the same rank. The goal of creditor protection during times of financial 
distress is adequately addressed by existing statutory rules. It is not illegal to obtain 
security by contract, although in some cases the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (and 
the Bankruptcy	Act	1966 (Cth) which applied at the time of the Bell facts) may 
allow transactions that were not illegal when made to be set aside by the court 
because they occurred too close to the date of liquidation.67 It is submitted that 
these statutory rules provide an appropriate balance between creditor protection 
and commercial decision-making.68
64 Bell (2012) 270 FLR 1, at 361 [2031] (emphasis added).
65 Walker	v	Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1; Kinsela	v	Russell	Kinsela	Pty	Ltd	(in	liq) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722; Spies 
(2000) 201 CLR 603.
66 Geneva Finance Ltd v Resource & Industry Ltd (2002) 20 ACLC 1427, 1438.
67 Part 5.7B Division 2, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
68 See, e.g., the carve outs to void security interests in section 588FJ(s), Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
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If the approach undertaken by the majority in Bell is affirmed by the High Court of 
Australia, it will have the effect of reformulating directors’ duties to creditors in a 
manner that will have a chilling effect on corporate rescue initiatives by directors. 
The new elevated duty would not only include an obligation to safeguard creditor 
interests generally, but an obligation to see that creditors of the same degree were 
treated equally. It will be exceedingly difficult to comply with such a duty. While 
trading on the business may involve prejudice to creditors, as it uses up scarce 
resources, shutting the business down prematurely for fear of potential prejudice 
may itself cause greater harm to creditors due to the lower returns in formal 
insolvency compared with informal workouts.
5. Conclusion
The Appellate Court decision in the Bell case significantly alters the landscape 
– it is the most important pronouncement in Australia on the implementation of 
fiduciary duties claims brought by creditors, since the High Court dicta in Walker	
v Wimborne69 and Spies70 on the nature of such claims. In elevating directors duties 
to creditors in the manner discussed above, the judicial approach adopted by the 
majority judges in Bell raises a broader and more fundamental question as to the 
possible justifications for the ill-defined duty.
In an extra-curial address and article, Justice Hayne of the High Court of Australia 
has questioned and rejected the premise underlying directors’ duties to creditors 
at common law on the basis that the law has adopted a solution in search of a 
problem.71 In attempting to unravel this messy reality, Justice Haynes has found 
favour with the view that recognising “fiduciary duties to creditors” in circumstance 
of insolvency may involve using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not 
exist,72 as recognised by the Delaware Court in the Gheewalla case.
It can be strenuously argued that, save for involuntary tort creditors, the 
legislature provides adequate protection for creditor interests.73 In Australia, Pt 
5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) targets certain transactions as voidable 
transactions, such as unfair preferences, uncommercial transactions, unfair loans 
and unreasonable director-related transactions. The Supreme Court in the UK in 
69 (1976) 137 CLR 1.
70 (2000) 201 CLR 603; [2000] HCA 43.
71 Hayne J, “Directors’ Duties and a Company’s Creditors” (2014) 38 Melbourne	University	Law	Review 795.
72 Ibid., at 814.
73 See section 563A, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) providing for the deferral of debts owed to members in their 
capacity as members until after all non-member claims have been satisfied.
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Rubin	v	Eurofinance	SA74 recently described the policy underlying such avoidance 
provisions as being:
“...to protect the general body of creditors against a diminution of the 
assets by a transaction which confers an unfair or improper advantage 
on the other party, and it is therefore an essential aspect of the process 
of liquidation that antecedent transactions whose consequences have 
been detrimental to the collective interest of the creditors should be 
amenable to adjustment or avoidance...”
In addition, creditors are given a measure of protection through the insolvent 
trading provision, which allows a liquidator, ASIC or a creditor to take action 
against directors who allowed the company to continue incurring debts at a time 
when it was insolvent and there were reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency.75 
It is clear that the insolvent trading provision imposes a threat of financial penalty, 
or even criminal sanctions,76 against directors and these are important factors in 
their decision-making processes during reorganisation attempts.
For reasons advanced in this chapter, it is submitted that the expansion of the 
liability regime for directors and officers during financial distress by the majority 
in the Bell appeal is unnecessary and inappropriate from both a policy and 
doctrinal standpoint. In light thereof, it is, indeed, legitimate to query whether the 
development at common law of the directors duty to consider creditor interests is 
a solution in search of a problem?
74 [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] BCC 1, at [95].
75 Part 5.7B Divisions 3 and 4, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Empirical evidence (based on 103 insolvent trading 
cases from 1961 to 2004) showed that the majority of cases are brought by creditors (60 per cent) and that in 75 
per cent of cases, the defendant was found liable. See further, P. James et	al., “Insolvent Trading — An Empirical 
Study” (2004) 12 Insolvency Law Journal 210.
76 The prospect of criminal penalties is not an empty threat. Empirical evidence showed 15 per cent of insolvent 
trading cases involved criminal proceedings. See James et al., above note 75.
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Chapter 4
New Sanctions for the Fraudulent Debtor in 
Romanian Insolvency Law
Lavinia Iancu
Introduction
In 1995, the first modern law of insolvency was regulated in the Romanian law. 
After several important legislative reforms, which followed the trends of the 
French Parliament, in 2006 Law no. 85 concerning the insolvency procedure was 
passed. Law no. 85/2006, that represented a profound reform of the provisions 
concerning the insolvency domain and the subsequent normative acts that provided 
several modifications to the legal text, did not reform the core of the mechanism of 
personal civil liability determination.
Only recently (June 2014), the Insolvency Code entered in force, which indicated 
the particular interest of the Parliament to transform the civil liability determination 
in the insolvency domain from a mechanism characterized by inefficiency and 
practical inapplicability in an efficient and functional one.
At present, there are two applicable legal documents: Law no. 85/2006 referring 
to the insolvency procedures initiated before 27 June 2014 and Law No. 85/2014 
referring to the insolvency procedures initiated from 28 June 2014 onwards. 
Right now, the personal liability determination for members of management 
bodies is grounded on Articles 138 through 142 of Law no. 85/2006 concerning 
the insolvency, as well as on Articles 169 through 173 of Law no. 85/2014, 
the Parliament setting out the conditions, framework, and rules applicable to 
determining the patrimony liability of members of management bodies and/or 
insolvency monitoring bodies.
Patrimony Civil Sanction
According to Law no. 85/2006, the institution of civil liability determination 
of members of management bodies that committed illicit deeds and caused the 
insolvency state was limited as regards the functionality and application due to 
three reasons:
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• impossibility to determine the liability of members of management bodies that 
would not submit the accounting documents of the debtor to the insolvency 
practitioner, time when any possibility to analyze the activity developed by 
the persons considered was practically annulled;
• the express and limitative character of the illicit deeds enumerated in Article 
138 paragraph 1 of Law no. 85/2006 for which the civil liability could 
be determined;
• the direct causality between the illicit deed and the damage that had to be 
proven as element of the tort civil liability.
The New Insolvency Code profoundly alters the institution of personal liability 
determination of the members of management bodies and/or monitoring bodies 
by the legal text provisioned by Article 169 paragraph (1). The new regulation 
eliminates those three limitations, thus:
• for the first time in the insolvency legislation of Romania, the premises for 
determining the personal liability of the members of management bodies not 
collaborating with the insolvency practitioner for delivering the accounting 
documents is created. The Parliament stipulates in Article 169 paragraph 1 
letter d) a relative presumption concerning the guilt and the causality relation 
for the members of the management bodies that do not deliver the accounting 
documents to the legal administrator/liquidator;
• for the first time in the insolvency legislation of Romania, it is allowed 
the determination of the personal patrimony liability of the members of 
management bodies for any deed committed with intent. Although the 
Parliament takes over in the Insolvency Code the seven deeds set out as 
limitation (in Article 138 paragraph 1 letters a – g of Law no. 85/2006 that 
became Article 169 paragraph 1 letters a – g by renumbering of Law no. 
85/2014) according to which the liability can be determined, within the same 
Article letter h) is introduced, which refers to any other deed committed 
with intent;
• the causal relation required for determining the liability for the illicit deed and 
the damage is redefined by replacing the expression “caused the insolvency 
state” by the expression “contributed to the insolvency state”. By using the 
“contributed” term, the domain of illicit deeds that can lead the legal person 
to the insolvency state comprises not only those deeds that directly caused the 
insolvency, but also those that represented a condition such an opportunity 
for producing the result. The relevancy of that modification appears in the 
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meaning that between the deed and the insolvency state no firm causality 
relation must exist; the committed deed can represent a favorable condition 
for the appearance of the insolvency state.
The new regulations set out by the Insolvency Code are meant to revitalize the 
institution of patrimony civil liability determination in the insolvency area, creating 
the actual possibility for the persons guilty of the debtor entering the insolvency 
state to bear personally the damage caused to the creditors. The Parliament did 
not limit only to activating that mechanism, whose latent state has been called 
upon by experts for over 10 years, but it brought as a novelty in the insolvency 
procedure the non-patrimony sanction for those that are proven guilty of the 
debtor’s insolvency state.
Non-Patrimony Civil Sanction
The Insolvency Code introduces in Article 169 two new legal provisions: on one 
hand, in paragraph 9 is set out the court of law’s obligation to send to the National 
Trade Registry Office the sentence ordering the determination of the patrimony 
liability of the statutory director and, on the other hand, paragraph 10 stipulates 
a non-patrimony civil sanction (interdiction to hold the director position for 
10 years).
At first sight, the Parliament’s intention to introduce a non-patrimony sanction next 
to the patrimony one derived from setting out the damage to be paid personally by 
the person that contributed to the debtor’s insolvency state seems commendable. 
The years when the determination of personal liability for insolvency had no 
practical applicability corroborated with the double civil sanction stipulated in the 
Insolvency Code, patrimony on one hand, for which the barriers existing in Law 
no. 85/2006 have been eliminated and non-patrimony, leads to the idea that this 
time the Parliament actually analyzed that institution in a real payment instrument 
of the receivables to the creditors.
Text of Article 169 paragraph 10 provisions that the person to whom a final 
decision of determining the liability was given can no longer be designated director 
or, if he is a director of other companies, he will lose that right for 10 years since 
the date when that decision remained final. Thus, the conclusion is without a doubt 
that creating a mandatory and not facultative non-patrimony sanction was desired 
and that it operates de jure (ope legis) and was not left to the discretion of the 
syndic judge. The non-patrimony sanction stipulated by Article 169 paragraph 10 
must not be ordered by the syndic judge by the request of liability determination. 
It will acquire legal strength by the simple giving of a final decision of liability 
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determination, its applicability being ensured by Article 169 paragraph 9 that binds 
one to communicate that sentence to the Trade Registry Office.
Critiques and Proposals
Nevertheless, when carefully analyzing Article 169 paragraph 10, several critiques 
can be submitted. On one hand, although the liability determination is possible 
for the members of the management bodies and/or monitoring bodies within the 
company, as well as for any other persons that contributed to the insolvency state, 
the patrimony sanction is limited to the director position. That means the person 
against whom a final decision was given of liability determination cannot be 
designated director or, if he is a director of other companies, he will lose that right 
for 10 years since the date when that decision remained final.
Persons holding positions such as manager or shareholder can lead the companies, 
which positions are not considered by the legal text or those persons can even 
hold no position in the company they run. Practically, the legal text as it is now 
formulated allows, from my point of view, a series of manners of escaping the 
non-patrimony sanction. Being a sanction, the analyzed provisions are determined 
by interpretation and they cannot be construed by analogy.
From our point of view, the patrimony civil sanction created by the Insolvency 
Code in Article 169 paragraph 10 strictly refers to holding the director position, not 
being any restriction in connection to exercising the specific attributions of other 
decision-making positions.1 Also in that context one can naturally ask which would 
be the situation of documents concluded (employment contracts, bank contracts, 
commercial contracts, etc.) by a person affected by a non-patrimony sanction and 
acting while breaching the provisions of Article 169 paragraph 10 of Law no. 
85/2014.
For reaching its maximum efficacy, the interdiction should refer to any decision-
making position within a company and not just to the director one; the actions 
forbidden to him matter and not the position in which they have been committed. 
My proposal that I believe would render the legal text efficient would envisage 
applying the non-patrimony civil sanction by the interdiction to run, manage, 
administer, directly or indirectly control a business, no matter the position held 
by that person.
1 For the contrary, please refer to R. Bufan, Tratat	practic	de	insolvență (2014, Ed. Hamangiu, București), at 834.
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Another criticism that could be brought to the new law text refers to the rigidity 
of the sanction that forbids the director position for a fixed 10-year period without 
considering the committed deed, the total amount of the caused damage or the 
paying of the damage set out by the decision of liability determination to the 
creditors. Although I acknowledge the preventive role of that sanction, I believe 
it is radical by the simple fact that it cannot be differentiated among various cases 
and more important, it cannot be lifted if the damage is paid to the creditors.
We believe that applying the non-patrimony sanction by the syndic judge is 
particularly useful, upon the request of the persons that can lodge also the petition 
of determining the personal liability, for a period between 3 and 10 years, and with 
the possibility that the syndic judge lifts that sanction when receiving the proof of 
paying the damage set out by the decision of liability determination. As well, the 
possibility of lifting the non-patrimony civil sanction by paying the damage will 
lead to recovering the creditors’ receivables in a shorter period of time, as against 
the perspective of being punished for a 10-year period no matter if the damage is 
paid or not.
Conclusions
Even if the regulation chosen by the Parliament as the non-patrimony civil sanction 
is questionable, as least a first step for that was made; its practical application 
follows to prove the efficiency of the legal text. The same cannot be said of 
correlating the provisions in the area of fraudulent bank transfers to the provisions 
in the personal liability determination, an aspect called upon by the doctrine2 as 
being necessary, but which did not catch the Parliament’s eye.
As a conclusion, one can state that the institution of personal liability determination 
of members of management bodies in insolvency faced an unprecedented evolution 
by the entry into force of the Insolvency Code. The real perspective of the members 
of management bodies of a debtor of being held personally accountable for the 
deeds committed prior to beginning the insolvency procedure but also during its 
development will certainly contribute to rendering more responsible the business 
environment participants and to recreating a natural climate in the development of 
an insolvency procedure in which the accounting documents can be analyzed and 
pertinent conclusions can be drawn in connection to those that contributed to the 
debtor’s insolvency state.
2 A. Buta, Raportul	cu	acțiunea	pentru	atragerea	răspunderii	fostelor	organe	de	conducere	a	debitoarei,	Anularea	
actelor	frauduloase	în	procedura	insolvenței (2014, Ed. C.H.Beck, București), at 438 et seq.
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Chapter 5
The Irish National Asset Management Agency: 
A Case Study on the “Bad Bank” Option
Irene Lynch Fannon
Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief description of the Irish bank bailout process which 
led to the creation of the National Asset Management Agency (“NAMA”) as a 
type of “bad bank” broadly defined and will trace the activities of the agency to 
this point where the Irish banks have stabilised. NAMA was created under the 
National Asset Management Agency Act 20091 to provide a structure whereby 
“bad” or non-performing loans held by Irish banks which had been bailed out 
through a government bailout scheme could be transferred, together with 
underlying securities, to NAMA. These loans and the underlying securities were 
to be managed for a period with a view to these loans being sold off for value to 
outside investors. The period of establishment led to a number of challenges and 
debates regarding the structure of the legislation itself and the operation of the 
Agency. This early phase will be considered in the first part.
The second and core part of the chapter will specifically consider the operation 
of NAMA against criteria which are derived from Law and Economics analysis. 
These issues concern oversight and monitoring to address agency problems; the 
problems created by market intervention; rent-seeking and finally more egregious 
problems concerning allegations of lack of transparency and possibly corruption 
regarding the finalisation of transactions between investors and transferees.
The final part will conclude that the operation of NAMA to date has given rise to 
a range of competing interests, these interests having emerged over time since the 
initial phase which occurred in the depths of a severe financial crisis. Even now 
in 2016, the most recent inquiry (concluded in January 2016) conducted into the 
Irish bank bailout (referred to colloquially as “the Banking Inquiry”)2 has made 
1 National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/34/
enacted/en/html. See also the website of NAMA at: www.nama.ie and a contemporary commentary at: www.
namawinelake.ie.
2 See: https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/.
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recommendations which specifically refer to NAMA. Having attempted to locate 
the resolution of these competing interests and issues in an analytical context, this 
chapter concludes that the consequent complexities will bear further legal and 
economic analysis in future years.
I – Establishing NAMA
As described, the National Asset Management Agency Act was passed in 2009. 
Some time elapsed before NAMA became really operational, but from the outset 
it met with some criticism. The context in which it was established was fraught 
with uncertainty where the complete financial collapse of the Irish banking sector 
was a real and significant threat. Hindsight and more information provides further 
clarity to the issues which had arisen and so this chapter does not seek to provide 
a definitive conclusion on whether, either the bank bailout in its entirety,3 or the 
creation of NAMA following that bailout were optimal solutions. Instead, this 
chapter is more focused on the problems which have arisen as a result of the 
establishment of NAMA.
Leaving aside the merits of the decisions which had been made surrounding the 
financial crisis, it had nevertheless been decided in September 2008 to bail out 
the main Irish banks. As part of this guarantee structure NAMA was created to 
facilitate the rescue of the Irish banking sector. NAMA took over bad and under 
performing loans from various Irish banks as part of the process of the government 
bailout/guarantee of these banks. The sum of the loan books were valued at EUR 
71.2 billion4 at face value but at the time of their acquisition by NAMA they were 
valued as having between 25% and 40% of their face value. The loans were spread 
across a number of Irish Banks including banks which had significant engagement 
with retail banking, including Allied Irish Banks where EUR 18.5 billion of loans 
were acquired by NAMA, and Bank of Ireland where EUR 9.4 billion of loans 
were acquired by NAMA.
However, the most controversial of the banks was Anglo Irish Bank plc which 
had no retail banking presence. Its loans which were taken over by NAMA had a 
3 Ibid., noting that, interestingly, the most recent inquiry into the banking crisis which has been concluded in 
January 2016 provides additional light on the question of whether the bank bailout should have included the 
decision not to “burn” senior bondholders.
4 Previous enquiries have provided considerable information as to the how the Irish banks had got into such an 
overexposed position. See “The	Irish	Banking	Crisis:	Regulatory	and	Financial	Stability	Policy	2003-2008” (The 
Honohan Report, May 2010). K. Regling and M. Watson, “A	Preliminary	Report	on	the	Irish	Banking	Crisis” 
(May 2010). “Misjudging	risk:	causes	of	the	systemic	Banking	crisis	in	Ireland:	Report	Of	The	Commission	Of	
Investigation	Into	The	Banking	Sector	In	Ireland” (The Nyberg Report, March 2011).
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face value of EUR 34 billion.5 The establishment of NAMA was followed in 2010 
by a full government guarantee of all banks. In turn this created a sovereign debt 
problem of unprecedented proportions, which in turn was followed by support 
being received for the state from the European Central Bank and the IMF.
Issues	surrounding	the	Establishment	of	NAMA	in	the	Context	of	the	Bank	
Bailout	by	the	Irish	Government	in	2008
Criticisms of NAMA made at the time came from respected sources, including 
a former Minister for Finance who had presided over a period of successful 
economic growth,6 and who expressed concern regarding the establishment of a 
state agency with the remit which NAMA had. In particular this criticism focussed 
on the fact that NAMA would now operate as a property management company, 
because of the fact that the underlying securities of the loans taken over by NAMA 
were almost exclusively of one asset type, namely real property. Joseph Stiglitz, 
a Nobel prize winning economist also criticised the creation of NAMA,7 but his 
criticism was focussed on the complete bank rescue of which NAMA was a part. 
Various Irish economists collectively expressed considerable reservations around 
the establishment of NAMA, focussing on transparency issues, the scope and 
duration of NAMA and the price paid for assets.8
Criticisms of the Legislation itself
Others expressed concerns about the detail of the legislation establishing NAMA 
and in particular the extensive powers given to the Minister for Finance under 
the legislation. There was some discussion about the possibility of the President 
referring the legislation to the Irish Supreme Court under the provisions of the Irish 
Constitution which allow for a judicial review of legislation before it is enacted.9 
These matters will be discussed where relevant in the next part. For example, this 
chapter concerns itself with issues of oversight and accountability and it is noted 
5 These values and discounts are taken from the Report of NAMA for 2010, available at its website (last viewed 
September 2015).
6 Former Minister for Finance, Ruairi Quinn, describing NAMA as “the biggest property company in the world”, 
expressed reservations as to the wisdom of a state agency taking on such a role: “Opposition criticises NAMA 
Bill” (Irish Times, 30 July 2009).
7 Joseph Stiglitz spoke against the establishment of NAMA in 2009 at Trinity College Dublin, although his main 
criticisms were focussed on the idea that all of the banks operating at this time would be rescued by the state 
and ultimately the Irish tax payer. He observed that only “banana republics” rescued banks in this manner and in 
retrospect it seems to be the case that at least one bank, Anglo Irish Bank plc seemed both less deserving but more 
importantly less centrally concerned with mainstream economic activity in the country. This bank was eventually 
liquidated by the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation under the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Act 2013.
8 Open letter to Irish Times: “Nama set to shift wealth to lenders and developers” (Irish Times, 26 April 2009).
9 These provisions are found in Article 26, Irish Constitution 1937. See I. Lynch Fannon and G. Murphy, Corporate 
Insolvency and Rescue (2nd ed) (2012, Bloomsbury Professional, Dublin), at 13.
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that the relevant Minister, in this case the Minister for Finance, has extensive 
powers in relation to information surrounding the operation of NAMA and the 
control of that information. For example, the Minister has powers in relation to 
the content of reports which NAMA is obliged to furnish.10 The Minister also 
has extensive powers in relation to the operation of NAMA as a state agency, 
specifically in relation to the issuing of guidelines11 and more significantly in 
relation to the issuing of directions to the Agency.12
Constitutional Challenges
During the initial period, the most significant events concerned the actions of 
particular borrowers who either threatened to challenge or did challenge the taking 
over by a State agency of the loans which they had with banks. These concerns 
led to the challenge by a property developing company group including Dellway 
Investments Ltd. and other companies to the taking over of its loans by NAMA. 
These companies were all owned by a prominent property developer, Paddy 
McKillen, who held shareholdings in each of the companies of between 50% to 
100%. The loans which were to be taken over by NAMA were valued at nearly 
EUR 2 billion.
In the initial phase of the litigation, the Irish High Court characterised the 
constitutional law issues as resting on two arguments. First, that the process by 
which the loans were acquired was unconstitutional with regard to constitutionally 
protected rights to fair procedures and second, that the acquisition of unimpaired 
loans was an unjustified attack on property rights. The High Court rejected the 
challenge to the operation of NAMA in this regard.13 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the appeal was successful in part relating to claims as to how the process to 
acquire the loans had been initiated before NAMA had been formally established. 
In rejecting the other arguments the Court effectively provided guidelines for the 
Agency as to how it would or should conduct its operations in the future to ensure 
that rights of those it affected were protected:
10 Section 53(4), National Asset Management Agency Act 2009. “The issue of confidentiality and the protection 
from dissemination of confidential information is also a consistent theme throughout the Act” in H. Byrne and 
L. McEntagart, The	National	Asset	Management	Agency	Act	 2009	–	Annotations	and	Commentary (2010, 
Bloomsbury Professional, Dublin). See also sections 56, 113 and 120.
11 Ibid., section 13.
12 Ibid., section 14. Annotations to section 14 state: “The powers given to the Minister under this section are 
extensive. If the Minister gives a direction to NAMA, the direction must be complied with.” (Byrne and 
McEntagart, above note 10).
13 Dellway	Investments	Ltd	and	Ors.	v	NAMA	and	the	Attorney	General	[2010] IEHC 364.
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“In the light of the decision given by the court… the appellants, in 
the event of NAMA proceeding to acquire any eligible assets related 
to them, will be entitled to be afforded an opportunity to make 
appropriate representations to it as indicated above. NAMA will be 
bound to take account of those representations. Following such a 
process borrowers in a position such as the appellants will be entitled 
to seek relief by way of judicial review if it is considered that the 
decision of NAMA has not been made in accordance with the terms 
of s. 84…and there are no grounds for considering that the appellants 
would in any way be hindered or restricted in their ability to seek such 
relief from the courts….”14
II- How NAMA operates
Analytical Criteria
Over the intervening period these loans with underlying property securities have 
been managed and operated through NAMA. It is important to emphasise that 
since 2009 the management of the loans, not only involved ensuring that the loans 
remained performing to some extent, but that the assets underlying the loans, 
namely the real property assets were also managed effectively.15 Eventually, as 
economic conditions improved and particularly from 2014 onwards, the loans and 
underlying securities have been sold on by NAMA to investor capital companies. 
A number of these transactions will be considered.
As stated in the introduction it is intended to consider the actions of NAMA 
against a number of criteria derived from analytical tools prevalent in law and 
economics analysis. The first concerns what law and economic theory describes as 
agency problems. Although the discussion of agency problems often concerns the 
internal governance of corporations, it is clear that similar problems will occur in 
relation to the taxpayer, the state and the operations of an agency such as NAMA. 
Monitoring and oversight are therefore crucial issues. Undoubtedly such questions 
regarding oversight should concern oversight of the initial acquisition of the loans. 
As described above, these acquisition were not without controversy. However, this 
chapter will focus on the management and sale of the loan portfolios in the period 
since the establishment of NAMA.
14 Dellway	Investments	Ltd	and	Ors.	v	NAMA	and	the	Attorney	General	[2011] IESC 13 and 14.See further Lynch 
Fannon and Murphy, above note 9, at 14.
15 The engagement by NAMA with management of properties which not only included apartment buildings, empty or 
nearly empty housing projects, incomplete housing projects and operating hotels is of particular interest and concern.
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A second issue which is related to the management and sale of the loan portfolios 
concerns the problem of market intervention. As mentioned NAMA has been 
described as the “largest property owning company” in the world. Considering 
it is a State agency, the nature of this market intervention and its consequences 
cannot be underestimated. A third issue concerns opportunities for rent seeking16 at 
each point of any given transaction. Finally, it seems that there is a real danger that 
in the process of selling assets and loan portfolios more serious issues concerning 
oversight of irregularities and accountability for certain types of transactions has 
become an issue. 
Agency	Costs,17	Oversight	and	Monitoring:	Reporting	Obligations	in	
the Legislation
As described the National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 provides that 
the Agency will issue reports to the relevant Minister, in this case the Minister 
for Finance. The Act makes provision for the submission of an annual statement 
under section 53 which in turn will be submitted to Parliament, but as described, 
the Minister has power to omit information from this report under section 53(4). 
NAMA is also obliged to prepare annual accounts under section 54. This provision 
gives the Minister power to direct the format of this report, and section 57 provides 
for the auditing of these accounts by the Comptroller and Auditor General with a 
subsequent presentation of these accounts to the Minister, who in turn puts these 
before Parliament. Section 58 provides that the Chairperson and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Agency shall be accountable to a Committee of the Dail (the lower 
house in the Irish Parliament). In doing so, section 58(3) expressly states that:
“the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer… shall not question or 
express and opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government 
or a Minister of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of 
such a policy.”
This would seem to put an end to the possibility of any extensive debate on matters 
arising from the accounts. Section 55 also provides that quarterly reports will be 
submitted by NAMA to the Minister and this provision includes a list of items 
which must be included in these reports. Finally, section 56 provides for the 
16 For the purposes of this chapter, “rent-seeking” simply refers to the problem of poor allocation of government 
resources, lost government revenue, increased income inequality and undue influence of special interests. C. 
Kershaw Rowley, The	Political	Economy	of	Rent	Seeking (1988, Springer, New York NY).
17 M. Jensen and W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” 
(1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305–360; E. Fama and M. Jensen, “Agency Problems and Residual 
Claims” (1983) 26 Journal of Law & Economics 327–349.
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provision by NAMA of further reports to the Minister as may be required and, 
again under section 56(4), the Minister has the power to omit information of a 
confidential nature but there is no obligation to submit this report to the Parliament.
Overall there is an interesting variation between the obligation under section 
55 providing for quarterly reports on specified matters and the other reporting 
obligations outlined above. Under section 55, the Minister has no authority to 
omit information of a confidential nature before these reports are presented to 
the Parliament, whereas he or she may exercise this power in relation to annual 
reports. This unusual variation in reporting obligations has been commented 
upon elsewhere.18 It is difficult to assess what the real effect of this distinction in 
the legislation is nor what its purpose was. Given concerns expressed regarding 
transparency from the outset the legislation itself is not consistent in its approach 
to the management of information flowing from the Agency, to the Minister and 
from there to parliament.
Oversight-Freedom	of	Information
Despite the reporting structure provided for in the legislation, it is clear that there is 
considerable discretion left to the Minister regarding the exclusion of confidential 
information. The Minister has the discretion to exclude confidential information 
from all reports and accounts which are presented to the Parliament with the 
exception of the section 55 “quarterly report”. However, this report is designed to 
cover a prescribed list of items and so there is a discretion given to the Minister 
outside the list of defined items. A definition of “confidential information” is 
provided for in section 202. This definition is very broad.19
The operations of NAMA were exempt from the Freedom of Information Acts, 
the first of which had been passed in 1997. This distinguished it from most public 
sector organisations. This meant for example that particular kinds of information 
which might have been of interest to the public generally, for example the price 
paid to professionals and others regarding fees and salaries which we consider 
18 Byrne and McEntagart, above note 10, at 118.
19 Section 202(1), National Asset Management Agency Act 2009: “In this Act “confidential information “ means—
(a) information relating to the commercial or business interests of a participating institution or of a person who 
is or has been in a relationship with a participating institution,
(b) information that is subject at law or in equity to a duty of confidentiality,
(c) information that, if it were contained in a document, would have the result that a person could not be 
compelled to disclose the document in evidence,
(d) information the disclosure of which would tend to place NAMA, a NAMA group entity or the NTMA at a 
commercial disadvantage, or
(e) information about proposals of a commercial nature and tenders submitted to NAMA, a NAMA group entity 
or the NTMA.”
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under the heading of “rent-seeking” were not available and there has indeed been 
considerable speculation on these matters. Following considerable speculation 
around this matter NAMA finally became subject to the Freedom of Information 
Acts following the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 2014. Along with 
a number of other state bodies which had hitherto been excluded from the Freedom 
of Information Acts, NAMA is now covered as of 14 April 2015. These bodies 
were given a particular “lead in” period to prepare them for such access.20 What 
is not clear is whether information can be requested regarding matters occurring 
before this date of 14 April 2015.
Market	Intervention
Consideration of the scale of the value of the loan portfolios and underlying assets 
will quickly lead any observer to conclude that the concentration of this level 
of property activity into one entity, whether this is a private company or a state 
agency would have significant effects on the market. In this section the chapter will 
recount some particular issues of concern. However, to begin it is worth considering 
information regarding activity provided by NAMA itself. In its Annual report for 
2014 NAMA described the nature of the assets which secured its loan portfolio by 
sector. 17% of these assets was classified as “land” – property awaiting designation 
for zoning as building land or otherwise; 20% of its asset base was characterised 
as “development property” – indicating property for which some sort of zoning or 
planning authority had been issued. 15% of property was categorised as residential 
property, and similarly a second 15% was categorised as office property. It is very 
clear therefore that from 2010 onwards NAMA controlled significant levels of 
property based assets in Ireland.21 The effect on the property market was quite 
simply one of stagnation.
Of more significance in the immediate short term in terms of those who continued 
to operate businesses throughout the really difficult initial period of the financial 
crisis in Ireland, a significant portion of NAMA assets were held in the retail sector 
(15%) and in the hotel sector (6%).22 The presence of NAMA in these sectors and 
20 A particular issue had arisen in the intervening years regarding environmental information. In July 2015, the 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected arguments by the National Asset Management Agency that it is not a public 
authority subject to freedom of environmental information requests. An information request had been made to 
NAMA under the 2007 European (Access to Information on the Environment) Regulation. This had been denied 
and following a decision of the Commissioner, and the High Court against NAMA, the Supreme Court upheld 
the request but differed in its reasoning from the Commissioner. “Although Nama is obliged to act commercially, 
is it undoubtedly vested with special powers well beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in 
relations between persons governed by private law.”
21 NAMA Annual Report 2014.
22 Idem.
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its continued management of properties in the retail and hotel sector had significant 
impacts on those operating businesses outside of NAMA controlled properties. 
Effectively parts of these sectors were being operated as state run operations 
with all that entails, and these businesses were intersecting and competing with 
businesses being run under ordinary market dynamics to the detriment of those 
trying to continue to trade in these sectors.23
Further information which became significant in 2015 was that 45% of NAMA 
held properties were located in Dublin, with 20% in the rest of the country (i.e. the 
Republic of Ireland). The remainder of NAMA assets were located in other parts 
of the world. This means that the effect of NAMA as a market player would be 
most keenly felt in Dublin, as distinct from the rest of Ireland, once it began to act 
in relation to the sale of these properties.
Market	Intervention-The	Property	Market	in	2014
While the effect of NAMA operating properties in the retail and hotel sector had 
been experienced by other market actors in the period from 2010-2014, the effect 
of NAMA in relation to the sale of its properties only became apparent in 2014. 
According to its own Annual Report, NAMA has stated that 59% of its total 
sales occurred in 2014. It also reports that these sales amounted to “63% of Irish 
property sales in 2014.”24 The 2014 Annual Report stated that “disposal receipts… 
generated [EUR 7.8 billion]”. At the same time, newspapers in Dublin began to 
report a resurgence in the property market in 2014. This resurgence seems to have 
become somewhat illusory by the end of 2015.
Market	Intervention-Some	Individual	Cases
As discussed above, there were some early challenges from particularly disgruntled 
developers to the operation of NAMA based on the disruption of their banking 
relationships. The acquisition of loan portfolios by NAMA from various banks was 
by and large conducted without any prior consultation with individual companies. 
On the one hand it is of course argued that this kind of intervention was demanded 
by the nature of the financial emergency and the depth of the crisis is not disputed 
here. On the other hand the Supreme Court did take the view that it was appropriate 
to provide some cautionary guidelines as to how NAMA would proceed following 
the challenge from Dellway Investments Ltd. and others.
23 A. Ahearne, The	Next	Steps:	Restoring	Financial	Stability	to	the	Hotel	Industry	(Irish Hotels Federation, June 2014).
24 NAMA Annual Report 2014.
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As time has gone on we have had further opportunities to consider the actions of 
NAMA. Most recently the inquiry into the financial crisis conducted by the Irish 
Government25 has allowed us to hear from various business people regarding the 
effect of the actions of NAMA on their businesses.26 It is difficult to assess the 
veracity of such claims in any forensic way, particularly within the confines of 
this chapter, but nevertheless there is a legitimate perception that the presence of 
NAMA significantly influenced the markets. Whether matters would have been 
even worse without NAMA is not an easy question to answer. More concretely, 
once NAMA began to dispose of properties from 2014 on we can see that there 
have been unforeseen consequences for the operation of businesses and it is to this 
issue that we now turn.
III – Competing Interests
Disposal	of	the	Loan	Portfolios	and	Unforeseen	Consequences
Eventually, particularly from 2014 onwards, the loans which were originally 
acquired during 2009 and 2010 have been sold on by NAMA to investor capital 
companies. A number of these transactions will be considered to illustrate how the 
selling on by the state agency to outside investors of “bad loans” originally entered 
into by rescued banks with property related enterprises has led to unforeseen 
consequences for the original debtors.
In the disposal of its loan portfolio NAMA has given names to the particular 
projects involving the sale of loan portfolios to investors. So for example Project 
Tower involved the sale of loan portfolios where the loans had been originally 
taken out by the O’Flynn Construction Group based in Cork. These loans were 
acquired by Blackstone Capital in early 2014 and some time later, in August 
2014, Blackstone Capital operating through its Irish subsidiary Carbon Finance 
Ltd. applied for Examinership (the process in Irish law which allows for the 
restructuring and rescue of companies) for the O’Flynn Construction Group with 
a view to restructuring the group and, in particular, with a view to reducing the 
shareholding by the O’Flynn family. For various reasons, which need not detain 
us here, the O’Flynn shareholders were successful in defeating the appointment of 
25 See: www.bankinginquiry.ie.
26 Johnny Ronan, who was the main owner of property development companies Fronterra Investments and Treasury 
Holdings, complained to the Oireachtas (Parliamentary) Banking Inquiry that “Nama destroyed my business”. 
“Johnny Ronan claims NAMA destroyed his business” (Irish Times, September 2015): “Nama, by its founding 
legislation, was granted such wide reaching and potentially unconstitutional powers that, unless it came under 
constant and careful scrutiny, it was always open to abuse…. In addition, it seemed to me, Nama was granted an 
endless financial budget to engage legal, public relations and other professionals to ensure that it would always 
have the financial muscle to win every argument.”
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an Examiner to the Group.27 The only point to be made here is that the application 
for the appointment of an Examiner to this company which had operated since the 
1970s nearly destroyed the company. However, since 2014 the O’Flynn Group has 
sought to reposition itself with its new investors and reports are that the parties are 
working on new developments together.28
In relation to Project Eagle and Arrow, a second large US capital fund company, 
Cerberus capital took over loans relating to properties in Northern Ireland. Issues 
were raised about the valuation of the properties and the manner in which these 
were acquired. The relevant developers there have complained of ‘ruthlessness’ 
and ‘unrealistic expectations’ on the part of the new owners of the loans which has 
made the operation of the businesses and management of the properties particularly 
challenging.29 In response to these allegations the following statement was made 
by the Chairman of Cerberus:
“Cerberus is a patient, long-term investor and has a well-established 
track record of making significant improvements to the assets that 
it manages. We believe Cerberus has the ideal base of expertise 
and experience to manage the Eagle portfolio and will be a strong 
partner for NAMA, for Northern Ireland and for all the stakeholders 
associated with this transaction.”30
However, these two Projects have also come under additional scrutiny in relation 
to the valuation of the loan books and assets and in relation to payments made 
around the sales.31 These allegations have been denied by NAMA.
Rent-Seeking
The fact that NAMA was not subject to the Freedom of Information Acts 1997 
(as amended) until very recently (as described above) led to continued and 
sustained criticism of the potential for “rent-seeking” which the establishment of 
NAMA created. Rumours abounded regarding levels of professional fees paid 
to solicitors and other lawyers regarding the transactional activities of NAMA. 
In the early years fees were also paid to those charged with managing NAMA 
assets from everything to hotels, other retail outlets and half developed properties. 
27 O’Flynn	Construction	Group	and	Ors.	v	Carbon	Finance	Ltd.	and	Ors. [2014] IEHC.
28 “Michael O’Flynn signs binding deal with Carbon Finance” (Irish Independent, 14 February 2015); “O’Flynn and 
Blackstone – it’s a deal” (Irish Examiner, 31 January 2015).
29 “Belfast developer Gareth Graham claims Cerberus ‘ruthless’” (Irish Times, 4 September 2015).
30 John Snow, Chairman, Cerberus Capital (4 April 2015).
31 “The controversy around Nama’s property deal has just gotten deeper” (The Journal, 23 October 2015), available 
at: http://www.thejournal.ie/project-arrow-ni-controversy-change-northern-ireland-2407079-Oct2015/?r_dir_d=1.
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Indeed some of the individual property developers were also paid consultancy 
and other fees and salaries to assist NAMA in the management of the extensive 
property portfolios. Information asymmetries regarding these amounts has led to 
considerable concern on these matters.
Further issues arise regarding the valuation of assets and loans even now as these 
are being sold on. For example, the sale in 2013 of the O’Flynn Construction Group 
portfolio valued at over EUR 1.5 billion for EUR 980 million was queried quite 
publicly by individuals close to the businesses concerned. In response NAMA 
stated that as a matter of policy it did not comment on individual transactions. In 
the same vein it was reported that in early 2015 Cerberus Capital:
“…has agreed to acquire the [GBP 4.5 billion] nominally valued 
Project Eagle loan portfolio for above [GBP 1 billion] in cash, in line 
with previous reports”32
Further	Difficulties
In addition to the normal problems of “rent-seeking” allegations are being made 
which would indicate certain types of activity which are more serious. In relation 
to Project Eagle and Arrow, the valuations placed on the properties were queried, 
most recently by Independent member of parliament Mick Wallace who stated in 
the parliament that:
“Cerberus have been able to sell loans for double what they paid for 
them in a very short period of time.”
He alleged that Nama sold the loans in what was called “Project Eagle”, for 
approximately 27 pence in the pound when in contrast Cerberus had profited from 
these sales. He went on to state:
“The missing 73 pence in the pound has been picked up by the 
taxpayer in the south.”
The allegations continued with this particular TD alleging in parliament (Dail) 
before the summer of 2015 that GBP 7 million was l ying in an Isle of Man bank 
account, linked to the Nama sale and intended for “fixers”. On 24 September, he 
made further allegations that “[EUR] 45 million has been paid to fixers.”33 It has 
been reported that these matters and particular claims made regarding payments to 
32 CoStar	Finance, 4 April 2015.
33 The same TD has been the target of litigation by Cerberus Capital and it has been reported recently (Irish Times, 
30 January 2016) that they have obtained a judgement of EUR 2 million against him.
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intermediaries in relation to this particular set of transactions are currently being 
investigated in both NI and the US.
Conclusion
In its concluding parts, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the range of 
vested interests has increased as the activities of NAMA unfolded. Originally the 
purpose was to ensure the stability of the Irish banking system. Once the sovereign 
debt issue developed, it then became clear that the concerns and interests of the 
sovereign and tax payers had to take centre stage. NAMA was entrusted with 
acquiring the best value possible for these investments, loans and securities 
which the State had taken on. As matters unfolded however, those closest to the 
banking transactions, namely the developers and their companies were affected 
by decisions and steps taken by NAMA, not least during the initial phases when 
loans were taken over and the state became involved in managing assets. Two 
kinds of problems emerged, questions of valuation and second, the manner in 
which the assets and loans were to be managed. Subsequently, when the loans were 
eventually sold, the unforeseen actions of third parties such as the capital funds 
mentioned also affected the original borrowers. In the meantime, those impacted 
by the market effects of the presence of NAMA, for example in the hotel and retail 
sector had an interest in how NAMA continued to operate in those markets.
Leaving the question of vested interests aside, one must return to the fundamental 
question by which NAMA will ultimately be assessed. Was value obtained for 
the State? It must be clarified that there is no doubt that the extent of the crisis 
was such that something drastic and effective had to be done. This chapter seeks 
to explore the question of whether NAMA has acted effectively and to consider 
analytical tools as to how that question will be answered. It is envisaged that 
NAMA will be wound down by 2019 and in fact a 10 year period was envisaged 
from the outset as its lifespan. Assessment of efficacy is extremely difficult. This 
chapter highlights some of the analytical tools by which lawyers might assess the 
establishment of NAMA and its operation. Further analysis, including economic 
assessments of the achievements of NAMA, will be ongoing as more information 
becomes available over time.
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Chapter 6
Australian Banks and Crisis Management: 
Recent Developments
Rosalind Mason and Michael Murray
Introduction
While some Australian banks experienced funding pressures during the height of the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”) in 2008, none failed. Financial stability was 
maintained by a well-coordinated regulatory response. Public sector intervention 
was largely limited to a guarantee for deposits and to wholesale funding (in order 
to “backstop” the access of banks to funds).1 Indeed, the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) has noted that:
“Australia has a history of few bank failures, even fewer financial 
crises, and its banking sector emerged from the global financial crisis 
relatively well.”2
The IMF undertakes a Financial Sector Assessment Program which examines a 
country’s financial system, assessing it against international standards, in order to 
assist the country to identify and remedy vulnerabilities.3 In 2012, the Financial 
Stability Assessment Report (“FSAR”) on Australia identified that a review 
of its crisis management tools may be necessary because of the structure of its 
banking sector.4 A key factor was the highly concentrated nature of the Australian 
banking sector.5
1 G. Turner, “Depositor Protection in Australia” (2011) Reserve	Bank	of	Australia	Bulletin (December Quarter) 45, 
at 50: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/pdf/bu-1211-5.pdf.
2 International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), Australia:	Financial	Safety	Net	and	Crisis	Management	Framework, 
(Financial Sector Assessment Program Update, Technical Note, 2012), at [11]: http://www.apra.gov.au.
3 Following the GFC, the G20 established a Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), which in 2011 endorsed Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions: Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes 
of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2011): http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/.
4 IMF, Australia:	Financial	System	Stability	Assessment, (IMF Country Report No 12/308, 2012), at [51]: http://
www.apra.gov.au.
5 B. Donovan and A. Gorajek,	“Developments in the Structure of the Australian Financial System” (2011) Reserve 
Bank	of	Australia	Bulletin (June Quarter) 29, at 39: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/jun/pdf/
bu-0611-5.pdf.
Australian	Banks	and	Crisis	Management:	Recent	Developments
72 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
Also in 2012, the government issued a Consultation Paper6 on strengthening the 
Australian prudential regulator’s crisis management powers over the formally 
termed “authorised deposit-taking institutions” (“ADIs”).7 Then in late 2013, 
the government established a Financial Systems Inquiry8 which handed down its 
final Financial System Inquiry Report (“FSI Report2) in December 2014.9 There 
was further public consultation on the final report however at the time of writing 
the government has not yet announced its response on implementing the FSI 
Report recommendations.10
This chapter will first outline the regulation of Australian ADIs. (That is, banks, 
credit unions and building societies although for simplicity we use the term 
‘banks’ in the chapter.) It will then describe those aspects of regulation that apply 
where a bank is facing financial difficulty and potential insolvency. Next, it will 
provide details of the 2014 Financial System Inquiry Report, concentrating on the 
recommendations regarding capital adequacy and crisis management. Thereafter 
it will address some current issues in Australia – the significant reliance upon 
prudential regulation; some concerns about the concentration of the banking sector; 
and the competing pressures to both comply with international standards on capital 
adequacy and to retain competitiveness and lending flexibility. In conclusion it 
comments on a key policy issue which was debated in the FSI Report has been the 
need to achieve a necessary balance between public expectations of government 
intervention during a financial crisis on the one hand, and market discipline through 
competition or self-regulation on the other.
Regulation of Australian Banks
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”), the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (the Reserve Bank; the central bank) and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (“ASIC”) oversee the Australian financial system. The 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is also relevant in so far as it 
6 The Treasury, Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers (Consultation Paper, 2012): http://www.
treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2012/APRA.
7 Section 5, Banking	Act (Cth).
8 Australia’s financial system has largely been based on the last inquiry in 1997, commonly known as the Wallis 
Report:	Financial System Inquiry, Final Report (1997), at 128: http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.asp.
9 Final Report of the Financial System Inquiry (7 December 2014), under the chairmanship of Mr David Murray, AO.
10 Note: following presentation of this chapter at the INSOL Europe conference, the government handed down 
its response on 15 October 2015. This recent development is referred to briefly in the conclusion: http://www.
treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/Govt%20response%20to%20the%20FSI.
73
regulates competition policy.11 APRA and ASIC have specific responsibility under 
their establishing statutes to supervise financial institutions.
A Council of Financial Regulators comprises APRA, the Reserve Bank, ASIC 
and the key government department, the Australian Treasury.12 The Council 
was created to provide a high-level forum for cooperation, collaboration and 
information exchange among its members. It operates in normal times as well 
as in crisis situations.13 The agencies overseeing the Australian financial system 
are to be independent of the government of the day. The Reserve Bank is an 
independent central bank and as such is accountable to the democratically elected 
federal Parliament.14
Even though APRA and ASIC are required to act independently and objectively 
in performing their functions and exercising their powers under their respective 
statutes, the Minister (in practice, the Australian Treasurer) retains responsibility 
for policy formulation and operational priorities.15 In 2014, statements of 
government expectations were issued to each of ASIC and APRA to the effect 
that, while each must continue to act independently and objectively, they were 
also expected to “take into account the government’s broad policy framework”.16
The Treasurer has some particular statutory involvement. In order to promote a 
policy objective on the spread of bank ownership,17 the Treasurer can apply to 
court if an unacceptable shareholding situation exists in relation to an ADI.18 In 
addition, there are circumstances in which APRA must inform the Treasurer, for 
example when applying to wind-up or restructure an ADI.
The FSI Report concluded that Australia’s regulatory architecture did not need 
major change. However, it recommended some improvements. In particular, it 
referred to the lack of a regular process that allows the government to assess the 
overall performance of financial regulators. It also identified some significant 
weaknesses in the regulators’ funding arrangements and enforcement tools, 
11 APRA Brochure (2010), at 3: http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Documents/APRA-Brochure-
FINAL-08Jan2010.pdf.
12 The Council is a non-statutory body which chaired by the Governor of the Reserve Bank.
13 IMF, Australia:	Financial	Safety	Net	and	Crisis	Management	Framework, (Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Update, Technical Note, 2012), at [2]: http://www.apra.gov.au/.
14 Sections 11 and 13, Reserve	Bank	Act	1959.
15 Section 12, Australian	Prudential	Regulation	Authority	Act	1998.
16 See: http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Documents/140417-SOE-APRA-Statement-of-Expectations.pdf; 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Statement-of-expectations--April-2014?openDocument.
17 Section 12, Financial	Sector	(Shareholdings)	Act	1998.
18 As defined in section 5, Banking	Act	1959. An ADI is essentially a corporate entity to which APRA has granted 
an authority to carry on banking business in Australia and includes banks, credit unions and building societies.
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particularly for ASIC. It also asked whether adequate consideration is currently 
given to competition and efficiency in designing and applying regulation.19
Crisis Management
Australia’s insolvency regime for trading companies is governed by the national 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”). This Act governs corporate 
law generally, of which corporate insolvency, in Chapter 5, is a part. ASIC is the 
relevant corporate insolvency regulator.20 The corporate structure and insolvency of 
certain bodies in Australia are, for policy reasons, governed by separate legislation. 
Such bodies are overseen by separate regulators. ADIs are separately governed by 
the Banking	Act	1959 (Cth) and are regulated by APRA.
While APRA regulates banks, given they are corporations, the Corporations 
Act also applies to them.21 ASIC therefore also has a role in their regulation, for 
example in relation to their financial reporting, market conduct and disclosure 
requirements.22 To assist in coordination and communication between the two 
regulators about potential risks to an ADI’s financial stability, APRA and ASIC 
each operate under a Memorandum of Understanding in relation to the sharing of 
information and other relevant matters under their respective authority.23
Australian	Prudential	Regulation	Authority	(APRA)
APRA is established under the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 
1998 (Cth) (“APRA Act”). It is funded largely by the industries that it supervises. 
Its purpose, relevantly, is to regulate the financial sector operating under prudential 
requirements, and to develop the administrative practices and procedures to be 
applied in performing that regulatory role and administration. Importantly, it 
also administers the government’s Financial Claims Scheme (“FCS”) by which 
bank depositors are protected to a certain monetary amount in the event of a 
bank’s failure.
19 “Overview”, FSI Final Report, at xx.
20 Established under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001.
21 Section 70B, Banking	Act 1959 provides that it “has effect despite any provision of the Corporations Act”.
22 In so far as they are companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (“ASX”) they are also regulated by the ASX.
23 Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (September 2014): http://download.asic.gov.au/media/2225959/afsa-
mou-published-1-october-2014.pdf.
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The APRA Act provides that:
“(i)n performing and exercising its functions and powers, APRA is to 
balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, 
contestability and competitive neutrality and, in balancing these 
objectives, is to promote financial system stability in Australia.”24
According to APRA, it promotes this:
“by requiring these institutions to manage risk prudently so as to 
minimise the likelihood of financial losses to depositors, policy 
holders and superannuation fund members. Through its supervision, 
APRA’s aim is to identify potential weaknesses in its regulated 
institutions as early as possible. APRA follows a risk-based 
approach under which institutions facing greater risks receive closer 
supervision. After an institution is licensed by APRA, it is subject 
to ongoing supervision to ensure it is managing risks prudently and 
meeting prudential requirements, and to identify those institutions 
that are unable or unwilling to do so.”25
APRA’s prudential framework for ADIs includes the issue of Prudential 
Standards,26 Prudential Practice Guides and Guidance Notes. The Standards 
implement the Basel III risk-based capital regulations27 and apply to all locally 
incorporated ADIs, including small- and medium-sized commercial banking 
institutions that are not internationally active.
The Basel framework deals with systemically important banks. While Australia 
has no global systematically important banks (“G-SIBs”),28 it has a number of 
“D-SIBs” (domestic systemically important banks), which could, if they were to 
come under stress, have an important impact on the domestic financial system and 
24 Section 8(2), Australian	Prudential	Regulation	Authority	Act	1998.
25 APRA, “Supervision”: http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutApra/Pages/Supervision.aspx.
26 By authority under section 11AF, Banking	Act	1959.
27 See the Basel Committee’s report, Regulatory	Consistency	Assessment	Programme	–	Assessment	of	Basel	III	
regulations	–	Australia	(March 2014).
28 G-SIBs are systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) of such size, market importance and 
interconnectedness that their distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the international financial 
system and adverse economic consequences: APRA, Information	Paper:	Domestic	Systemically	 Important	
Banks	in	Australia	(Information Paper, December 2013): http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/Publications/Documents/
Information-Paper-Domestic-systemically-important-banks-in-Australia-December-2013.pdf.
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economy.29 APRA has outlined the approach that it is taking in implementing the 
D-SIB framework in Australia.30
The Banking	Act contains a range of legal measures allowing APRA to maintain 
and regulate financial stability in the banking sector, and measures to allow a crisis 
management response by APRA in the event that it is required. The Act also allows 
the formal insolvent winding-up of the ADI.31
The Banking	Act deals with the authorisation for, and carrying on of, “banking 
business”32 under the authority of APRA, covering APRA’s prudential supervision 
and monitoring of the compliance of ADIs with prudential standards. The criteria 
to revoke the authority to carry on “banking business” include, for example, that it 
would be contrary to the national interest or contrary to financial system stability 
for the authority to remain in force. 33 A further criterion is that the bank is insolvent 
and is unlikely to return to solvency within a reasonable period of time.34
There are necessarily certain procedures to be undergone before APRA revokes 
an ADI’s authority, although in matters of urgency, APRA has the authority to act 
promptly. Those procedures allow or require APRA to give directions to an ADI, 
again on broad based criteria that include insolvency, or that there is a “material 
risk to the security of the bank’s assets, or its financial condition”,35 or that the 
ADI is conducting its affairs in a way that may cause or promote instability in the 
Australian financial system.
The kinds of direction that APRA may give to an ADI include not to give 
any financial accommodation or to accept deposits, or to borrow, or to give 
directions about:
29 IMF, “IMF Expanding Surveillance to Require Mandatory Financial Stability Assessments of Countries with 
Systemically Important Financial Sectors” (Press Release No 10/357, 2010): http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
pr/2010/pr10357.htm.
30 APRA, Information	Paper:	Domestic	Systemically	Important	Banks	in	Australia	(Information Paper, December 
2013): http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/Publications/Documents/Information-Paper-Domestic-systemically-
important-banks-in-Australia-December-2013.pdf.
31 Sections 7-36, Banking	Act	1959.
32 Ibid., section 5: “banking business”, defined by reference to the banking and related powers under the Australian 
Constitution.
33 Ibid., section 9A.
34 Ibid., section 9A(2)(e). Under section 5, insolvency is defined as “not able to pay all its debts as and when they 
become due and payable”. However the words “unlikely to be returned to solvency within a reasonable time” 
allow more flexibility in relation to APRA’s decision to take action.
35 Ibid., section 11CA(1)(g).
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“anything else as to the way in which the affairs of the [ADI] are to 
be conducted or not conducted.”36
Where the ADI is subject to an APRA direction, a party to a contract with the ADI 
may not deny any obligations under that contract; accelerate any debt under that 
contract; or close out any transaction relating to that contract.37
The Banking	Act also covers APRA’s statutory duty regarding the protection 
of depositors. Where an ADI which may be showing signs of financial stress, 
APRA has power to address a range of circumstances, including appointing an 
“investigator” to assess the ADI’s position. APRA may also give recapitalisation 
directions to a failing ADI by way of directing the ADI to issue shares in the ADI, 
or in other capital instruments determined by APRA.38 In addition, APRA has 
power under the Financial	Sector	(Business	Transfer	and	Group	Restructure	Act)	
1999	(“Business Transfer Act”) to direct a transfer of business from one ADI to 
another, or to a body corporate. The Business Transfer Act enables some or all of 
the business of an ADI to be transferred to another ADI, or to be transferred to 
an asset management vehicle. Such a vehicle enables impaired assets of the ADI 
to be quarantined and dealt with separately while efforts are made to resolve the 
distress of the ADI. A compulsory transfer may be effected without the need for 
the approval of the ADI.39
If the investigator or APRA finds that the ADI’s financial position is in serious 
decline, APRA may decide to appoint an “ADI statutory manager”. Typically that 
person would be a registered company liquidator.40 That manager takes immediate 
control of the ADI’s business and has a range of powers and duties in effect to 
resolve the ADI’s financial distress. The directors are removed and their authority 
is displaced. The ADI statutory manager must report to APRA as required. The 
manager can recommend action by APRA, including that APRA apply to wind-up 
the ADI.
Separately, in the absence of any notice from the ADI, the Banking	Act allows 
APRA to appoint a statutory manager to an ADI on various bases, including if 
36 Ibid., section 11CA(2)(p).
37 Ibid., section 11CD.
38 Ibid., section 13E.
39 APRA must be satisfied that the transfer is appropriate, having regard amongst other things to the interests of the 
financial sector as a whole, and that complementary legislation to facilitate the transfer has been enacted to ensure 
that, when a certificate of transfer comes into force, the receiving body is taken to be the successor in law to the 
transferring body, to the extent of the transfer: section 25(2), Business Transfer Act. Such legislation is required 
to address the transferring body’s assets, liabilities, duties, obligations, immunities, rights and privileges applying 
to the receiving body, to the extent of the transfer: section 28.
40 Registered and regulated by ASIC under the Corporations Act 2001.
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APRA “considers” it is likely that the ADI will be unable to carry on banking 
business in Australia consistently with the interest of its depositors; or it is likely 
that the ADI will be unable to carry on banking business in Australia consistently 
with the stability of the Australian financial system.41
Once the ADI statutory manager is appointed, its role will vary depending on 
whether APRA has adopted, in the words of the IMF, an “open” or “closed” 
resolution strategy. In an open resolution, the role of the statutory manager is to 
enable the ADI to meet its existing obligations and to continue business either 
through the existing ADI or in another entity. In doing so, the statutory manager 
acts in conjunction with APRA, and at APRA’s direction. In a closed resolution, 
the role of the statutory manager is to position the ADI for its orderly liquidation. 
This could involve withdrawing the ADI from the payment system or facilitating 
the transfer of its deposit book to another ADI. The ADI would be closed to new 
business. APRA may then apply to the court to wind-up the ADI.42
The Banking	Act	then allows APRA to apply to the court for an order that an ADI 
be wound-up if APRA considers that the ADI is insolvent and cannot be restored 
to solvency within a reasonable period.43 That winding-up of the ADI is conducted 
in accordance with the Corporations	Act,	upon which the role of the ADI statutory 
manager ends. Separately, APRA also has authority under the Corporations 
Act to apply to wind-up an ADI and have an official liquidator appointed.44 On 
the appointment of a liquidator, APRA may terminate the position of the ADI 
statutory manager.45
The winding-up of the ADI would then largely proceed under the Corporations 
Act regime. Significantly, the court order for winding-up allows the government 
to immediately implement the Financial Claims Scheme (“FCS”) established 
under the Banking	Act by which depositors of the failed bank would be paid.46 
The liquidator has a significant role in assessing depositors’ claims and facilitating 
payment. Account holders of the ADI may then be paid from the FCS. Australia 
41 Section 13A(1)(b) and (c), Banking	Act	1959.
42 IMF, Australia:	Financial	Safety	Net	and	Crisis	Management	Framework, (Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Update, Technical Note, 2012), at [39].
43 Section 14F, Banking	Act	1959.
44 In cases of urgency, a liquidator may be appointed provisionally.
45 Termed an “ultimate termination of control”: section 13C, Banking	Act	1959.
46 The FSI Final Report recommends ensuring Australian ADIs have sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity in resolution to make it feasible to implement an orderly resolution of an ADI’s position and reducing 
perceptions that some institutions have an implicit government guarantee. Australia does not have a bail-in 
regime, whereby depositors’ funds are applied to meet a failed bank’s liabilities, as an option for dealing with 
crisis management in its banking sector. See A. McCunn, “Insolvencies, bailouts and resolutions: Dealing with 
banks when the music stops” (2014) 25 Journal	of	Banking	and	Financial	Law	and	Practice 71.
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does not have a bail-in regime, whereby depositors’ funds are applied to meet a 
failed bank’s liabilities. Instead deposits are protected through an explicit guarantee 
under the FCS, supported by depositor preference. The scheme is administered by 
APRA in conjunction with the liquidator of the insolvent ADI.
Australian law in relation to insolvency proceedings for ADIs is now explained in 
some more detail.
Insolvency Proceedings
The outcome of a failing ADI may be its formal insolvency. A winding-up action 
may be brought before the court by APRA under the Banking	Act47 or through 
its right to do so under the Corporations Act.48 APRA’s right to apply under the 
Banking	Act exists only if an ADI statutory manager remains in control of the 
ADI’s business and:
“APRA considers that the ADI is insolvent and could not be restored 
to solvency within a reasonable period.”
The winding-up of the ADI is to be conducted in accordance with the Corporations 
Act with only limited continued application of the Banking	Act. APRA is to inform 
the Treasurer who may then choose to activate the FCS so that depositors can receive 
earlier and higher payments than they would through the winding-up process.
A creditor or shareholder may apply to wind-up an ADI under these general 
Corporations Act provisions. In such cases, the Banking	Act imposes an obligation 
on such an applicant to give advance notice to APRA; a breach is a criminal 
offence.49 Importantly, the legal consequences of the appointment of a statutory 
manager include the imposition of an automatic stay on legal proceedings being 
brought against the ADI, including winding-up proceedings, and the termination 
of the appointment of any pre-existing external administrator.50
The requirement under the Banking	Act to formally notify APRA of an application 
to the court is not imposed in circumstances where an insolvency administrator is 
voluntarily appointed under the Corporations Act. The ADI could place itself into 
voluntary liquidation, or into Part 5.3A voluntary administration or into a scheme 
of arrangement. Once in insolvency administration, it is open to the various 
47 Section 14F, Banking	Act	1959, s 14F.
48 Section 459P, Corporations Act 2001. APRA is a “prescribed agency” under Corporations Regulation 5.4.01 for 
the purposes of section 459P.
49 Section 62B, Banking	Act	1959.
50 Ibid., section 15A.
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insolvency appointees to place the ADI into other types of administration, for 
example from liquidation into a Part 5.3A administration or into a Part 5.1 scheme 
of arrangement, as means of dealing with the ADI’s insolvency.
The winding-up of an ADI is conducted according to the Corporations Act, which 
gives the liquidator extensive powers and discretions, including selling the business 
of the company or any part of it. The Banking	Act imposes some overlays by way 
of limiting and oversighting the role of the liquidator. For example, section 63 
requires the Treasurer to consent to any reconstruction of the affairs of an ADI that 
may be proposed by a liquidator. The Banking	Act	also imposes responsibilities on 
the liquidator to manage the FCS.
Beyond that, the Corporations Act is the sole source of how the winding-up is to 
be conducted.51 As with other comparable jurisdictions, it requires the liquidator to 
gather in and realise assets, ascertain the creditors, take proceedings for recovery 
as may be possible, and pay dividends to creditors. Creditors’ claims against the 
ADI are stayed, save for secured creditors. A liquidator may trade on the insolvent 
company’s business only to the extent necessary to facilitate its winding-up.
It is apparent that the ADI would have been wound-up at the end of a process 
of earlier intervention by APRA. The funds of depositors would necessarily be 
assets of the ADI over which the liquidator retains control; a freeze on depositors’ 
funds would apply but at the same time the FCS would immediately apply to 
allow payments to depositors to be made. A major task of the liquidator would 
be to assess and facilitate those payments. No other banking business could be 
conducted. Loan books of the ADI would continue to be managed and may be sold.
Creditors of a bank are ranked and paid in the ordinary course according to the 
provisions of the Corporations Act. Depositors are creditors of the bank and as 
such they must prove for the amount of the debt and, subject to specific provisions 
mentioned below, would rank behind secured creditors and any preferential 
creditors, such as employees.52 Also, APRA’s costs of having an ADI statutory 
manager in control of an ADI’s business are payable from the ADI’s funds and 
are a debt due to APRA.53
51 See generally M. Murray and J. Harris,	Keay’s	Insolvency:	Personal	and	Corporate	Law	and	Practice (9th ed) 
(2016, Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, Sydney).
52 A. Tyree, Banking	Law	in	Australia (8th ed) (2014, LexisNexis, Sydney), at [3.4.1]. Also see FSI Final Report, 
in Figure 3: ADI liability structure and prudential requirements.
53 Section 16, Banking	Act	1959. These priorities apply over all other unsecured debts, but subject to the statutory 
priorities for the application of assets of an ADI in Australia, under section 13A(3).
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A significant feature of the Banking	Act is that it provides, in relation to both 
insolvent Australian banks and the Australian branches of insolvent foreign banks, 
that deposit liabilities in Australia receive a priority out of Australian assets. 
That is, the assets of the bank in Australia are to be available to meet the bank’s 
liabilities in Australia in priority to other liabilities of the bank.54 In support of 
these priorities, ADIs that take retail deposits in Australia are required to hold 
assets in Australia at least equal to their deposit liabilities in Australia.55
The Financial Claims Scheme
The Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) was introduced into the Banking	Act in 2008 
and provides deposit protection for bank depositors.56 It established a government 
funded57 Early Access Facility for Depositors, administered by APRA. Its purpose 
is to ensure that depositors in a failed ADI have immediate or early access to funds 
more quickly than they would receive through the winding-up process and the 
depositor preference arrangements.
Since 1 February 2012, the FCS guarantees deposits up to a cap of AUD 250,000 
for each account-holder of an Australian incorporated ADI.58 This includes 
Australian banks and locally incorporated foreign subsidiary banks. If such an 
ADI becomes insolvent, then both individual and business depositors have quick 
access to their deposits.
The FCS is only activated when APRA applies to have an ADI wound-up and the 
Treasurer declares that the FCS will be applied to that ADI. APRA may require 
the liquidator to assist APRA in paying account holders their entitlements, to 
which the liquidator must give precedence over any other aspects of winding-up 
the ADI, including any requirements under the Corporations Act.59 Priority is 
given to prompt payment to depositors; for example, the liquidator may admit 
54 Ibid., section 11F in relation to a foreign bank and section 13A(iii) in relation to an Australian bank. There is a 
similar priority to that found in section 116, Insurance Act 1973.
55 Ibid., section 13A(4). Since 2011, ADIs may issue “covered bonds”; however, in the event of an ADI’s insolvency, 
the cover pool does not form part of its assets and so is not affected by section 13A. APRA retains a power to 
order (for the benefit of depositors) that an ADI stop maintaining a cover pool: section 31A(5).
56 Ibid., Part II Division 2AA (section 16AB ff).
57 The Scheme, which has not been called upon in respect of ADIs, provides that the government may recoup 
payments from the winding-up and if there is any shortfall then APRA may apply a levy on the ADI sector: 
see APRA, Financial	Claims	Schemes	or	Authorised	Depot-taking	Institutions (1 February 2012), available 
at: http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/ADI%20Financial%20Claims%20Scheme%20FAQ%20
01%2002%2012.pdf. See FSI Final Report, at 82: “Government should retain the current FCS funding model for 
ADIs, under which payouts are recovered from liquidating the failed ADI and, where this is insufficient, an ad 
hoc levy can be placed on the banking industry.”
58 The original cap of A$1 million was reduced following a government review.
59 Section 16AJ, Banking	Act	1959.
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a depositor’s claim even if it has not been proved according to the requirements 
of the Corporations Act.60 When depositors are paid, APRA then “stands in the 
shoes” of each of the depositors as a creditor in the winding-up of the ADI. As 
such, APRA is entitled to receive a dividend in respect of those payments in the 
final winding-up of the ADI.61 Costs incurred by APRA in administering the 
FCS are admissible as a debt due to APRA.62 The liquidator’s remuneration and 
expenses are given priority.
In addition to the FCS, the Australian Government operated a Guarantee Scheme 
for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding from late 2008 and closed it for new 
liabilities at the end of March 2010.63 It was designed to assist eligible ADIs64 to 
continue to access funding during the height of the GFC. It was also intended to 
ensure these ADIs were not disadvantaged compared to international competitors 
that were able to access similar government guarantees on bank debt.65 The 
government decision to close the scheme followed advice from the Council of 
Financial Regulators that economic conditions had improved to the point where it 
was no longer required.
Consultations and Inquiries
In 2008, 2009 and 2010, a series of legislative reforms in relation to banks, 
insurers and superannuation (pension funds) providers implemented measures 
to enhance prudential regulation and to protect consumers. Then the Australian 
Government’s 2012 Consultation Paper66 sought submissions on a range of 
options for enhancing and streamlining financial services legislation. In particular, 
it sought to align Australia’s regulatory framework with international standards 
for crisis management arrangements in response to the FSB’s focus for its 
member countries.67
60 Ibid., section 16AQ.
61 Ibid., section 16AI. To date, there appear to have been no claims against an ADI under the FCS.
62 Ibid., section 16AO.
63 See: http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/FinanceAndMarkets/Deposit-and-Wholesale-Funding-
Guarantees/Report-on-the-Operation-of-the-Guarantee-Scheme-for-Large-Deposits-and-Wholesale-Funding.
64 These are listed in the Scheme Rules and include Australian-owned banks; Australian-incorporated ADIs 
which are subsidiaries of foreign banks; branches of foreign banks; building societies and credit unions: www.
guaranteescheme.gov.au.
65 Idem.
66 The Treasury Consultation Paper, 2012: http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/
Consultations/2012/APRA.
67 Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2011).
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During 2014, the broader Financial System Inquiry referred to earlier was 
undertaken. Prior to this, the last major inquiry into Australia’s financial system 
had been the 1997 Financial System Inquiry report (commonly known as the Wallis 
Report) upon which Australia’s financial system has since largely been based.68 
The FSI Final Report recommended strengthening three aspects of Australia’s 
regulatory framework for the orderly resolution of ADIs:
1. Completing the existing processes for strengthening crisis management 
powers that have been on hold pending the outcome of the Inquiry; 69
2. Effective pre-positioning and planning for the use of those powers. The 
Inquiry supported further work by government on this aspect.70 
3. Implementing a framework for minimum loss absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity in line with emerging international practice, sufficient to facilitate the 
orderly resolution of Australian ADIs and minimise taxpayer support.71
These recommendations remained under consideration by the government until 
mid-October 2015.72
Conclusion: Current Issues in Australia
Reliance upon Prudential Regulation
The history of Australia’s dealing with banks’ financial instability and potential 
insolvency is based more on their strict prudential regulation by APRA rather than 
on APRA’s use of its crisis management powers under the Banking	Act	or the 
Corporations	Act. Should that prudential regulation not in fact forestall or prevent 
an ADI’s failure, the question would arise whether an Australian government 
would in fact “allow” that ADI to fail. That issue raises a tension between a strict 
regulation of banks and a more open and competitive banking market. What 
68 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) (Wallis Report), at 128: http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/
FinalReport.asp.
69 FSI Final Report: The Treasury, Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers (Consultation Paper, 2012) 
refers to APRA directions powers, group resolution powers and powers to assist with resolving branches of 
foreign banks; and the Council of Financial Regulators recommendations include a specialised resolution regime 
for financial market infrastructure and the need for the clarifying of the application of location requirements for 
financial management infrastructure operating across borders.
70 FSI Final Report: “All proposals should go through the appropriate consultation, regulatory assessment and 
compliance cost assessment processes.”
71 Ibid., at 67-75.
72 NB: the government handed down its response following presentation of this chapter at the INSOL Europe 
conference, for which see: http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/Govt%20
response%20to%20the%20FSI. This subsequent development is mentioned briefly in the conclusion.
Australian	Banks	and	Crisis	Management:	Recent	Developments
84 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
governments require of banks in difficulty is that they be targeted at an early 
stage and reorganised so as to ensure the continuing viability of their operations. 
In that context the focus is more on whether adequate legislative and regulatory 
mechanisms are available, rather than on the perhaps unlikely outcome of a bank’s 
formal insolvency.
Governance of an ADI
As an ADI is a company, it has a board of directors and management. Directors 
are subject to the general obligations of corporate governance and the duties of 
directors at general law and also under the Corporations Act, for example in 
relation to the exercise of good faith, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.73 
Under the Banking	Act, APRA may remove a director of an ADI, as well as a 
“senior manager”.74 Statutory management takes the place of the directors and 
management, whose authority ceases, where APRA does not have confidence that 
the board and management of the ADI is capable of resolving the ADI’s financial 
distress satisfactorily or indeed where the actions of the board and management 
may have led to the ADI’s financial position.75
In other circumstances, the statutory manager may seek to have the existing 
management of the ADI retained, in order to seek to preserve the core business 
and functionality, and the economic value, of the ADI entity with a view to its 
business continuing. Equally, existing management may be retained to prepare and 
pre-position the ADI for an orderly discontinuation of business.
Corporate governance of ADIs was raised during the Financial System Inquiry 
and in 2014, APRA issued Prudential Standard CPS 510 Governance setting out 
minimum foundations for good governance of an APRA-regulated institution. Its 
objective is:
“to ensure that an institution is managed soundly and prudently by 
a competent Board (or equivalent), which can make reasonable and 
impartial business judgements in the best interests of the institution 
and which duly considers the impact of its decisions on depositors 
and/or policyholders.”76
73 Sections 180-4, Corporations Act 2001; the definition of director and related persons is in section 9; section 11CA, 
Banking	Act provides that the term “director” has the same meaning as it has in the Corporations Act.
74 Section 11CA, Banking	Act	1959. A senior manager is defined in section 5 as “a person who has or exercises any 
of the senior management responsibilities (within the meaning of the prudential standards) for the ADI...”
75 Ibid., section 15.
76 See: http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/Final-Prudential-Standard-CPS-510-Governance-
(January-2014).pdf.
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Concentration	of	the	Banking	Sector
A key issue in the FSAR was the highly concentrated nature of the Australian 
banking sector. The comparatively high ownership of banking assets by four 
banks77 increased following the GFC:
“with the major banks’ share of total ADI assets increasing from 65.4 
per cent in September 2007 to 78.5 per cent in March 2014.”78
The risks associated with this concentration are exacerbated by the predominance 
of similar business models focused on housing lending, in that a problem at one 
bank could cause issues for the sector and financial system as a whole. During 
2015, APRA strengthened the capital adequacy requirements for residential 
mortgage exposures.79 Also the FSI Final Report recommended the preservation 
of the longstanding “Four Pillars” policy, which precludes mergers between the 
four major banks.80
Balancing	Public	Expectations	of	Government	in	a	GFC	and	Private	Market	
Discipline	through	Competition	or	Self-regulation
The 1997 Wallis Report stated that in general terms:
“the government should not provide an absolute guarantee in 
any area of the financial system (just as it does not do so in other 
areas). Primary responsibility should remain with those who make 
financial promises.”81
Nevertheless a decade later during the GFC, the Australian government did 
provide additional support through the Wholesale Debt Guarantee Scheme82 and 
the Financial Claims Scheme.
The 2014 Financial System Inquiry considered the wisdom of the changed public 
expectations on government intervention during a financial crisis.83 It preferred 
77 The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ); the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA); 
the National Australia Bank Limited (NAB); and Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac).
78 Interim FSI Report (2014), at 2-6.
79 See: http://www.apra.gov.au/mediareleases/pages/15_19.aspx.
80 FSI Final Report, at 34.
81 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) (Wallis Report), at 128: cited by David Murray in his address to 
the Australian Business Economists (1 May 2014), available at: http://fsi.gov.au/2014/05/01/australian-business-
economists/.
82 See: http://www.guaranteescheme.gov.au/.
83 Murray, above note 81.
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market discipline, through competition or self-regulation, to government 
intervention:84
Competition and competitive markets are at the heart of the Inquiry’s 
philosophy for the financial system. The Inquiry sees them as the 
primary means of supporting the system’s efficiency. Although 
the Inquiry considers competition is generally adequate, the high 
concentration and increasing vertical integration in some parts of 
the Australian financial system has the potential to limit the benefits 
of competition in the future and should be proactively monitored 
over time.85
In its response to the Financial System Inquiry Report,86 the government has 
acknowledged that Australia’s financial system is strong, stable and well regulated. 
However, it also accepts that its reliance on foreign capital leaves Australia 
vulnerable to financial shocks and as a result, its regulatory framework needs to 
be stronger than those of comparable economies. Since the Report, APRA had 
already announced measures to improve the resilience of the banking system and 
that it will take further action on regulatory capital requirements. The government 
also accepts that it needs to act to strengthen crisis management powers for APRA 
and ASIC to ensure they have the tools they need “in the unlikely event” that an 
Australian financial institution or market fails.
The government has also accepted that financial accountability and capabilities of 
the regulators could be strengthened. It proposes to revise the respective Statements 
of Expectations and require the financial regulators to report on their capabilities 
and how they balance competition with the other elements of their mandates. The 
government is already conducting a capability review of ASIC and consulting on 
an industry funding model for ASIC.
In conclusion, Australia is moving closer to international standards in its approach 
to the crisis management of banks so that there are adequate tools available for 
such an event. Thus Australia is addressing the crisis management powers of the 
financial regulators and is implementing loss absorbency capacity and leverage 
requirements in line with emerging international practice. Yet Australia is likely to 
maintain a strong reliance on prudential regulation and supervision as an important 
ex ante protection against the perhaps unlikely failure of an Australian bank.
84 Discussion of objectives regarding “Loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity”: FSI Final Report, at 68-69.
85 Ibid., at xvi. 
86 The government response was released on 20 October 2015, for which see: http://www.treasury.gov.au/
PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2015/Govt%20response%20to%20the%20FSI.
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Chapter 7
The Opt-out and Opt-in Rules for Group 
Coordination Proceedings in the EIR:  
A Critical Evaluation and Focus on  
Large-Scale Insolvencies
Jessica Schmidt
Introduction
The recast of the European Insolvency Regulation has brought many innovations. 
Among the most striking is undoubtedly the introduction of special rules on group 
insolvencies. With the new Chapter V, the Recast EIR has finally filled this often 
bemoaned gap. The central piece is the new possibility of group coordination 
proceedings (Articles 61 – 77 EIR). Especially in cases of large groups, effective 
coordination is generally of paramount importance for a successful restructuring. 
But even if it turns out that restoring financial soundness and economic viability 
is not possible, the coordinated realisation of the assets of the individual group 
members will often yield a higher revenue than an uncoordinated “asset stripping”.1
But the crucial question is, of course: Will the new concept of group coordination 
proceedings work in practice? Needless to say, this will hinge not only on the 
general soundness of the legal framework, but on a myriad of different practical 
parameters. The one specific feature which will be the focus of this paper are the 
opt-in and opt-out rules. These rather intriguing mechanisms may actually prove 
to be one of the critical breaking points of the new legal framework.
Group Coordination Proceedings at a Glance
But before I come to the specifics of opt-in and opt-out, let me first provide a brief 
outline of the legal framework for group coordination proceedings in general. The 
concept of group coordination proceedings consists of three key elements:
1 Cf.	the explanatory notes to the German draft, BT-Drs. 18/407, at 38 ff.; R. Bork, K. van Zwieten and J.	Schmidt, 
Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation (2016, OUP, Oxford), at 72.16; P. Mankowski, M. Müller, 
J. Schmidt and J.	Schmidt, EuInsVO	2015 (2016, C.H. Beck, München), Article 72 paragraph 17.
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(1) a coordination court;
(2) a coordinator; and
(3) a group coordination plan.2
Group coordination proceedings may be requested before any court having 
jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group; a request 
may be filed by any insolvency practitioner of a group member (Article 61(1) EIR). 
If multiple requests are filed at different courts, the priority rule applies (Article 
62 EIR). But Article 66 EIR allows the choice of another (more appropriate) court 
by agreement of a two-thirds majority of the insolvency practitioners involved 
(Article 66 EIR).
The coordinator has two essential tasks:
(a) to identify and outline recommendations for the coordinated conduct of the 
insolvency proceedings; and
(b) to propose a group coordination plan (Article 72(1) EIR).
The group coordination plan shall identify, describe and recommend a 
comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated approach to the 
resolution of the group members’ insolvencies (Article 72(1)(b) 1 EIR). But its 
function is that of a mere “reference plan”: its implementation is not effected 
centrally, but within the framework of the individual insolvency proceedings.3 The 
group coordination plan is not binding upon the insolvency practitioners, they are 
not obligated to follow it either in whole or in part (cf. Article 70(2) subparagraph 1 
EIR). In fact, the EIR relies on a “comply-or-explain”-mechanism: If an insolvency 
practitioner does not follow the group coordination plan, he shall give reasons for 
not doing so to the persons or bodies that he is to report to under his national law, 
and to the coordinator (Article 70(2) subparagraph 2 EIR).4
Opt-in and Opt-out as Manifestations of the Voluntary Nature of Group 
Coordination Proceedings
As already indicated, a rather intriguing feature of the legal framework is that no 
group member can be forced to participate in group coordination proceedings. 
2 Cf.	J. Schmidt, “Das Prinzip “eine Person, ein Vermögen, eine Insolvenz“ und seine Durchbrechungen vor dem 
Hintergrund der aktuellen Reformen im europäischen und deutschen Recht“, KTS 2015, 19, at 38.
3 Ibid., at 41.
4 Idem.
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Initially, the group coordination proceedings include all insolvent5 members of 
the group of companies (as defined in Articles 2(13) and (14) EIR). But each 
insolvency practitioner has the right to declare an opt-out for “his” group member 
(Article 64(1)(a) EIR), with the consequence that it will not be included in the 
group coordination proceedings (Article 65 EIR).
The possibility of an opt-out is intended to ensure the voluntary nature of the 
group coordination proceedings.6 During the legislative debates in the Council, 
there had apparently been concerns with respect to the “coercive nature” of the 
group coordination proceedings.7 The French delegation had even suggested 
that group coordination proceedings should generally only include those 
group members whose insolvency practitioner had explicitly given his assent.8 
Ultimately, the Member States agreed on the now implemented opt-out-model as 
a compromise. However, the voluntary nature of group coordination proceedings 
extends also to the reverse side: As a counterpart to the opt-out right, Article 69 
Recast EIR establishes the possibility of a subsequent opt-in – albeit only under 
certain conditions.9
Opt-out
So let’s take a closer look first at the opt-out.
Entitlement	to	Opt-out
Any insolvency practitioner appointed in respect of a group member is entitled 
to make an objection against the inclusion in the group coordination proceedings 
(Article 64(1) EIR).10 In case of a debtor-in-possession, the right to object lies with 
himself (cf. Article 76 EIR).11 The size and the role of the group member within the 
group is irrelevant.12 The only (implied) exception is the insolvency practitioner 
who filed the request to open group coordination proceedings – it would be rather 
5 With respect to the limitation to insolvent group members see Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 56 
paragraph 10.
6 Cf.	Recital 53 subparagraph 1 sentence 1; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.4; Mankowski et	al., above note 
1, Article 64 paragraph 4.
7 Cf.	Schmidt, above note 2, at 39; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.4; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 
64 paragraph 4.
8 Cf.	the proposal of the French delegation in doc. 10688/14 (Article 42 da1(2), EIR draft).
9 Cf. L. C. Henry, “Le nouveau ‹‹règlement insolvabilité››: entre continuité et innovations” Dalloz 2015.979, at 987; 
V. Legrand, “Le nouveau règlement Européen relatif aux procédures d’insolvabilité transfrontalières: premier 
aperçu”, Petites	affiches 2015, n° 16, 8, at 15 ; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.2; Mankowski et	al., above 
note 1, Article 69 paragraph 2.
10 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.7; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 7.
11 Idem.
12 Idem.
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paradoxical if he were allowed to object to his own request.13 Yet, the right to 
object is limited exclusively to the insolvency practitioners: creditors, other courts 
or public authorities involved are not entitled to file for an opt-out.14
Opt-out	Period
Moreover, it is important to note that the opt-out right is subject to a strict time 
limit. This is imperative, because group coordination proceedings could never 
work effectively if there was a constant threat that group members might opt out 
at any given moment. Hence, the EIR limits the opt-out right to a 30-day-period 
before the actual opening of group coordination proceedings. 
A court seised of a request to open group coordination proceedings first executes 
a kind of preliminary examination whether the three conditions for the opening of 
group coordination proceedings laid down in Article 63(1)(a)-(c) EIR are fulfilled.15 
If it has satisfied itself that these conditions are fulfilled, it shall give notice as soon 
as possible to the insolvency practitioners appointed in relation to the members of 
the group (Article 63(1) EIR). This notice shall be sent by registered letter attested 
by an acknowledgment of receipt (Article 63(3) EIR). The receipt of the notice 
triggers the start of the 30-day-objection period (cf. Article 64(2) EIR), which runs 
separately and independently for each insolvency practitioner (depending on when 
he received the notice).16
The decision to open group coordination proceedings must not be made before 
this objection period has elapsed (Article 68(1) 1 EIR). This serves a three-fold 
purpose: Firstly, it ensures that the insolvency practitioners really have the full 
time period to raise their objections.17 Secondly, this also guarantees that at the 
time of the decision whether or not to open group coordination proceedings the 
court knows which group members would be included; if too many group members 
have opted out and/or the ones which have opted out were of vital importance to 
the success of the group coordination proceedings, the court may come to the 
conclusion that the conditions for opening are no longer fulfilled, because – due to 
the opt-outs – group coordination proceedings would not be appropriate to facilitate 
the effective administration of the insolvency proceedings relating to the different 
13 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.7; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 7.
14 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.8; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 8.
15 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 63.5; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 63 paragraph 5; Schmidt, above 
note 2, at 39.
16 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.15; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 16.
17 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 68.8; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 68 paragraph 8.
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group members (cf. Article 63(1)(a) EIR).18 Thirdly, once the opening decision has 
been made, the group members included are – metaphorically speaking – “caught” 
– in a way, the old maxim “cling together, swing together” applies.
Form of Objections
In order to streamline the procedure, there will be a standard form for making 
objections (the use of which, will, however, not be mandatory).19 Article 64 EIR 
does not explicitly require the giving of reasons for the opt-out.20 Nevertheless, an 
insolvency practitioner objecting would be well-advised to provide a substantiated 
statement of the reasons for his objection.21 Although the objection leads to an 
automatic opt-out of the proceedings of the objecting insolvency practitioner, it 
does not stop the opening of group coordination proceedings for the other members 
of the group.22 The objecting insolvency practitioner can only achieve this by 
making such convincing objections that either all others will also opt-out or that 
the court will come to the conclusion that the conditions for the opening of group 
coordination proceedings set out in Article 63(1) EIR are not fulfilled.23
Approval	required	by	National	Law
Although the entitlement to opt-out lies solely with the insolvency practitioner (or 
the debtor-in-possession, respectively), Article 64(3) EIR requires him to obtain 
any prior approval which may be required under the law of the State of the opening 
of insolvency proceedings for which he has been appointed. Hence, a German 
insolvency practitioner will, for example be required to obtain the prior consent of 
the creditors’ committee (or if there is none: the creditors’ meeting) (cf. § 160(1) 
InsO24).25 Special authorisation requirements and/or procedures may in particular 
apply in case of a debtor in possession; under German law, for example, the debtor 
in possession also needs to obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee (cf. §§ 
276, 160(1) 2 InsO26).27
18 Cf.	Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 68 paragraph 17.
19 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.13; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 13.
20 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.14; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 14.
21 Idem.
22 Idem.
23 Idem.
24 Insolvenzordnung (InsO) v. 5.9.1994, BGBl. I, 2866.
25 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.17; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 19.
26 See below note 30.
27 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 64.18; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 64 paragraph 20.
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This is an important restriction because it ensures that with respect to the opt-out 
decision, the insolvency practitioner (or debtor-in-possession) will be subject to 
the same approval requirements which he is subject to for comparable important 
decisions under national law.
Evaluation
Attempting a provisional evaluation, the opt-out mechanism undoubtedly fits into 
the general concept of the voluntary nature of group coordination proceedings, 
which is, for example, also manifested in the non-binding nature of the group 
coordination plan. However, overall it seems rather problematic.
• Firstly, it complicates things immensely.
• Secondly, the 30-day objection period delays the opening of the group 
coordination proceedings; in some cases, where time is of the essence, this 
may be crucial. The only possible way to obtain a faster opening may be to try 
to get all the insolvency practitioners to waive their opt-out right (but such a 
waiver is not explicitly provided for in the EIR and it may be very problematic 
to get it in practice).
• Thirdly, the opt-out right constitutes a very powerful weapon which may 
be abused by individual insolvency practitioners as a strategic leverage in 
order to push through inappropriate demands or even induce parties willing 
to cooperate to pay a “vexation premium” or bestow certain benefits to the 
disrupter as a consideration for not opting-out.
To provide a drastic example: Let’s imagine a large international group with 
subsidiaries in each EU Member State and let’s imagine that the group’s business 
model is based on a patent held by a small subsidiary which essentially does 
nothing else than administrate the patents of the group. The opt-out right would 
de facto enable the insolvency practitioner appointed for that subsidiary to sort 
of “dictate” the terms of the group coordination by threatening to opt-out if his 
demands are not met. Of course, this danger is somewhat counterbalanced by 
the requirement to obtain the prior approval pursuant to national law. Moreover, 
the insolvency practitioner may face civil or even criminal liability if the opt-out 
would constitute a violation of his duties. But it remains an open question whether 
these “safety devices” will be sufficient to effectively prevent abuse. There will 
not always be an approval requirement or the insolvency practitioner may even 
collude with the creditors’ committee and liability will only be a deterrent if it is 
effectively enforced.
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Opt-in
So what about the opt-in?
Overview
Like the opt-out, the opt-in mechanism is also a manifestation of the voluntary 
nature of group coordination proceedings.28 Its purpose is to ensure that group 
members who initially did not participate in the group coordination proceedings –
either due to an opt-out or because they only ent ered insolvency proceedings after 
the group coordination proceedings had already been opened – have the possibility 
to opt-in subsequently.29 However, since such a subsequent opt-in of another group 
member may have significant repercussions for the entire coordination concept, 
there is no unqualified right to opt-in; instead, the opt-in requires the coordinator 
to accede to the opt-in request, which is subject to certain conditions being met.30
Opt-in	Request
The opt-in procedure is initiated by a request of the insolvency practitioner 
appointed for the group member whose proceedings are to be included (Article 
69(1) EIR) (or the debtor-in-possession, respectively, Article 76 EIR) to the 
coordinator.31 Article 69(1) EIR requires the request to be made by the insolvency 
practitioner “in accordance with its national law”. This apparently refers to any 
requirements of prior authorisation by a specific body (e.g. a creditors’ meeting or 
committee; a public authority; the court) before making such a request. Hence, a 
German insolvency practitioner would – just like in the case of an opt-out – need 
to obtain the consent of the creditors’ committee (or if there is none: the creditors’ 
meeting) (cf. § 160(1) InsO).32
There is neither a standard form nor any other formal requirements.33 But for 
evidentiary purposes, text form would certainly be advisable.34 There is also no 
requirement to give any reasons for the request to opt-in.35 However, a well-
28 Cf.	Henry, above note 9, at 985; Legrand, above note 9, at 15; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.2; Mankowski 
et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 2.
29 Cf.	also Recital 56 sentence 3; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.2; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 
paragraph 2.
30 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.2; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 2.
31 With respect to the coordinator as addressee see Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.10; Mankowski et	al., above 
note 1, Article 69 paragraph 11.
32 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.9; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 10.
33 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.11; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 12.
34 Idem.
35 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.12; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 13.
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founded statement of reasons would nevertheless be advisable, since the success 
of the request ultimately depends on persuading either the coordinator or all the 
other insolvency practitioners involved of its merits.36 Finally, there is also no 
specific time limit.37 However, the later the request is filed, the smaller its chances 
for success will most likely be.38
Decision of the Coordinator
The request is decided upon not by the court, but solely by the coordinator.39
Prior Consultation of the Insolvency Practitioners
Before making his decision on the request, the coordinator has to consult the 
insolvency practitioners involved.40 Since there is no specific procedure for the 
manner of consultation, it is up to the discretion of the coordinator to decide on 
an effective manner of consultation.41 He can, for example, call a (real or virtual) 
meeting or simply call or e-mail each insolvency practitioner individually.42
Conditions	for	the	Approval	of	the	Request
The coordinator may only – and must – accede to the request if one of the two 
criteria set out in Article 69(2) EIR is met.43
Fulfilment	of	the	Criteria	set	out	in	Articles	63(1)(a)	and	(b)	EIR
Firstly, Article 69(2)(a) EIR permits (and obligates) the coordinator to accede to the 
request if he is satisfied, taking into account the stage that the group coordination 
proceedings have reached at the time of the request, that the criteria set out in 
Article 63(1)(a) and (b) EIR are fulfilled. Since these provisions pertain to the 
original opening of group coordination proceedings, they can naturally only be 
meant to apply mutatis mutandis.44
Hence, the coordinator firstly has to satisfy himself that the opt-in of the group 
member in question is appropriate to facilitate the effective administration of the 
insolvency proceedings relating to the different group members (i.e. not only the 
36 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.12; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 13.
37 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.13; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 14.
38 Cf.	Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 14.
39 Ibid., Article 69 paragraph 15.
40 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.14; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 16.
41 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.15; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 17.
42 Cf.	Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 17.
43 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.16; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 18.
44 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.17; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 19.
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one requesting to join, but also those already participating) (Article 69(2)(a) EIR 
in conjunction with Article 63(1)(a) EIR).45
Secondly, he has to satisfy himself that no creditor of any group member already 
participating in the proceedings or requesting to participate is likely to be 
financially disadvantaged by the inclusion of that member in the proceedings if 
they henceforth also include the member requesting to join (Article 69(2)(a) EIR 
in conjunction with Article 63(1)(b) EIR).46
In this context, the coordinator has to take into account the stage that the group 
coordination proceedings has reached at the time of the request. Generally, a 
subsequent inclusion will be all the more difficult and all the less sensible the 
further the group coordination proceedings have already advanced.47 It may be 
the case that the proceedings have already advanced so far that it would no longer 
be practically feasible to include another group member.48 Let’s suppose, for 
example, that the group coordination plan provided for the sale of the assets of all 
participating group members to an investor and the group members participating 
in the coordination have already signed a deal with an investor, but the closing is 
still pending. Including another large group member into the group coordination 
proceedings at this point would probably be very problematic, especially if the 
investor is not willing to buy also the assets of this group member. If, however, 
the investor is actually keen on also getting the assets of this group member, the 
coordinator would have to accede to the request.
Agreement of all Insolvency Practitioners involved
Article 69(2)(b) EIR permits (and obligates) the coordinator to accede to the request 
if all insolvency practitioners involved agree. Each insolvency practitioner has to 
agree under the conditions provided by his national law. This apparently again 
refers in particular to any requirements of prior authorisation by a specific body 
(e.g. a creditors’ meeting or committee) before making such a request.49 Hence, a 
German insolvency practitioner would have to obtain the consent of the creditors’ 
committee (or if there is none: the creditors’ meeting) (cf. § 160(1) InsO).50
45 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.18; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 20.
46 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.19; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 21.
47 Cf.	Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 22.
48 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.20; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 22.
49 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.22; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 27.
50 Idem.
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Communication of the Decision and Challenges against the Decision
In order to guarantee a fair procedure, Article 69(3) EIR requires all insolvency 
practitioners to be informed of the coordinator’s decision and Article 69(4) EIR 
gives them the possibility to contest it before the court which has opened the 
coordination proceedings.51 The procedure for the challenge is governed by the 
law of the Member State where group coordination proceedings have been opened.
Time	and	Consequences	of	Opt-in
If the coordinator validly accedes to the request and there is no successful challenge 
pursuant Article 69(4) EIR, the group member in question participates ex nunc 
from the time the coordinator’s decision becomes effective.52 The opt-in does 
not have retroactive effect.53 From the moment the opt-in becomes effective, the 
group member is a full participant in the group coordination proceedings with all 
corresponding rights and duties.54 However, the time of the opt-in may be taken 
into account for purposes of the final allocation of the costs.55
The opt-in is, on principle, final; there is no possibility to opt-out again.56 Yet, in 
light of the concept of the voluntary nature of the group coordination proceedings57, 
nothing should prevent an agreement by all insolvency practitioners involved 
allowing a group member to no longer take part in the group insolvency proceedings.58
Evaluation
Attempting again a provisional evaluation, my verdict on the subsequent opt-in is 
much more positive. Admittedly, it adds another layer of complexity. However, 
in contrast to the opt-out right, the opt-in does not delay the progress of the group 
coordination proceedings and there is no comparable danger of abuse. Moreover, 
giving group members who have so far remained “outside” the possibility to join 
group coordination proceedings – provided that this is either beneficial for the 
effectiveness of the proceedings or all involved agree – is evidently sensible in 
order enable effective group coordination proceedings.
51 Cf.	Recital 56 sentence 4; Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.3; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 
paragraph 3.
52 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.31; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 37 ff.
53 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.31; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 38.
54 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.32, Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 39.
55 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.32, Article 77.20; Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 
39, Article 77 paragraph 25.
56 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.33, Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 40.
57 Cf.	Recital 56 sentence 1.
58 Cf.	Bork et	al., above note 1, Article 69.33, Mankowski et	al., above note 1, Article 69 paragraph 40.
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Conclusion
So which overall conclusions can be drawn with respect to the value and 
effectiveness of the opt-in and opt-out rules? Both opt-in and opt-out can be 
perceived as manifestations of the general concept of the voluntary nature of the 
new group coordination proceedings. This concept further manifests itself in the 
non-binding nature of the group coordination plan, the reliance on a “comply-or-
explain”-mechanism for its enforcement and the absence of any powers of the 
coordinator to unilaterally make binding decisions for the entire group. The opt-out 
and opt-in mechanisms fit in seamlessly into this concept.
However, they add yet another layer of complexity to already very complex 
proceedings. Whereas this may be acceptable with respect to the opt-in as it 
is now designed, the right of each insolvency practitioner of a group member 
to opt-out may prove to be a real problem and significant stumbling block for 
effective coordination. Admittedly, an opt-out mechanism is still much better 
than the requirement of explicit assent of each individual insolvency practitioner 
contemplated during the legislative procedure in the Council. Especially in case of 
large groups, this would probably have spelled doom. In this respect, the current 
system – being “in” as the “default setting” and requiring an active objection in 
order to opt-out – is certainly preferable. Nonetheless, the 30-day opt-out period 
brings about a significant and problematic delay of the opening proceedings and, 
what is more, the opt-out right undeniably entails a huge potential of obstruction 
and abuse.
Whether the “safety devices” currently installed will be a sufficient deterrent 
remains to be seen. Especially for large group insolvencies the possibility that the 
opt-out of a pivotal group member or of a significant number of group members 
may thwart an effective coordination and restructuring may be a real problem. Then 
again, one might argue that “forcing” unwilling group members to be included 
into coordination proceedings might not be the best way to ensure effective 
restructuring or liquidation either – i.e. better to let them opt-out beforehand than 
enabling them to obstruct the entire coordination afterwards – or: it’s better to 
make a painful break early on than to draw out the agony.
Ultimately this brings us back to the inherent general problem of the concept of 
group coordination proceedings as they are now regulated in the Recast EIR: 
Due to their non-binding and voluntary nature, they will only work if all parties 
involved are able and willing to work together effectively.
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Chapter 8
Coordination of Group and Financial 
Insolvencies in the SADC Region
Leonie Stander
Introduction
Because of the substantial differences between conventional corporate insolvency 
and bank insolvency, the writer is of the opinion that two separate insolvency 
regimes are necessary. Apart from that, the resolution of cross-border bank 
insolvency in the Sothern African Development Community (“SADC”) Region is 
governed by several national insolvency laws. These laws differ considerably for 
substantive insolvency law and have not yet been harmonized by any Insolvency 
Regulation. There is no need to emphasize the necessity that the SADC develop 
a uniform insolvency law approach to regulate cross-border insolvency disputes, 
especially where cross-border banks are concerned. In the words of Saurombe, in 
order to have meaningful economic integration and a free and reliable trade zone, it 
is important to have uniform trade laws and commercial practices within the region 
as well as uniform cross-border insolvency legislation and insolvency regulation 
for group and financial institution insolvencies.1 The underlying objective of a 
uniform insolvency law approach would be to create a level playing field, and to 
avoid a race to the bottom and forum shopping practices.2 Keeping in mind that 
cross-border insolvency law is a very complex process, the significant question is 
how the insolvency of financial institutions such as banks will be coordinated in 
the SADC Region?
The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance that will simplify the whole 
process in this Region, based on the example provided by the European Union and 
the United States of America, but which can effectively be applied to the unique 
circumstances of the SADC.
1 See A. Saurombe, “The SADC Trade Agenda, A Tool to facilitate Regional Commercial Law: An Analysis” 
(2009) 21 South African Mercantile Law Journal 695.
2 N. Leno, “Development of a Uniform Insolvency Law in SADC: Lessons from OHADA” (2013) 57(2) Journal 
of African Law 259, at 260.
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1. The SADC
The SADC was established within the framework of an agreement3 between certain 
southern African states. It can thus be seen as a “treaty-based organisation”.4 Its 
main purpose is to create a development community through regional co-operation 
and integration for the economic liberation and development of the community.5 
The countries concerned are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These 
countries co-operate politically and socially and on various policy levels such as 
in issues pertaining to human rights.. Although this has not yet progressed very 
far, they are in the process of integrating aspects of their economies.6 To bring 
about meaningful economic integration the SADC heads of state and government 
agreed to establish a free trade zone with the East African Community (“EAC”) 
and a Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”).To this 
end the SADC has created community organs to oversee the implementation of 
its objectives.7 There are many problems and obstacles in this area of regional 
development, however.
2. Problems
First of all the financial systems of the various SADC countries are extremely 
diverse. Countries with highly developed financial systems (like South Africa and 
Mauritius) co-exist with fragile states facing severe economic challenges (such 
as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Zimbabwe) and countries with less-
developed financial systems (such as Angola or Mozambique).8
Since the trading activities and business transactions in the SADC will involve 
several multinational enterprises from different States, the very relevant question 
is how cross-border insolvency disputes, especially involving groups and financial 
institutions such as banks, can be best resolved? It is common knowledge that 
there is an absence of a common legal tradition, language, currency or uniform 
3 SADC Treaty, Windhoek, 17 August 1992.
4 P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowette’s Law of International Institutions (6th ed) (2009, Sweet & Maxwell, London), at 16.
5 Article 21, SADC Treaty. The areas of cooperation, ranging from food security and agriculture to international 
relations and peace, are set out in this article.
6 T. Kruger, “Regional Organizations and their Dispute Settlement Bodies” (2008) 41 De Jure 305.
7 Article 9, SADC Treaty. See D. Leno, “Regionalism: Lessons the SADC can learn from OHADA” (2012) 75 
Contemporary	Roman-Dutch	Law 256, at 259.
8 See the discussion of this aspect in M. Cabello et	al., “Cross Border Banking Supervision in SADC Region” 
(2013) 4(2) Banking	on	the	African	Moment 36, at 36.
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commercial insolvency law in the SADC region.9 Each country in the SADC region 
has a distinct legal framework and mechanism, and that the insolvency regimes 
and procedures within the SADC region are very diverse. There are currently no 
proposals to reform commercial laws in the region.10
It is important to remember, and Garrido11 emphasizes the fact, that in all insolvency 
system there are crucial differences in the treatment accorded to personal or 
contract rights and in rem rights. Insolvency is defined by the existence of a 
conflict between competing claims over the assets that form the insolvent estate.12 
Garrido explains that in the case of the insolvency of a financial intermediary such 
as a bank, the main risk is that the interests of investors13 come into conflict with 
those of the creditors14 of the intermediary; more so where the bank and some of 
the investors and creditors are in another jurisdiction.15
The fear of non-compliance with treaty provisions is one of the major challenges. 
Non-compliance arises from a number of issues, including the complexity of the 
implementing agreement and the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language.16 
Very relevant in the circumstances of Southern Africa are the limitations on the 
capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, and the temporal dimension of 
the social, economic and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties.17
Cabello and others18 mention other factors that make a cross-border bank 
insolvency law in the SADC region particularly challenging, including:
(1) the high level of financial heterogeneity in the SADC region;
(2) the differences in the incentives for host and home administrators to 
share information;
9 B. Chinsinga, “The Challenges of Globalization and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African 
Development Community” in M Milazi (ed), Democracy,	Human	Rights	and	Regional	Co-operation (2002, 
Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria), at 115; Leno, above note 2, at 4; D. Ailola, “UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Its Efficacy and Sustainability as a Basis for a SADC Convention” (2000) 11 
Stellenbosch Law Review 215.
10 Chinsinga, above note 9, at 115; Leno, above note 2, at 263.
11 J. Garrido, “The Loss-sharing Rule in the Insolvency of Financial Intermediaries” (2010) Uniform	Law	Review 
779, at 780.
12 Ibid., at 782.
13 Those who have financed the bank.
14 Those who have entered into contracts with the bank.
15 Garrido, above note 11, at 782.
16 Leno, above note 2, at 280.
17 Idem.
18 Cabello et al., above note 8, at 36, 38.
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(3) the fact that regional guidelines to improve cross-border banking supervision 
are not binding, and are therefore difficult to implement;
(4) the lack of effectiveness of Memoranda of Understanding to drive cross-
border cooperation; and
(5) the existence of political constraints preventing deeper regional integration.
The High Level of Financial Heterogeneity in the SADC Region19
This high level of diversity is one of the main obstacles to the development of an 
integrated framework for cross-border supervision in the region, and a lack of 
supervision from the different countries will definitely hamper the development 
of cross-border bank insolvency law – not every country will have the capability to 
supervise. Because regional initiatives to improve banking insolvency regulation 
must be built upon some basic consensus, the actual agreed initiatives in the SADC 
region will force regional authorities to operate according to a “lowest common 
denominator” approach (this means the most basic, least sophisticated level of 
development, regulation, sensibility, or opinion among a group of countries). 
Judged in an international context, this approach or attitude toward the problem 
is not acceptable. Furthermore, while all SADC countries have committed to 
implementing the Basel	Core	Principles	for	Effective	Banking	Supervision, actual 
compliance varies significantly.
The Differences in the Incentives for Host and Home Administrators to  
share Information20
The differences in supervisory capacity among SADC countries will complicate 
efforts to promote information sharing among financial administrators. Cabello 
and others declare, and rightly so, that it is difficult to imagine that a home-country 
administrator such as South Africa or Mauritius would be comfortable relying 
upon information from a country that is non-compliant with several BCPs and does 
not apply International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”). I agree that it is 
not far-fetched to think that a host-country administrator in such a country would 
struggle to analyse and incorporate information from a home country with a more 
developed supervisory framework. According to these writers the obstacles and 
challenges which are closely linked to this problem in the SADC region include 
the following:
19 Ibid., at 36 discussing the issue.
20 Idem.
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• The fact that banks involved in cross-border banking operations in the region 
originate from different regulatory backgrounds;21 
• The true home country of a bank is not always fully clear;22 
• The complex corporate structures of many of the financial groups make them 
inherently difficult to administer;23 
• Several of the big financial groups have high intra-group exposures.24 
Non-Binding	Nature	of	Regional	Guidelines	to	improve	Cross-border	 
Banking	Supervision25
Regional financial authorities in the SADC, namely the SADC Committee of 
Central Bank Governors and the SADC Subcommittee of Banking Supervisors, 
signed the Finance and Investment Protocol in order to address some of these 
challenges. This protocol came into effect on 16 April 2010. An initiative in this 
regard has been the development of the SADC	Model	Central	Bank	Law. Cabello 
and others indicate, however, that the effective implementation of the provisions 
included in the Model	Central	Bank	Law remains a major issue. The reason for this 
is that regional agreements are not binding on the member states and are therefore 
difficult to implement.26
The	Lack	of	Effectiveness	of	MoUs	to	drive	Cross-border	Cooperation27
Cabello and others note that the relevant memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
lack a strong legal framework. Bilateral information sharing within the SADC 
region is limited because of the absence of any legal requirement to cooperate 
under MoUs that are not legally enforceable. It is essential that incentives of home 
and host administrators to exchange information should exist because capacity to 
share information and the willingness to work together are critical for the future of 
cross-border bank insolvency law in this region.
21 Idem. This aspect makes it more difficult for host country administrators to ensure that they are suitably familiar 
with the type and quality of the information available to them and the reliance that can be placed upon it.
22 Idem. This is true for example, of the United Bank of Africa (“UBA”), Ecobank, Afriland and BancABC.
23 Ibid., at 37, noting that the Standard Bank Group (“SBG”) and the FirstRand Group have complex holding 
company structures and a variety of banking, insurance, and other financial subsidiaries, a fact which complicates 
the determination of the home country of those banks.
24 Idem, examples being the Standard Bank Group and Ecobank. Members of such financial groups are more exposed 
to intra-group risk. As a result, problems in one country of operation are more likely to spread across borders.
25 Idem.
26 Idem.
27 Idem.
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The Existence of Political Constraints preventing Deeper Regional Integration
There is also an important political economy aspect which plays a huge role 
with regard to the whole issue under discussion. The existence of political forces 
below the surface of the regional integration process in the SADC affects the 
implementation of a successful cross-border bank insolvency law system in the 
region. At issue are the forces of sub-regionalization and localization.28
3. Preliminary Summary
The SADC does not operate a uniform commercial law system and, as said before, 
no attempt has been made to unify the commercial laws or private international 
rules applicable to cross-border disputes. This means that, in the event of a cross-
border insolvency dispute, the debtor will be subject to diverse national insolvency 
law regimes. From the above exposition it is also clear that in an era of globalization 
a collective effort is necessary. Leno emphasises that:
“when states cooperate in the enactment of an insolvency law for 
financial institutions such as banks, one end result should be that 
the contracting states will enjoy a simple, modern and accessible 
insolvency law.”29
For an effective cross-border bank insolvency law, information sharing and 
communication between the countries concerned are essential. Therefore measures 
should be put in place to facilitate this “working together” of the administrators 
from the different countries. These issues have to be addressed because the 
financial situation in the SADC Region is not entirely stable. The region lacks the 
financial foundation of first world countries and regions. An economic shock such 
as the failure of a transnational bank could trigger the failure of a chain of banks 
or precipitate a chain of significant losses to banks in the whole region, resulting 
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability30 – something 
the region in my opinion could not afford. Such an event would in all likelihood 
28 Idem, defining “sub-regionalization” as efforts aimed at creating closer relationships among a smaller subset of 
countries which share certain similarities and common interests. The Common Monetary Area (“CMA”), which 
includes South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland, is an example of a “sub-regionalization” process within 
the SADC framework. “Localization” is defined as the manner in which countries take steps to reinforce their 
political and supervisory autonomy. In explaining the effect of this phenomenon these writers use the case of 
Mozambique, which could see its political autonomy reduced in the event of deeper integration in the SADC.
29 Leno, above note 2, at 276.
30 Also see S. Schwarcz, “Systemic Risk” (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193, at 204-205; P. Sester, “Towards 
a Transnational Bank Restructuring Law?” (2010) 7 European Company and Financial Law Review 512, at 523.
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necessitate undesirable bail-outs31 of financial institutions at taxpayers’ cost. It is 
also my view that such an event would necessitate substantial support on (usually 
scarce) state aid – states would provide financial assistance to stabilize the region.
The provisions of a legal framework for cross-border bank insolvency law should 
be self-executing so as to enjoy precedence over nationally enacted insolvency 
law. This is also the view of Leno, where he motivates for a general uniform 
insolvency law in SADC.32 Upon ratification of a uniform bank insolvency treaty 
by a state, the internal laws of the signatory states would be modified and the state 
would automatically be bound by the provisions of the treaty. The contracting 
states would then be bound by their international obligations.
4. Recommendations
In order to warrant a higher degree of legal certainty, transparency and 
predictability, the provisions of the unified legislation should be contained within 
a legal framework of either:
(1) a treaty; or
(2) a regulation.
Treaty
Those in favour of a treaty argue that the treaty should actually impose a duty 
of adherence on member states.33 A few issues that would then arise might be 
the following:
• The SADC Council of Ministers should be empowered as a “guardian of 
treaties”, and should be able to bring before the SADC Tribunal enforcement 
proceedings against a non-complying state.34
• It is essential in the banking environment that the rights of investors in their 
securities need to be respected in the event of the financial intermediary’s 
31 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailout, where it is stated that a bail-out is a colloquial term for giving financial 
support to a company or country which faces serious financial difficulty or bankruptcy. It may also be used to 
allow a failing entity to fail gracefully without spreading contagion. Financial contagion refers to “the spread 
of market disturbances -- mostly on the downside -- from one country to the other, a process observed through 
co-movements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and capital flows. Financial contagion can be a 
potential risk for countries who are trying to integrate their financial system with international financial markets 
and institutions. It helps explain an economic crisis extending across neighbouring countries, or even regions.”
32 Leno, above note 2, at 277.
33 Ibid., at 20.
34 See M. Cuthbert, European Community Law (6th ed) (2009, Sweet & Maxwell, London), at 12; compare Article 
226, Treaty Establishing the European Community (10 November 1997).
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insolvency.35 This principle ensures that the rights of investors over the 
securities are not threatened by the peculiarities of the specific legal regime 
for intermediated securities and the combined impact of the insolvency law. 36
• Certain protection techniques are raised in connection with this functional 
approach. One such is the recognition that the investor has a proprietary 
interest in the securities. The investor will then be seen as the owner of the 
securities and his proprietary claim would not conflict with the credit claims 
by third parties.37
According to some writers a protection technique should include the default loss-
sharing rule.38 When a shortfall materializes, the rule provides a possible 
solution for the distribution of damage among the affected investors. This 
loss-sharing rule mirrors the origins of the pari passu rule in insolvency law. 
However, in my opinion this rule still needs further investigation, refining 
and research.
Legal	Framework	of	Regulation
The second possibility is a Regulation and Directive Framework. Some argue 
that a regulation-based regime is necessary for systemic cross-border banking 
groups such as the Barclays Group and the Standard Bank Group, because a full 
harmonization approach is needed.39 Focus should be on the facilitation of a private 
sector solution with limited state aid, for example the takeover of the distressed 
bank by a competitor. In the case of non-systemic and national banks such as 
ABSA Bank and African Bank in South Africa, a directive-based framework 
should be employed. This would leave sufficient leeway for the national legislator. 
Again, the focus should be on the facilitation of a private sector solution with 
limited state aid, like the takeover of the distressed bank by a competitor.
35 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities Geneva 2009 (“Geneva Convention”), 
available at: http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/main.htm.
36 See e.g. the Geneva Convention. This Convention takes a functional approach with regard to securities, where 
financial institutions are involved. Garrido, above note 11, at 783 declares that it is the only way of achieving 
results in an area where legal concepts and techniques are diverse, although the nature of the problems and 
the results to be achieved are substantially similar worldwide. The Convention includes key principles that are 
instrumental in solving the problems presented by the insolvency of financial intermediaries such as banks. The 
most important one is the principle of the effectiveness of rights in insolvency proceedings, which addresses the 
question of the protection of the investor against the claims of third parties in the event of the insolvency of the 
financial intermediary. In this way, the Convention states that “rights that have become effective against third 
parties are effective against the insolvency administrator and creditors in any insolvency proceeding in respect of 
the relevant intermediary.”
37 Garrido, above note 11, at 783.
38 Ibid., at 785.
39 Sester, above note 30, at 544.
107
It is Sester’s opinion that the framework should facilitate a fast and smoothly 
coordinated reaction by supervisors with first-step harmonization, procedural 
safeguards and speedy intervention.40 Restructuring is of the utmost importance. 
Where in the case of a treaty it is recommended that a Council of Ministers should 
be formed to act as the “guardian” of the treaty, it is suggested that in the case of 
a regulation-based regime a Resolution Authority should be established.41 This 
Authority would become the lead supervisor to oversee the insolvency proceedings 
and apply certain intervention and resolution tools. The structure of systemic bank 
groups should be subject to regular review and discussion between the group’s 
management and supervisors.42 It is imperative that there should be some kind of 
authority to oversee the process.
There should also be a legal framework for intra-group asset transfer. It is 
recognised and acknowledged, however, that many points of critique exist against 
this technique of handling the matter. Further, a right of appeal is necessary 
because the Resolution Authority might interfere with management. Therefore 
– and I feel very strongly about this recommendation – the establishment of a 
separate insolvency court should be a priority.43 Another option is the introduction 
of a SADC Banking Charter to support an effective crisis management and 
resolution system.44
Tools for the Authority
Sester45 lists a number of tools. To my mind, the following measures are vital 
aspects or facets for the successful implementation of a cross-border bank 
insolvency law and should be mandatory for an effective legal framework in 
this regard:
• The establishment of legally binding support commitments from group 
members;
• The setting up of measures to minimize activities that pose excessive risk to 
the soundness of a banking group;
40 Idem.
41 Idem.
42 Ibid., at 539.
43 Leno, above note 2, at 278 notes that the one obstacle to the OHADA drafters’ drive for uniformity is the fact 
that there are general courts which vary from one member state to another and no specialized commercial or 
insolvency court for the settlement of both national and international insolvency disputes within the OHADA.
44 Because resolution tools will necessarily interfere in corporate governance structures and shareholders rights of 
the various legal entities belonging to the same group: Sester, above note 30, at 545.
45 Sester, above note 30, at 546.
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• The restriction of expansion plans;
• The imposition of reduction strategies regarding refinancing46 risks;
• The mandatory review of group structures;
• Grounded and motivated interference with shareholders’ rights in company 
and property law;
• The mandatory application of “haircuts” to the claims of secured creditors;47
• The temporary limitation of compensation.
It is recognized that criticism can and will be levelled against each of these 
measures, and it is my opinion that this subject will become a popular topic in the 
SADC region for further research.
Conclusion
A separate legal framework in the case of cross-border bank insolvency should 
be established for the SADC region. It is vital for this purpose that measures or 
regulations there should be established as soon as possible to enable a uniform and 
even operation of the regional (SADC) inter-bank market in the event of cross-
border bank insolvency. The advantage of this would be that the establishment 
of such measures would at least minimize the need for financial aid that could 
46 Refinancing is described at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refinancing as a term that may refer to the replacement 
of an existing debt obligation with another debt obligation under different conditions. “The terms and conditions 
of refinancing may vary widely by country, province, or state, based on several economic factors such as, inherent 
risk, projected risk, political stability of a nation, currency stability, banking regulations, borrower’s credit 
worthiness, and credit rating of a nation. In many industrialized nations, a common form of refinancing is for a 
place of primary residency mortgage. If the replacement of debt occurs under financial distress, refinancing might 
be referred to as debt restructuring. A loan (debt) might be refinanced for various reasons: (1) to take advantage 
of a better interest rate (a reduced monthly payment or a reduced term; (2) to consolidate other debt(s) into one 
loan (a potentially longer/shorter term contingent on interest rate differential and fees); (3) to reduce the monthly 
repayment amount (often for a longer term, contingent on interest rate differential and fees); (4) to reduce or alter 
risk (e.g. switching from a variable-rate to a fixed-rate loan; (5) to free up cash (often for a longer term, contingent 
on interest rate differential and fees.”
47 “Secured creditor haircuts” occur when a portion of fully secured creditors’ claims are treated as unsecured. 
The more equitable way to reorganize a financially distressed bank would be to make shareholders and bank 
bondholders take the hit, rather than the taxpayer. In these circumstances it would help if bank regulators 
would insist that bad loans be written down on the books. See: http://www.liquisearch.com/debt_restructuring/
bondholder_haircuts, where it is stated that “(b)ondholders would take haircuts, but these losses are already priced 
into deeply discounted bond prices. If the key issue is bank solvency, converting debt to equity via bondholder 
haircuts presents an elegant solution to the problem. Not only is debt reduced along with interest payments, but 
equity is simultaneously increased. Investors can then have more confidence that the bank is solvent, helping 
unfreeze credit markets. Taxpayers do not have to contribute money and the government may be able to just 
provide guarantees in the short term to buttress confidence in the recapitalized institution. For example, where 
a bank owes its bondholders ZAR 267 billion, a 20% haircut would reduce this debt by about ZAR 54 billion, 
creating an equal amount of equity in the process, thereby recapitalizing the bank significantly.”
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create many problems and concerns specifically in the SADC region. Bail-outs 
at the taxpayer’s cost and the support on state aid should be limited as far as 
possible. These regulations should where possible also warrant the protection 
of shareholders’ rights in liquidation and the equal access of all of the banks to 
equity48 capital, by creating a regional level playing field with regard to capital 
requirements in the case of systemic cross-border banks. These regulations should 
also reduce the refinancing costs of banks. This would in turn promote the credit 
demand for investment projects.
48 Reducing bank debt levels by converting debt into equity would increase confidence in the financial system. 
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_(finance), where it is explained that “equity is the difference between 
the value of the assets/interest and the cost of the liabilities of something owned. For example, if someone owns 
a car worth ZAR 55,000 but owes ZAR 25,000 on that car, the car represents ZAR 30,000 equity. This means 
that equity can be negative if liability exceeds assets. This source also explains that in an accounting context, 
shareholders’ equity represents the equity of a company as divided among individual shareholders of common 
or preferred stock. Accounting shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers as they deal with the public. Negative 
shareholders’ equity is often referred to as a (positive) shareholders’ deficit. For the purposes of liquidation during 
bankruptcy, ownership equity is the portion of a business’s equity which remains for the owners after all liabilities 
have been paid and all other creditors have been reimbursed.”
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PART II
THE YOUNG ACADEMICS’ 
NETWORK IN INSOLVENCY  
LAW PAPERS
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Chapter 9
Influence of the EU Regulations on  
Banking and Financial Insolvency  
in Candidate Countries
Djuro Djuric
1. Introduction: EU Regulations on Insolvency of Banking and Other 
Financial Institutions
The question of insolvency of banks and other financial institutions has become a 
particularly “hot topic” since the onset of the world financial crisis in 2008. Since 
many banks and other financial institutions from EU countries are major players 
in financial markets across the world, and since some of them have been hit hard 
by the problems that the crisis has brought, it is natural that EU and its regulations 
in this field have come under scrutiny. The crisis has shown that the models that 
have previously existed were not sufficient and did not enable an adequate level 
of cooperation between the member states, in order to minimize the spreading of 
negative effects of individual insolvencies and problems of individual financial 
institutions across the EU and all over the world. Therefore, changes were needed 
in the regulations, and indeed, certain changes have been made.
For years, the main regulatory instrument in this field was Directive 2001/24/EC 
of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions.1 It 
provided elementary rules that gave member states significant freedom to set up 
respective legal regimes that suited their legal traditions, economic policies and 
goals and preferences. Several rules and principles are the most important:
• credit institution and its branches form a single entity, subject to the 
supervision of the competent authorities of the state where an authorisation 
valid throughout the Community was granted (home member state);
1 Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, OJ L 125, 
05.05.2001, at 15-23.
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• the administrative or judicial authorities of the home member state have 
the sole power to decide upon and implement the reorganisation measures 
provided for in the law of that member state;
• member states are obliged to inform one another when undertaking measures 
according to this Directive;
• creditors of the credit institution are to be treated equally, regardless of the 
member state of their origin;
• decisions of the competent authorities of the home member state are to be 
recognised in other member states without any special formalities.
The financial crisis that started in 2008 brought about several notable insolvencies 
in the financial sector that were handled mostly by national governments in 
different ways: from various kinds of bail-outs to full bankruptcies and ex post 
interventions. The events have shown that the effects of a failure of a single 
financial institution can spread far across national boundaries. The prevailing 
conclusion was that the authorities of involved countries other than only the home 
country should be involved in the decision-making process and that the regular 
procedure for bankruptcy of non-financial companies is not entirely suitable for 
financial institutions, especially for those operating on an international scale. Also, 
joint international financial funds for rescuing failing financial institutions have 
been set up. Devastating economic consequences of the crisis have shown that the 
financial sector requires stricter regulations and supervision.
The main regulatory reform effort on the EU level was the adoption of Directive 
2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (EU Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive/“BRRD”),2 which has also amended several other EU 
directives and regulations, including Directive 2001/24/EC.
Main characteristics of the legal regime set up by BRRD are the following:3
• the goal of BRRD is that the consequences of the failure of financial institution 
(bank or investment firms that fall within the scope of BRRD) are borne by its 
shareholders and creditors, instead of the taxpayers;
2 Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit 
institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, at 190-348.
3 Ibid., for which see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm (last viewed 14 September 2015).
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• financial institutions have to prepare a full recovery plan with measures that 
are to be taken in different cases of financial difficulties; those plans are to be 
coordinated with and presented to competent national resolution authorities;
• resolution authorities are authorised to intervene in case of deterioration of 
financial situation of the financial institution; measures include requiring that 
the recovery plan measures be undertaken by the institution, requiring that 
management be changed, or even appointing a special manager to replace 
existing management of the financial institution in question;
• when it is determined by the competent authorities that the institution is failing 
or likely to fail and when any other measures are not deemed to be sufficient 
under the circumstances, resolution is triggered, which means that the 
resolution authority can use some of the resolution tools provided by BRRD: 
sale of the part of the business without shareholder`s consent, forming a bridge 
institution and a “bad bank“ (separating the good and healthy parts of the 
institution from the “bad“ assets), or even using a bail-in tool, which allows 
liabilities to be written down or turned into equity, so that the institution can 
survive as a going concern;
• banks and investment firms are required to contribute financially to national 
funds established for fulfillment of the tasks of BRRD, for example creating 
a bridge bank and securing capital or loans for it to operate; contributions 
of the institutions are to be in proportion with their respective liabilities and 
risk profiles.
BRRD has brought certain amendments to Directive 2001/24/EC, broadening its 
reach to include investment firms and their branches, as defined by Regulation 
(EU) No. 575/2013 of 26 June 2013. It has also replaced the provisions on the 
duties of informing the competent authorities and known creditors about the 
provisions on the duties of the resolution authorities in Article 83 of BRRD.
Although the enlargement of the EU is currently not on top of EU political and 
economic agenda, the candidate countries are in the process of adjusting their 
legislation and practices in order to be better prepared for negotiating with the 
EU, but also in order to make their respective economic conditions and markets 
more harmonized with the EU countries, therefore making them more attractive to 
potential foreign investors. We shall attempt to give a brief analysis of how several 
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West Balkans EU candidate countries have reacted to the described changes in EU 
regulations regarding financial institutions and handling their financial difficulties.4
2. Regulatory Framework in the Republic of Serbia
The banking law legislation reform in Serbia in 2015 has been significantly 
influenced by the changes in EU legislation, specifically the new BRRD. First 
of all, Serbian Parliament has enacted a completely new Law on Bankruptcy 
and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Companies.5 This Law provides a 
legal procedure that falls within the scope of the Directive 2001/24/EC on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, which has also been revised 
by the BRRD in 2014.
This Law applies to the bankruptcy and liquidation of banks, insurance companies 
and also the companies that provide the services of financial leasing, which means 
that it is intended to provide the same legal framework for all institutions that are 
considered to be financial institutions. According to this Law, bankruptcy and 
liquidation proceedings are initiated by a decision of a competent commercial 
court, where the decision is based on the previous decision of the People`s Bank 
of Serbia (Serbia`s central bank/“NBS”). In case of bankruptcy, simultaneously 
with the making the decision that the preconditions for initiating bankruptcy 
proceedings have been met, NBS revokes the license of the bank in question. 
Interested parties can initiate a proceeding for reassessment of the legality of 
the decision of NBS before the Administrative court. In that proceeding, the 
Administrative court can only decide that the decision was not legal, annul it and 
send it back to NBS to repeat the proceeding, but the court cannot decide alone in 
the matter, in full jurisdiction.6
The organs of bankruptcy proceedings are the court, bankruptcy administrator and 
the board of creditors. The Deposit Insurance Agency7 (“DIA”) acts as bankruptcy 
administrator in every case ex lege. DIA immediately pays the deposits in the 
amount in which they are insured by the law, which currently stands at EUR 
50,000 per individual depositor. The court publishes the decision to initiate a 
4 A. Anic, M. Malovic and V. Misic, “Macroeconomic Environment and NPLS: Evidence from Serbia and the 
Czech Republic” (205) XXXIX Teme 175.
5 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Companies, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia, N°14/2015. See also N. Jovanovic, “Novi zakonodavni „mućak“ Srbije u MiFID okruženju” in 
Usklađivanje	poslovnog	prava	Srbije	sa	pravom	Evropske	unije (2011, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 
Beograd), at 228-304.
6 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Companies, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, N°14/2015.
7 Deposit Insurance Agency of Serbia: http://www.aod.rs.
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bankruptcy proceeding, in which it determines the deadline for submitting claims 
of the creditors of the bank in bankruptcy proceeding, which could be in between 
30 and 90 days.
DIA makes a list of assets and obligations of the bank, its significant contracts 
in power, deals done in the last 180 days, etc., as well as the initial bankruptcy 
balance sheets. During the proceeding, deals that were made by the bank in the last 
six months before the proceedings initiation could be disputed before the court if 
some creditors were brought in favorable position by such deals. If the deals were 
made with connected persons, they can be disputed if they were made in the last 
year. Compensation of one`s debts with the debts of the bank toward that person 
can be made before the decision on final distribution of assets. In the bankruptcy 
proceeding, selling off a debtor bank as a legal entity is not permitted.
DIA determines the validity of creditors’ claims within six months after the 
deadline for submitting the claims. Within 60 days after that, a court hearing is 
held where the final list of claims is made.
A liquidation proceeding is similar to the bankruptcy proceeding, with the exception 
that no board of creditors is formed (since the bank in question is solvent, hence the 
creditors have no need for that kind of protection). Organs of the proceeding are 
the court and the liquidation administrator, which is again the DIA.
The Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks and Insurance Companies 
provides a relatively small number of regulations, directing instead to the rules 
of bankruptcy proceedings for regular (non-financial) companies for matters not 
specially regulated by this Law.8
However, a wide variety of measures that could be undertaken in the period before 
the initiation of bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings is regulated by the Law 
on Banks.9 The Law on Banks was significantly amended in 2015, among other 
under the influence of BRRD. One of the most significant changes has been the 
introduction of the reorganisation procedures, which are regulated in some detail. 
The competent national authority for restructuring banks is NBS – the central 
bank. All in all, with the amended Law on Banks, NBS has a much more active 
role in following the day-to-day doing business of the banks, with the aim of 
being able to intervene in a timely and adequate manner, with as little damage to 
8 M. Vasiljevic, Kompanijsko	pravo (2012, Sluzbeni glasnik RS, Beograd). Dj. Djuric, “Serbian Insolvency Law 
and its relation to EU Insolvency Standardization and the US Bankruptcy Code”, Chapter 12 in: R. Parry	(ed), 
Substantive Harmonisation and Convergence of Laws in Europe (2012, INSOL Europe, Nottingham), at 159-171.
9 Law on Banks, “Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia”, No. 107/2005, 91/2010 and 14/2015. More on the official 
site of the National Bank of Serbia: http://www.nbs.rs.
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overall financial stability and other market participants as possible. This kind of 
legislative change is completely in line with the changes in EU regulations that are 
the consequence of the financial crisis.
For example, banks are obliged to compile a Recovery plan, which is to be applied 
in the case of significant worsening of their financial status. Those Recovery plans 
are delivered to NBS on a yearly basis, or more often if necessary (if requested 
by NBS). Therefore, the provisions about Recovery plans are in line with the 
provisions of BRRD. The provisions on the supervisory role of NBS in analyzing 
auditor`s reports of the banks are also made stricter. As we have already pointed 
out, NBS has a much greater role and competence in following the banks, including 
some measures that did exist in Serbian law until these latest amendments to the 
Law on Banks. Also, a stricter system of responsibilities has been established to 
be in place inside the banks themselves.
Restructuring of a bank has been established as a special procedure to be applied 
when the need exists to secure the maintaining of the critical functions of the 
banks, protecting the stability of the financial system as a whole, protecting state 
funds, depositors, investors and clients of the bank and their assets. The main 
principles of the restructuring process are: the first ones to bear the losses are the 
shareholders of the bank (a clear statement that the public funds are to be spared 
and not be used to cover the losses in the private financial sector); next ones to bear 
the losses are the creditors of the bank, but in the same order as if the bankruptcy 
or liquidation proceeding were initiated; deposits insured by law will be paid in 
full; members of the management of the bank will be dismissed, but will be obliged 
to assist in the restructuring process and also be held legally responsible for the 
damage they may have caused by their actions to the bank and its creditors.
Measures like those brought by the presented laws reflect not only the need to 
adjust Serbian law to EU regulations in this field, but also the fact that Serbia has 
had several cases of failed banks in recent years, with one specialty: those banks 
were already (at the moment that failure became apparent and imminent) almost 
entirely owned by the State. Therefore, Serbian taxpayers are already familiar with 
the situation when the losses of financial institutions fall ultimately and directly to 
the state budget. That is exactly the situation with the EU regulations, as well as 
with Serbian regulations, aimed to be avoided in the future.
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3. Regulations in Montenegro
Bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings for banks in Montenegro are regulated 
in the Bank Bankruptcy and Liquidation Law.10 The main characteristic of 
both proceedings is that they are conducted exclusively by the Central Bank of 
Montenegro (“CBM”). CBM initiates the proceedings, appoints the bankruptcy 
or liquidation administrator and the members of bankruptcy board and decides 
on closing the bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings. Bankruptcy or liquidation 
administrator is a natural person that meets the criteria set in the Law. The Law 
contains detailed regulations of the proceedings, in which the bankruptcy (or 
liquidation) administrator has the main role, but is ultimately responsible to the 
bankruptcy board and the CBM. Unlike the bankruptcy proceedings for regular 
companies in Montenegro, courts do not participate in bankruptcy proceedings for 
banks, except in the case of lawsuits filed against administrative acts of CBM in 
the bankruptcy proceeding.
The Law on Banks11 regulates several measures that can be undertaken by the CBM 
in the event that supervision determines that the bank has done business in an illegal 
or not solid manner, especially in relation to risk management. Those measures 
include various orders and bans (that effectively mean interfering in doing day-to-
day business of the bank), ordering the bank to create a plan for improving the state 
of affairs of the bank, introducing a temporary administration to the bank, or even 
revoking the bank`s license. In case of introducing temporary administration, CBM 
appoints a temporary administrator that takes over the management of the bank and 
is responsible to the CBM. Temporary administrator can order the emission of new 
shares of the bank (emission to existing shareholders only, which is the primary 
way, except in the case of already failed recapitalisation), or selling the shares of 
existing shareholders to raise new capital, or even transferring the bank`s assets 
and/or liabilities to another bank, without the consent of shareholders, creditors or 
debtors. These actions can be compared to those introduced by BRRD, although 
they are definitely not caused by BRRD, since the last amendments to the Law on 
Banks were adopted in 2011.12
10 Bank Bankruptcy and Liquidation Law, “Official Gazette of Montenegro”, Nos. 47/2001, 62/2008 and 44/2010. 
More on the official page of the Central Bank of Montenegro: http://www.cbmn.org.
11 Law on Banks, “Official Gazette of Montenegro“, Nos. 17/2008, 44/2010 and 40/2011.
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations of Montenegro, Report on Analytical Survey of 
Harmonisation of Legislation of the Republic of Montenegro, Chapter 9 – Financial Services, available at: http://
www.mvpei.gov.me (last viewed 14 September 2015).
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4. Regulations in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Banking Law of Macedonia13 contains regulations concerning bankruptcy and 
liquidation proceedings for banks, as well as a wide array of measures that can 
be undertaken before initiating such proceedings, when banks run into difficulties 
during their business operations. While the bankruptcy proceeding can be initiated 
by the Governor of the National Bank of The Republic of Macedonia, liquidations 
proceeding can be initiated either by the bank itself or by the Governor of the 
National Bank. The bankruptcy proceeding is initiated by the Governor of the 
National Bank, who after passing the decision that the requirements for initiating 
bankruptcy proceeding are fulfilled, files a proposal for opening the proceeding to 
the court. The bankruptcy proceeding is conducted by the court, which appoints 
a bankruptcy administrator, after receiving the opinion of the Governor of the 
National Bank for this appointment. Bankruptcy administrator must be a (natural) 
person that meets the legal requirements for being a member of the management 
of the bank. The court also appoints a board of creditors. The National Bank is 
also involved in the proceeding, since the bankruptcy administrator compiles a 
report on all the claims and liabilities of the bank and sends the report to the 
National Bank, which sends it to the bankruptcy court after inspecting the received 
documents. Not all the bankruptcy proceeding rules are contained in the Banking 
Law, since this law often directs to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law, which 
regulates the bankruptcy proceeding for regular companies.
Macedonian Banking Law contains a whole chapter dedicated to branches of 
banks from EU member states, which means that the Macedonian law grants the 
banks stemming from EU states a special status, simplifying their access to the 
Macedonian banking market through branches.14 Namely, Macedonian Banking 
Law contains a different set of rules for foreign banks, which are not from EU 
member states. Banking Law also prescribes that the only competent authority 
for deciding on opening bankruptcy or liquidation procedures against a bank, 
including its branches in Macedonia, is the competent authority of the home 
country. This, as well as the other provisions of the Banking Law, is harmonised 
with the provisions of the Directive 2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and winding 
up of credit institutions.
13 Banking Law of Macedonia, “Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia” Nos. 67/2007, 90/2009, 67/2010, 
26/2013 and 15/2015. More on the official page of the National Bank of FYRO Macedonia: http://www.nbrm.mk.
14 M. Malovic and S. Paunovic, “Flow of Funds in Balkan Banks: Narrow Banking or Narrow Escape?” in P. 
Teixeira et	al. (eds), European	Integration	Process	in	Western	Balkan	Countries (2012, University of Coimbra 
Press, Coimbra), at 564-588.
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Banking Law also provides the Governor of the National Bank, as the competent 
authority, with a wide set of measures that could be undertaken in the case of 
observed irregularities in the functioning of the bank, including introducing 
administration or appointing new members of administration of the bank that is 
facing difficulties.
Conclusion
The analysis of the state of legislation in the selected EU candidate countries shows 
a general trend of adapting to the post-crisis conditions of the banking markets, 
which is also somewhat influenced by the changes in EU regulations in this field. 
While it can be said that Serbia has responded in the most direct manner to new 
EU regulations, such as BRRD, it is clear that other countries are also preparing 
their respective markets for the challenges of EU accession negotiations. For 
example, FYR Macedonia has already introduced a special treatment for banks 
that originate from EU states into legislation, which facilitates their access to 
Macedonian market.
However, the future of banking regulations of candidate countries is still uncertain, 
and it must be said that the outcome is not entirely dependent on the quality of 
their laws and their implementation. Political and economic circumstances have 
put other topics to the agenda lately (immigration crisis, Greek crisis, Ukrainian 
crisis, slow economic growth in many EU member states), which means that EU 
enlargement is currently not under serious consideration. Also, it is still to be 
determined how the EU regulations themselves, which are to be used as a model 
for the candidate countries, would perform in case of a new financial crisis. The 
process of testing and evaluation of legislation of candidate countries is a process 
that will certainly take years.
Influence	of	the	EU	Regulations	on	Banking	and	Financial	Insolvency	in	Candidate	Countries
122 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
123
Chapter 10
The Cost of Bank Insolvencies:  
A Socio-Economic Rights Analysis
Jennifer Gant
Introduction
High risk banking practices were a central factor of the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and the world is still feeling the aftershocks. Sovereign debt, austerity, and 
the degradation of social benefits, employee rights, and even the democratic 
framework of sovereign nations have been only some of the negative results. 
Given the complicated nature of modern financial markets, complex and remote 
financial instruments, and the banking industry, it is uncertain as to whether the 
current banking regulation and reforms can provide an effective safety net to avoid 
the social costs associated with future financial crises. It could be that it is time for 
a paradigm shift in the way in which banking and lending are approached from 
a philosophical perspective, taking into account a renewed understanding of the 
purpose and character of debt and lending, particularly when dealing with those 
debt transactions affecting individuals. Considering the juxtaposition of wealth 
maximisation, a fundamental aim of banking and finance, to the potential social 
costs when profit focussed activities go wrong, it could be possible that a neo-
liberal and economically focussed approach to banking regulation and reform may 
need to be shifted to reflect the actual social costs of capitalism.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the fundamental underpinnings of the 
UK’s approach to banking and lending with a focus on the apparent theoretical 
or philosophical approach to banking and regulation within the economy with 
reference to Coase’s “The Problem of Social Costs”1 and whether or not his 
framework of analysis is relevant to the regulation of today’s financial markets. 
The origins of the financial crisis in irresponsible banking and lending practices 
will be explored as well as the social costs the financial crisis and the specific 
impact of lending practices on the consumer. Historic views on debt will be 
presented with a view to tracing how those views have changed in the modern age, 
particularly in consideration of the banking industry’s approach to debt selling. 
1 R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
The	Cost	of	Bank	Insolvencies:	A	Socio-Economic	Rights	Analysis
124 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
There will also be brief look at some of the post crisis regulatory reforms that have 
occurred and a critical analysis of the neo-liberal economic approach in this area, 
followed by a conclusion that will comment on whether or not the current approach 
and underpinning theoretical framework can be adequate to circumvent the social 
costs of irresponsible banking practices in the future.
Origins of Financial Crisis
It is fairly well known that the most recent global recession was triggered by a 
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007, which then led to a global 
liquidity crisis due to the interconnectedness of many financial institutions, both 
banks and non-banks, which were affected by the “credit crunch”.2 It was common 
to transfer certain repackaged debt obligations to increase liquidity, thereby 
giving creditors a means of trading debt obligations on the market. Without debt 
instruments to facilitate trading, debt remains an obligation from one party to 
another. When debt instruments are used as a means of facilitating debt trading, 
debt obligations can be removed from one party and given to another quickly 
and efficiently. Complex debt relationships have evolved among the financial 
institutions of the world, thus when mistakes are made by one, whether through 
negligence or mismanagement or simply overly risky behaviour, all institutions 
are affected, or perhaps infected as a result.3 Thus when banks ceased to function 
in the provision of credit on the scale to which the world economy had become 
accustomed, states often intervened in order to protect the national economies from 
complete collapse.4
Once confidence was shaken in Lehman Brothers in 2008, fewer market 
participants were willing to purchase securities from them as the trust that the 
company would eventually be able to repurchase them at a higher price had been 
lost.5 Its collapse and bankruptcy led to great market uncertainty and, failing to 
secure a government rescue package, revealed a fundamental cause of the crisis: 
excessive risk-taking. The loss of confidence in the financial system caused by 
the collapse of Lehman led to a global market collapse, which frightened many 
2 S. Lubben and S. Woo, “Reconceptualising Lehman” (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 297; T. Jiang 
et	al., “Dynamics in Bank Crisis Model” [2015] Mathematical	Problems	in	Engineering,	available at: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/378463 (last viewed 15 September 2015); G. Walker, “Financial Crisis – UK Policy 
and Regulatory Response” (2010) 44(2) International Lawyer 751.
3 Jiang et al., above note 2.
4 D. Singh, “UK Approach to Financial Crisis Management” (2013) 19 Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 869.
5 This refers to a repo-agreement in which securities are sold with an agreement for the seller to buy them back at 
a later date and normally at a higher price.
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governments into action to try to avoid additional bank collapses by providing 
bail outs to many banking institutions. It impacted not just banks, but a number 
of financial type institutions, such as the insurance group AIG, which had linked 
itself to complex mortgage backed securities market, providing guarantees for 
collateralised debt obligations without making adequate provision in capital for 
any claims that could arise.6 The complex financial instruments to which the risks 
were attached lured considerable interest due to promised high returns, leading to 
additional repackaging and securitising and rapid growth in this market due to the 
perceived efficiency and high returns on investment. Eventually the demand for 
these kinds of products overwhelmed the need for due diligence regarding their 
product quality, which fuelled demand for the securitisation of lower forms of 
assets, such as subprime mortgages.7
While massive bank collapses were viewed as an imminent threat to the global 
economy, there remained a question of moral hazard as to whether it could be 
justified for governments to intervene with taxpayer’s money to rescue banks from 
collapse when essentially the primary cause of their distress was mismanagement.8 
Essentially, governments would be taking money from the people they were trying 
to protect from the effects of banking collapses caused by mismanagement of 
the very debt that belonged to the people governments were trying to protect! 
Of course, the banking industry also has an intimate connection to the lives of 
ordinary people as it is to the banks that people turn in order to acquire loans 
for housing, entrepreneurial business activities, and pensions to see them through 
to the end of their days. Thus when the banking industry suffers, regardless if 
the taxpayer is forced to bail them out, the ordinary man will also suffer due to 
difficulties in attaining credit.
The financial crisis exposed existing problems in the financial markets and the 
banking industry in terms of financial supervision, theory and practice. In addition, 
the intangible nature of debt securities and credit derivatives calls into question 
the value that can be placed on a promise when it has passed through numerous 
“hands” and has been split, combined, and amalgamated subject to additional 
promises that rely on all previous promises being met, until the original “promise” 
is no longer recognisable. This sounds more like fantasy than any real transaction 
between financial entities and/or individuals.
6 Singh, above note 4, at 873-874.
7 Ibid., at 875-876.
8 Ibid., at 871-872.
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Modern Views on Debt9
Debt used to have an intrinsic moral dimension tied to the human condition. While 
early banks could only lend against the deposits held within the bank, this is no 
longer banking norm. Today dispensing with debt has become a financial decision 
as institutions tend to treat individual debt obligations as profit-making and capital 
freeing instruments. Granted, in order for banks to lend to individuals, they must 
first have capital to provide to borrowers and capital can only be freed if banks 
can also free themselves from the debt of their borrowers, often by selling it on 
through the complex securitization transactions, such as those that were at least 
partially indicted by assessments of the financial crisis. However, the extent to 
which debts can now be separated from the individual who owes them is reflective 
of fundamental changes in how debt is perceived in the modern financial context, 
particularly when compared to the anthropological origins of debt as a concept.
Debt and credit have an extraordinarily long history lying well outside their current 
financial aspects. It has been said that the origin of modern debt and credit lies in a 
sense of human community, mutual obligations, and morality.10 It has been viewed 
as a product of humanity’s existential condition owed by virtue of the natural 
mutual protections afforded by living in a society or, from a religious standpoint, 
the existential debt owed to a supreme being.11 Those living proper and moral lives 
are obliged to constantly repay the existential debts owed to one another. This 
evolved into a social obligation over time related to a reputation for honesty and 
charity,12 something that can be traced to the early developments of social contract 
theory as well.
In principle, debt requires a relationship between individuals who do not consider 
each other fundamentally different and who are potentially equals. The balance of 
debt and credit addresses this equality in the sense that the urge to repay a debt is 
also the need to reinstate the equality between the debtor and creditor. If one is then 
unable to reinstate that equality, the person who is in debt must be at fault. Thus 
a debt is an exchange between individuals that has not yet been reciprocated.13 
Given the association of creditworthiness with reputation for honesty and integrity, 
9 The research in this section has also contributed to the author’s PhD thesis, “Rescue before a Fall: an Anglo-French 
Analysis of the Balance between Corporate Rescue and Employment Protection” (submitted in January 2016).
10 D. Graeber, Debt:	the	First	5000	Years	(2011, Melville House Publishing, Brooklyn NY), at 1-19.
11 This is a primordial debt “owed by the living to the continuity and durability of the society that secures their 
individual existence”: G. Ingham, The Nature of Money (2004, Polity Press, Maldon MA), at 90.
12 Graeber, above note 10; J. Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes and 
Negotiability” (2003) 25(3) The International History Review 505, at 506.
13 Graeber, above note 10, at 120-121.
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financial debt obligations eventually became indistinguishable from moral 
obligations.14 Hence the development of laws prohibiting usurious lending which 
was viewed as a type of theft as the charging of interest had no representation in 
goods. As money was meant to be only to be a representation of value in goods 
and services, interest was equated to taking money from an individual for nothing 
in return.15
The growth of capitalism precipitated the gradual collapse of economic reliance 
upon traditional communities due to the growing power of an impersonal market. 
There was a gradual transformation of moral networks by the intrusion of 
impersonal market rules and the powers of the state. The legalisation of interest 
led to the evolution of signed legal bonds agreeing terms of loans, which in 
turn required the evolution of a court system that could deal with the influx of 
commercial claims.16 While today debts and credits have taken on an impersonal 
and purely financial character within a specific legal framework, their derivation is 
in good faith, socially acceptable behaviour and reputation that create the “credit” 
of an individual in society.17
Whether or not the origins of debt can truly be said to be in this ideal of human 
community and the obligations owed to one another for the safety of living in 
society, it can certainly be agreed that debt was once a personal obligation that 
most individuals would seek to escape as soon as possible. This could be due to 
the feeling of being subordinated to another human being due to what is owed, or 
perhaps just the consequences of not repaying. Today, however, it is rare to find an 
individual who does not live in a perpetual state of financial debt: it is the accepted 
status quo of the human condition, which has essentially commoditised the value 
of debt into something that has been separated from its moral roots. It has become 
abstracted from any proprietary interest that a debtor may have had over it; banks 
do not ask a mortgagor if they can sell their “IOU” on to hedge funds, insurance 
companies, or other financial institutions, despite that by all appearances, debt has 
a proprietary nature.
While it could be that banks are exchanging funding now for money later as the 
debt is repaid, the question remains as to how if debt is an obligation, how can it be 
sold free from consent? It is admitted that this is a highly controversial assertion, 
14 W. Hunt, The	Puritan	Moment:	the	Coming	of	Revolution	in	an	English	County (1983, Harvard University Press, 
Harvard MA), at 146.
15 Graeber, above note 10, at 289.
16 Ibid., at 332-333.
17 Ibid., at 56-57; according to Munro, above note 12, at 506, usury is defined as the exaction of interest or of any 
specified return beyond the principal value of a loan.
The	Cost	of	Bank	Insolvencies:	A	Socio-Economic	Rights	Analysis
128 Banking and Financial Insolvencies: The European Regulatory Framework
given that these transactions have been going on for centuries, essentially in a sense 
like a bookmaker laying off large bets to other book makers in order to reduce their 
exposure. Applying the analogy, these transactions can effectively spread the risk 
across the financial market rather than solely impact on the entity lending.
Social Costs of Financial Crisis
The banking origins of the financial crisis fed into the sovereign debt problems 
in Europe, which led to a severe economic slowdown and eventually a crisis of 
the Euro in 2010. This crisis was due in part to differentials in macroeconomic 
development between the member states in the Euro, with the previously more 
expensive and developed countries becoming balanced with those states that used 
to benefit from their less expensive production environment. Thus the economic 
advantages of states like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy that could benefit from 
the imbalance in competitiveness prior to the introduction of the Euro, lost their 
edge. This combined with mounting current account deficits, led to the sovereign 
debt crisis.18 The situation in Europe in 2010 has been described as a twin sovereign 
and banking crisis that mutually feed each other, resulting in a gradual contagion 
to more countries and more asset classes. Government bailouts of national banks 
further added to the public debt and as private debt became public debt, sovereign 
debt became critical.19
Since the financial crisis and following the sovereign debt crisis there have been 
massive changes in national approaches to the regulation of aspects of national 
and supranational economies and social policies. This is particularly evident in 
the changes that have occurred throughout the EU in its reduced emphasis on 
social protections, in favour instead of a more neo-liberal approach designed to 
support its weakened economic status. Member State reforms under these revised 
EU policies as well as the austerity measures required in those States that are party 
to Memoranda of Understanding20 in return for financial support have seen the 
steady erosion of workers’ rights generally, while the “rescue culture”21 has been 
steadily infused into Member State legal systems. While the presence of good 
rescue mechanisms may mitigate to some extent the loss of social protection, it 
is questionable whether or not such reforms are capable of going far enough to 
18 B. Moro, “Lessons from the European Economic and Financial Great Crisis: A Survey” (2013) 34 European 
Journal of Political Economy s9.
19 Ibid., at s11.
20 Hereafter referred to as “MoU”.
21 An economic policy emphasising the priority of rehabilitating viable companies in financial distress for the 
purposes of preserving their economic value as well as the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an 
enterprise, including unsecured creditors, employees, communities and other stakeholders.
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protect the most vulnerable of those EU citizens affected by the financial crisis.22 
There has thus been a fundamental shift in welfare state politics with austerity 
becoming a key measure to combat growing budget deficits. While a number of 
economists have now discredited the economic research that allegedly supported 
the push toward austerity, it remains a central feature of the recovery efforts that 
continue to exist, particularly in those countries whose sovereign debt spiralled to 
the point of needing or nearly needing supranationally supported loans to avoid 
insolvency.23 This in turn has created a democratic deficit due to the requirements 
of these loans to reform the affected countries’ legal systems, regardless of whether 
or not the government has been elected on an austerity platform or otherwise.
Beyond the impact on employment and business failure, the financial and sovereign 
debt crises have also affected individual borrowers seeking to finance business 
ventures or to purchase family homes. Repossessions became a common claim due 
to the inability to repay mortgages as a result of the fall in housing prices. Social 
benefits have been cut back everywhere as a part of austerity measures. This has 
often had the most severe effects on the most vulnerable individuals in society: 
the elderly and the disabled. Suicides among those vulnerable members of society 
who have been put through the rigours of defending their need to receive certain 
benefits have risen due to the stress and hopelessness that changes to benefit to 
which changes in applications have led. While public support for the welfare state 
has not changed, rather indications are that it has become even more beloved due to 
the fact that it shields people from losing their jobs and protects income in case of 
unemployment, there has been a steady erosion of social rights and benefits.24 It has 
been argued that a number of countries had gone too far in their social protections, 
causing some of their debt related problems by failing to balance social policy with 
the requirements of capital. However, the social impact on individuals due to the 
instigation of austerity is manifest.
22 A full exploration of the impacts of the sovereign debt and financial crises on employment protection and corporate 
rescue was explored at the IEAF Conference in Istanbul in 2014 in a paper titled “The Road to Recovery: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Rights of Workers in Greece, Portugal, France 
and the United Kingdom and their Insolvency Legal Systems” written with Dr Alexandra Kastrinou.
23 For an exploration of the economic arguments against austerity, see P. Krugman, “The Austerity Delusion” 
(The Guardian, 29 April 2015), available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/
the-austerity-delusion (last viewed 30 April 2015).
24 B. Vis et	al., “To What Extent Did the Financial Crisis Intensify the Pressure to Reform the Welfare State?” 
(2011) 45(4) Social Policy & Administration 338, at 342.
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A Legal Economic Analysis of Debt Instruments
The financial sector has long benefitted from a neo-liberal economic approach 
to its regulation. This has allowed innovation in investment and profit-making, 
creating new and different debt instruments and ways of selling and packaging 
them in order to increase bank liquidity, permitting more and greater lending 
to individuals and businesses. However, the roots of the crisis in high risk debt 
trading have shown that such an approach does not afford the social benefit that 
highly liquid financial markets were meant to provide. Rather, it has required input 
from tax-payers to make sure the economy did not implode entirely. It must be 
queried, then, if a purely economic approach to regulation of the financial market 
is adequate, particularly given the distance that has evolved between debt and the 
human element of it and the ease of which it is now disposed.
The principles of Law and Economics provide an analytical framework within 
which a balance between social and commercial interests is sought. The basis of 
an economic approach to legal rules assumes that the people involved in a legal 
system will act rationally to maximise their own satisfaction.25 In an economic 
analysis of the law, if two opposing sides of an issue behave rationally, they will 
find a balance that maximises the benefits/happiness of each side when an outcome 
is uncertain at the outset.26 Rational maximisation within a legal system suggests 
that by putting a conceptual price on legal rights and remedies, it will be possible 
to create legal rules that maximise effectiveness by finding the perfect balance of 
economic efficiency between competing aims.27
Law and economics defines a good legal system as one that keeps the profitability 
of businesses and the welfare of people aligned, so that the pursuit of profit also 
benefits the public. This is somewhat reflective of the ideals of utilitarianism, a 
fairly hedonistic and secular political theory that places the overall pleasure or 
perhaps satisfaction of humanity as the defining characteristic of what is “right” 
for humanity in terms of political and legal structure.28 However, while classical 
utilitarianism seeks to maximise the sum of all individuals’ functions in terms of 
utility, law and economics aims to try to maximise social wealth rather than social 
utility. Goods should be awarded to those individuals who are willing to pay the 
most, not to those for whom those goods will have the highest utility. Fines and 
25 R. Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory” (1979) 8(1) Journal of Legal Studies 103, at 104.
26 R. Posner, “Observation: The Economic Approach to Law” (1974) 53 Texas Law Review 761.
27 Ibid., at 764.
28 M. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th ed) (2014, Sweet & Maxwell, London), in Chapters 2 
and 3; B. Bix, Jurisprudence:	Theory	and	Context (6th ed) (2012, Sweet & Maxwell, London), in Chapter 3.
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sanctions then become a deterrent if they are set at a level that people are unwilling 
the “pay the price” for doing the unwanted behaviour. The trick is to set the price 
at a level that deters the behaviour, but does not deter one from engaging in some 
risk, particularly if applied to economic activity.29 While true that sanctions may 
prevent unwanted and costly behaviour, it would be economically inefficient in 
terms of regulating the financial market to set those sanctions at such a level that 
no one would want to lend, invest, or follow entrepreneurial ideas. Thus a balance 
needs to be struck in order to find the point that deters enough behaviour to retain 
some order in the market, while not discouraging some risk in the market.
One problem with the law and economics theoretical framework is that it has been 
perceived as being of a specifically free-market, capitalistic ideology and even an 
apology for conservatism. While it is not intended to paint capitalism as “evil”, 
it must also be acknowledged that it does not often consider those elements of 
society that fall outside of the markets and profit. If economic efficiency depends 
on what people are willing to pay, then by association, a person’s willingness to 
pay is directly connected to what they are able to afford. Thus the more wealth 
one has, the more likely it is that it can be increased in a system built on models of 
pure economic efficiency. Its precept tends to support unequal income distribution, 
which tends to be a highly political subject.
Ronald Coase’s theory, developed in the 1960s, on social costs posits that in 
circumstances where two activities conflict, the costs should be assessed as the 
combination of both activities. The classic example used was a scenario where 
a train travels through a farmer’s field and causes crop fires on occasion due to 
flying sparks. While many would view it as axiomatic that the farmer should be 
compensated for the losses incurred, Coase’s view was that it was not merely the 
case that without the railway there would have been no fire, but that if the farmer 
had not planted crops so close to the railroad tracks, there would similarly have 
been no fire. This approach has allowed the application elements of supply and 
demand on how damage may be allocated. The economic analysis of law has an 
underlying capitalistic foundation and the fault-based approach would require far 
more government regulation than a profit driven society could accept.
The train in Coase’s example had a social benefit. It provides transportation of 
the very crops that the farmers grow. It allowed for quicker access between cities 
and represents a kind of progress that has effectively benefitted all. There is an 
argument to be made for ensuring that the damage caused by trains, were a fault 
29 U. Gneezy and A. Rustichini, “A Fine is a Price” (2000) 29(1) Journal of Legal Studies 1.
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based approach applied, might lead to changes and limitations in rail travel that 
could reduce its overall usefulness to society. As such, a balanced approach that 
allocates the costs to both farmers and railways can allow for both to continue to 
co-exist and provide their benefits to society as a whole.
Fast-forward to the modern day and apply Coase’s theory to the prospect of 
financial regulation. The railway and the farmers’ crops both provide a social 
benefit that has the potential to enrich all of society in one way or another. While 
the ability to sell debt allows for increased liquidity and releases capital for 
lending, does the current system effectively put capital in the right places so that 
all of society can benefit from these transactions, rather than those who do the 
buying and selling? Regulation has been created to control industrial pollution, 
noise and other noxious or anti-social effects of industry, but complicated financial 
transactions and particularly those involving complex, repackaged, depersonalised 
debt instruments present an entirely different social cost that regulators should 
probably take into account. If debt is an obligation or promise, what happens 
when that promise is mixed with other promises, amalgamated, divided, sold and 
dispersed to the point that it is no longer identifiable? Granted, debt is itself only 
a concept having no true physical existence, at least not since the un-pegging of 
major currencies from the gold standard, and even then money only represented 
a promise to pay something else of equivalent value, accepted only because it is 
assumed that others will also accept it as valuable in exchange.30 That said, if debt 
is to remain a promise, surely the person who made that promise should remain 
connected to it in some way.
Conclusion
Following the crisis of 2007/2008 reform in banking and finance was firmly on the 
agenda of many of the most affected countries throughout the world. The United 
States passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
which was a compendium of financial regulations affecting financial institutions 
and their customers, passed in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of events that 
caused the 2008 financial crisis. The UK passed the Banking Act in 2009 following 
the Turner Review which was the regulatory response to the global banking crisis, 
the Banking Reform Act in 2013, and set up the Prudential Regulation Authority 
that can hold banks to account for the way they separate their retail and investment 
activities. The EU has issued the De Larosière Report, which has provided some 
foundation for reform, though it does not have binding force, while there have also 
30 Graeber, above note 10, at 47.
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been changes to the institutions dealing with banking by introducing the European 
Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Many 
of these reforms have been fundamentally reactive in nature, though they have 
certainly gone further than any reforms that have come before. That said, it must 
be queried whether these reforms are treating the symptoms, or the disease, and if 
the latter, what is the disease?
It has been said that there is nothing inherently “wrong” with the complex financial 
instruments that were central to the crash of confidence in debt markets that 
precipitated the financial crisis. It is the people who use them and manage the 
relevant debt. It would seem that enough people have used them inappropriately 
that it was possible to provide a part of the cause of the second worst financial 
crisis of living memory. If the ethics guidelines were not followed then, who is 
to say that changes to guidelines and ethics will prevent the bad behaviour in the 
future. It is necessary therefore to find a way to better “enforce” the guidelines, or 
essentially, in the style of Coase, to make the “price” of breaking the rules too high 
for bankers or other financiers to be willing to pay. Compare it for example to the 
arguments about gun laws in the United States. The gun lobbyists and the NRA say 
it is not the guns; it is the people who use them. With that logic it would seem that 
given the increase in senseless gun crime in the US over the last several decades, 
it is clear that the people cannot be controlled with the rules that are in place now. 
Perhaps then something should be done about access to the guns themselves. They 
are fine and useful tools if used properly by well trained, sane and appropriate 
people – but that means making sure that we put our guns – and our money – in 
those right hands.
While the reasons for the crisis cannot be laid solely at the feet of the banking 
industry, the way that debt is handled is at least one small aspect that can be 
reconsidered, perhaps leading to improved institutions for handling debt that could 
prevent its level of contribution to future problems in the global economy. The 
complex, interconnected, and dependent structure of financial institutions require 
an international approach to financial distress amongst financial institutions. 
Although UNCITRAL provides model laws and promotes the noble goal of 
coordination among the courts of the world that hear insolvency cases, it has been 
viewed as being inadequate to the nature of financial institutions as they tend to 
fail to address the structural dependency inherent in them.31 A paradigm shift in the 
way that debt is perceived could lead to a better handling of future economic risks, 
potentially avoiding a financial crisis having the catastrophic impact of the last one. 
31 Lubben and Woo, above note 2, at 300.
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A more transparent system of banking may also lend itself to a better coordination 
on the international stage as well. Given the interconnectedness of our economies, 
better cooperation could only improve the resolution of debt.
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Chapter 11
Prepacks: No Evil is Without Good
Alexandra Kastrinou and Stef Vullings
Introduction
Prepackaged insolvency proceedings have been with us for some time now, but 
in the last decade or so the number of prepackaged proceedings has increased 
dramatically across many jurisdictions in the European Union. From a debtor’s 
perspective prepacks can be attractive for a wide range of reasons, for instance the 
process is quick, secret and inexpensive. On the other hand, from an apprehensive 
creditor’s perspective, a variety of concerns arise primarily due to the lack of 
transparency of the process. However, notwithstanding the criticisms and concerns 
prepacks have repeatedly received support and ultimately validation as a helpful 
rescue tool.
In light of prepacks having been widely adopted by a number of European 
jurisdictions as a rescue tool, the aim of this paper is to provide a comparative 
analysis of the approach towards prepacks. The paper will consider the different 
approach adopted in the very creditor-friendly UK and compare it with the 
approach taken in the Netherlands. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role 
of secured creditors in the prepack process, banks in particular.
Moreover, the paper will briefly examine whether prepacks are proving to be a 
useful social policy tool. With particular regard to the UK, it could be argued that 
the preservation of employment and as a result the greater social prosperity is the 
explanation behind the support of prepacks. A comparison will then be drawn with 
the Dutch prepack regime and the paper shall assess whether or not preservation 
of employment is also a driving force behind the increased endorsement of the 
prepack practice.
The Rise of Prepacks in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom prepacks fall within the context of administration 
proceedings. A prepack administration involves a pre-arranged sale of the distressed 
business, which will be executed immediately after the formal appointment of 
the administrator.
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The Enterprise Act 2002 (“EA 2002”)1 strengthened the rescue ethos of the United 
Kingdom by streamlining the administration procedure, first introduced in the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”), and effectively making it a key restructuring 
tool. In particular, the EA 2002 introduced revolutionary changes to what was 
previously a time-consuming, expensive and complex administration procedure. 
The EA 2002 contains a series of reforms designed to make administration an 
attractive restructuring device.
However, it is important to note that the EA 2002 does not make specific reference 
to prepacks. Instead prepacks developed as a market technique to promote 
corporate rescue, but no legislation is directly applicable to them. A prepack 
typically involves a sale of a distressed business, seamlessly prepared outside of 
formal administration proceedings, which is executed immediately after the formal 
appointment of an administrator.
As previously stated, a prepack sale, albeit not expressly regulated by the relevant 
legislation, nevertheless falls within the context of administration proceedings. It 
is therefore important at this stage to provide a brief analysis of the applicable law.
The Law regulating Prepack Administration Proceedings
A significant change introduced by the EA 2002 is the fact that it makes provision 
for two “out of court” routes to administration. Under the old law, an administrator 
could only be appointed by an order of the court, on a petition by the company, 
its directors or any creditors.2 However, under the EA 2002, a company is able to 
enter administration not only by means of a court order but also by:
(a) an appointment by a floating charge holder; or
(b) an appointment by the company or its directors.
The EA 2002 enables the holder of a floating charge to appoint an administrator, 
provided that their security has become enforceable3 and that their security interest 
relates to the whole or substantially the whole of the company’s property.4 The 
power to make an appointment must be specified by the instrument creating their 
security.5 The second gateway to administration is by virtue of an appointment by 
1 Pursuant to the EA 2002, Part II of the IA 1986 has been replaced and a new Part II was inserted in its place, which 
gives effect to an additional Schedule B1.
2 Section 9(1), IA 1986.
3 Ibid., paragraph 16, Schedule B1.
4 Ibid., paragraph 14(3).
5 Ibid., paragraph 14(2).
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the company or its directors. It could be argued that, although directors can often 
be held responsible for the company’s difficulties, nonetheless, the rationale for 
granting them expedited appointment rights is to provide incentives (in the form of 
“sticks and carrots”) for them to take drastic action, when the company is in crisis.6 
It is noteworthy that, although the floating charge holder does not initiate this 
process, he is still given the opportunity to appoint his own administrator, unless 
the court thinks otherwise.7 In addition, the floating charge holder must receive 
at least five days’ notice of the company’s intention to appoint an administrator8 
and no appointment may be made until the notice period has expired or until the 
floating charge holder gives his written permission.9
A remarkable change introduced by the EA 2002 is with regards to the purpose of 
administration.10 The administrator must hierarchically perform his functions with 
the objective of: 
“a) rescuing the company as a going concern; 
b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up; or 
c) realizing property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.”11
Additionally, the administrator must perform his functions “in the interests of the 
company’s creditors as a whole”12 and as “quickly and efficiently as is reasonably 
practicable”.13 In exercising his functions, the administrator acts as the company’s 
agent.14 Upon his appointment, the administrator has the power to do anything 
necessary or expedient in relation to the management of the affairs, business or 
property of the company.15 For instance, he may challenge undervalue transactions, 
preferences, extortionate credit transactions and certain floating charges.16
6 J. Armour and R. Mokal, “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002” (2005) 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, at 32.
7 Paragraph 36, Schedule B1, IA 1986.
8 Ibid., paragraph 26(1).
9 Ibid., paragraph 28.
10 Phillips and Goldring argue that “this provision makes it expressly clear that administration is first and foremost 
about rescuing the corporate entity”: M. Phillips and J. Goldring, “Rescue and Reconstruction” (2002) 15(10) 
Insolvency Intelligence 75, at 76.
11 Paragraph 3(1) a-c, Schedule B1, IA 1986.
12 Ibid., paragraph 3(2).
13 Ibid., paragraph 4.
14 Ibid., paragraph 69.
15 Ibid., paragraph 59(1).
16 See sections 238, 239, 244 and 245, IA 1986, respectively.
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Further, the EA 2002 affords creditors enhanced participation in the administration 
proceedings. The EA 2002 requires the administrator to submit a statement 
of proposals for achieving the purpose of administration,17 which must be 
accompanied by an invitation to an initial creditors’ meeting.18 However, no such 
meeting is necessary where the administrator believes that:
(a) the company has sufficient property for each creditor to be paid in full;19
(b) that the company has insufficient property to enable a distribution to be made 
to unsecured creditors other than by virtue of the statutory ring-fencing of fund 
for unsecured creditors;20 or
(c) that none of the objectives for which the administration process was initiated 
can be achieved.21
Upon consideration of the proposals, the creditors can either approve or reject 
them. Additionally, the creditors may approve the proposals with modifications. 
However, the administrator must consent to each modification.22 Subsequently, if 
the administrator approves the proposed modifications and believes that they are 
substantial, he must call for a further meeting, where he will present the revised 
proposals or report any decisions to the creditors, and then report the matter to 
the court.23 It should be pointed out that the requirement for administrators to set 
out proposals, which are in turn to be approved by the creditors at the creditors’ 
meeting, is designed to enhance creditor participation in the re-organisation 
process. However, the objective of this requirement is arguably undermined 
by prepackaged administrations, as, where such proceedings are involved, it 
is possible for the administrator to effect a prepack disposal of the company’s 
business, or a substantial part of it, prior to a creditors’ meeting.24
Furthermore, although the administrator will consult with the company’s secured 
creditors prior to a prepack (in fact it is impossible to give effect to a prepack sale 
without the bank’s support), it could be argued that the rights of less powerful 
creditors will be overridden. Frisby identifies that creditors’ rights of participation 
17 Paragraphs 49(1), (3)-(5), IA 1986, which state that a copy of the proposals must be sent to all the members it 
applies to, no later than the end of 8 weeks from the commencement of administration.
18 Ibid., paragraph 51(1). Paragraph 51(2) states that the meeting must be held as soon as is reasonably practicable 
but not later than the end of 10 weeks from the commencement of the administration process.
19 Ibid., paragraph 52(1)(a).
20 Ibid., paragraph 52(1)(b).
21 Ibid., paragraph 52(1)(c).
22 Ibid., paragraph 51(3).
23 Ibid., paragraph 54.
24 A more detailed analysis of the prepackaged administration technique and criticism over its use is offered below.
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are subjugated to commercial considerations in a prepack situation, and 
acknowledges that there is a strong possibility that the commercial advantages of 
a prepack, in the form of enhanced consideration for the business and a reduction 
in the costs of selling it, will probably not inure to the advantage of those creditors 
who are excluded from the decision-making process.25
As mentioned earlier, the prepack is a restructuring method, whereby a sale is 
seamlessly prepared outside of formal insolvency proceedings, with a primary 
aim to preserve value. However, although the popularity of prepack has risen 
dramatically, the use of the procedure has not been free from criticism. In 
particular, it could be said that a significant criticism of the prepack process relates 
to the extent of control exerted by secured creditors, which arguably is not in line 
with the objectives of the EA 2002. An analysis of some of the key criticisms is 
offered below.
Prepacks and The Role of Secured Creditors in the Process
One of the key changes introduced by the EA 2002 is the virtual abolition of 
the administrative receivership procedure, with the objective of replacing a 
somewhat “selfish” proceeding with a somewhat more collective administration 
procedure. In other words it is no longer possible for a floating charge holder 
to appoint a receiver, who would primarily act in the interests of his appointor. 
Instead, following the reforms introduced by the EA 2002, the aim of which is to 
promote a more collective approach towards insolvency, the floating charge holder 
has an option to make an out of court appointment of an administrator,26 whose 
statutory duty to perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors 
as a whole.27
It could be argued that although the legislature’s intention was to promote a more 
collective insolvency procedure than administrative receivership, the manner in 
which prepack administration operates in practice is such that it closely resembles 
the administrative receivership procedure, effectively reviving the abolished 
procedure. In particular, some critics argue that prepacks have effectively replaced 
administrative receivership, as the procedure of choice for the secured lender 
as appointor.28
25 S. Frisby, “Report on Insolvency Outcomes” (2006), at 72, available at: http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/
insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/corpdocs/InsolvencyOutcomes.pdf.
26 Paragraph 14(1), Schedule B1, IA 1986.
27 Ibid., paragraph 3(2).
28 S. Davies, “Prepack” (2006) Recovery (Summer) 16.
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The aim of the EA 2002 to promote corporate rescue and a collective approach 
towards insolvency is clearly reflected in paragraph 3 of Schedule B1 IA 1986, 
where it is stated that “the administrator of a company must perform his functions 
hierarchically with the objective of –
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be 
likely if the company were wound up (without first being in administration), or
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.”
Therefore, with particular regard to the statutory purpose of administration, it 
could be argued that prepacks defy the intentions of the EA 2002, as with a prepack 
the emphasis is no longer on rescuing the company as a going concern. Instead, 
since as part of a prepack sale an agreement to sell the business is concluded prior 
to the administrator’s formal appointment, it could be argued that a prepack fails 
to achieve the primary objective of administration. It is therefore apparent that the 
prepack is designed to achieve either the second or third objective of administration, 
where the emphasis shifts to the protection of the secured creditors’ interests.
Although it appears that prepacks undermine the statutory objectives of 
administration in practice and that the significant control exercised by secured 
lenders is retained post EA 2002, one could nevertheless argue that prepacks 
could in the right circumstances constitute the most appropriate course of action. 
For instance, in circumstances where an insolvent company cannot be sold as 
a going concern, the prepack constitutes a great “value-preservation” tool, as it 
facilitates a discreet and quick sale of the business. 29 In particular, the prepack 
could prove to be a very valuable tool where a business has a strong brand or 
intellectual property, the value of which could decrease dramatically by even a 
hint of a formal insolvency.30 Furthermore, a prepack minimises the erosion of 
customer confidence, reduces any damage to relationships with key employees, 
especially in service based companies.31
Whilst there is a clear advantage to be gained from concealing the troubles of a 
company from the general public, where a prepack sale is involved, looking at the 
29 The sale is negotiated and prepared prior to entering into formal administration proceedings and is executed 
immediately after the appointment of the practitioner. Therefore the process is quick and confidential and as a 
result the value of the business assets is preserved.
30 M. Ellis, “The Thin Line in the Sand: Prepacks and Phoenixes” (2006) Recovery (Spring) 3.
31 Davies, above note 28.
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process from an apprehensive unsecured creditor’s perspective, it could be said 
that the lack of transparency within the prepack process makes it very difficult to 
determine how a deal was struck (arguably, the prepack-sceptic unsecured creditor 
is predisposed to believe that secrecy translates into a willy-nilly arrangement 
to benefit the secured creditors) and whether the administrator has properly 
conducted all the necessary enquiries as well as complied with his statutory 
duties.32 Furthermore, whilst unsecured creditors would be kept in the dark, a 
prepack cannot be completed without the involvement of the secured creditors, 
often banks or other financial institutions. The debtor needs the secured creditor 
to provide a release on the encumbered assets or else they cannot be sold. The 
creditors on the other hand need the administration procedure to take recourse on 
their secured assets. Therefore, the secured creditors are always involved in the 
process, whereas unsecured creditors are not.
However, it is submitted that banks benefit from successful prepack proceedings 
and have interest to ensure that there has not been an abuse of process. In addition, 
although safeguards (such as the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP 16”)) 
are in place, so as to ensure that insolvency practitioners act in accordance with 
their duties, it is rather unlikely that an administrator would willingly jeopardise 
his reputation (and hence his livelihood) and risk losing his licence, so as to benefit 
a particular creditor.
Furthermore, although prepacks appear to be a “controlled way forward” for banks, 
one could argue that banks are very well-placed, due to their experience and vast 
range of resources, to provide advice on the viability of a rescue business plan and 
to positively influence the outcomes of a prepack administration proceeding. 33 It is 
submitted that banks benefit from successful prepack proceedings and have interest 
to ensure that there has not been an abuse of process.
The lack of transparency which surrounds prepack administration gives rise to 
further criticisms relating particularly to the marketing and the valuation of the 
business prior to a sale. It could be argued that a proposed prepack sale is not 
subjected to the competitive forces of the market, which ultimately is likely to 
lead to the business or assets within the business being sold at a value significantly 
lower than it would, had it been properly exposed to the market for an appropriate 
period. With particular regard to instances where the sale of the business is to a 
connected party, even where the deal offered by the connected party is the best 
32 Importantly, the administrator must perform his functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole 
and as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable.
33 In particular the London Approach suggests an influence on restructurings dating back to the 1970s.
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one available in all the circumstances, unsecured creditors in particular perceive 
the sale to be inherently unfair.
The Graham Report,34 which offered an overview of the criticised prepack 
elements and proposed reforms to improve the procedure, suggested that the 
creation of a “pool of independent experts”35 would effectively address problems 
raised by the limited marketing of the business and would provide extra checks and 
balances to the process. The Graham report recommends that in connected sales, 
the connected party should voluntarily take the opportunity to present outline of 
the deal, together with the reasons why it is necessary to proceed in a particular 
way to an independent member of the “pool” prior to administration. 
This would create independent scrutiny of the sale, whilst retaining the much 
desired secrecy before the event. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the creation 
of a pool of experts only partly addresses the issue of limited marketing of a 
business, as it only applies to the case of a sale to a connected party. In addition, in 
the case of connected sales, it remains to be seen as to whether or not the creation 
of a pool of experts will operate effectively or instead add to the existing “comply 
or explain” bureaucracy insolvency practitioners are faced with. Finally, one has 
to question whether the Graham report recommendation will serve its genuine 
purpose or simply amount to a mechanism that alleviates insolvency practitioners 
from liability.
The Dutch Prepack: An Alternative on the Rise?
As part of the revision of the Dutch Insolvency Act, the Dutch have introduced 
a legislative framework for their prepack practice in the Wet Continuïteit 
Ondernemingen I.36 The Dutch prepack derives from English practice, but is 
different on many levels.
In the Netherlands the prepack falls within the context of the “faillissements” 
procedure (“liquidation”), which focuses on the winding up of the company. 
However, in practice the liquidation procedure is also used as the most important 
instrument for the reorganisation and continuation of businesses in financial 
difficulties.37 A big advantage of this procedure can be found in the rules governing 
employment contracts. Importantly, since the liquidation procedure is aimed at the 
34 T. Graham, “Graham Review into Prepack Administration June 2014”, Report to the Honourable Vince Cable MP.
35 The “pool of experts” became operational on 2 November 2015.
36 Kamerstukken	II 2014/15, 34 218, 2.
37 N. Faber et	al. (eds), Commencement of Insolvency Proceedings (2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 427.
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winding up of the company, the Acquired Rights Directive (“ARD”)38 excludes 
the automatic transfer of employment contracts upon the transfer of the business.39
Though at first sight the Dutch Insolvency Act (“DIA”) does not seem very rescue-
orientated, the liquidation procedure can be used quite effectively for restructuring 
purposes. The liquidation procedure gives two possible routes for the continuation 
of the business or company. First there is an option for liquidation compositions. 
The liquidation composition must be offered to all ordinary creditors who can 
adopt the proposal by a simple majority that together represent at least half of 
the debts.40 The proposal often consists of an offer to partially pay the debts after 
which the total amount of these debts will be discharged.41 A major advantage of 
this procedure is the court approval and the binding on a dissenting minority of 
ordinary creditors. After the court approval the liquidation procedure comes to an 
end without liquidating the company (Article 161 DIA). Therefore, the liquidation 
composition gives the possibility to restructure the debts within the same legal 
entity.42 However, these liquidation procedures are used very rarely in practice. 
The fact that the composition only works against the unsecured creditors is a 
major drawback.43
The second route involves the asset transaction in liquidation, also known as 
“restarts”. The Dutch prepack derives from such restarts. As part of a restart the 
assets of a company are sold followed by the liquidation of the corporate entity as 
an “empty shell”.44 The big advantages of this asset sale by the trustee are the speed 
of the procedure and the privacy of the sale.45 In contrast to the composition plan, 
the asset sale does not require public voting at a creditors’ meeting. The consent of 
the supervisory judge is required and so is the permission of key secured creditors 
to sell the encumbered assets which are secured by their security rights.46 Most 
restarts of business are based upon these asset transactions followed by liquidation.
The lack of transparency that surrounds the prepack process is often criticised both 
the in UK and the Netherlands. Particularly, the concerns in the UK are focussed 
38 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001.
39 Article 5(1), ARD; Article 7:666 section 1, Dutch Civil Code (“DCC”).
40 Articles 138 and 145 DIA; an exception can be made under the conditions mentioned in Article 146, DIA.
41 J. Groenewegen and J. Van Buren-Dee,	Tekst	&	Commentaar	Insolventierecht	(2014, Kluwer, Deventer), art. 138 
DIA, aant. 4.
42 J. Adriaanse, Restructuring	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Law:	Informal	Reorganisation	in	the	Netherlands (2005, Kluwer, 
Deventer), at 16.
43 Idem.
44 Idem.
45 L. Kortmann, “Improved Prepacks: Going Dutch” (2012) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 225.
46 Ibid., at 226.
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on “connected party sales”, the potential conflict of interest of an insolvency 
practitioner, as well as the lack of involvement of the unsecured creditors. Instead, 
in the Netherlands the main concern has been the applicability of the ARD.
As part of the proposed Dutch prepack, a debtor who approaches insolvency, 
but is not yet insolvent,47 can request the court to appoint an intended trustee. 
This intended trustee is an insolvency practitioner who is likely to be appointed 
as trustee in case of impeding liquidation proceedings.48 Following the debtor’s 
request, it must be proven that the appointment of the intended trustee will provide 
“added value”. Added value can be shown in at least two cases: when the debtor 
can show that the preparation by an intended trustee can limit the damage for the 
stakeholders in the case of a potential liquidation procedure, or when he can show 
that the preparation in secrecy can increase the value and job preservation to such 
an extent that this preservation outweighs the fact that the preparation is conducted 
in secrecy and lacks certain aspects of transparency.49 Where the court is convinced 
that added value is present, an intended trustee can be appointed for a maximum 
of two weeks.50 Furthermore, the court can make the appointment of the intended 
trustee subject to certain conditions, such as the involvement of the representatives 
of the employees or the unions.51
The Role of Unsecured Creditors in Prepacks
In most prepacks unsecured creditors are “out of the money” and receive very 
little, if anything at all, from the empty shell distributions.52 The statutory priority 
of claims in respect of distributions in insolvency places the unsecured creditors 
almost at the bottom of the list both in the UK and the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands the intended trustee and the intended supervisory judge are 
involved in the process to supervise the debtor and ensure that the interests of the 
unsecured creditors and employees are not neglected.53 Since most of the creditors 
are not involved in the preparation process, the responsibility on the intended 
47 Proposed article 363 sub 1, DIA; The debtor may not yet be insolvent since he has to be able to pay the salary of 
the intended trustee as well as the debts that fall due in short term.
48 Proposed article 363 sub 1 first sentence, DIA.
49 Proposed article 363 sub 1 third sentence, DIA.
50 Proposed article 363 sub 3, DIA. For the extension of the period the debtor has to prove once again that the 
appointment will have added value. Before the extension of the period, the court will hear the intended trustee 
and the intended supervisory judge.
51 Proposed article 363 sub 4, DIA; Kamerstukken	II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 14 (MvT).
52 “Out of the money” meaning that after the expenses and return to the preferential and secured creditors, there will 
be no return for the unsecured creditors.
53 Kamerstukken	II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 7 (MvT).
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trustee and intended supervisory judge is even greater than would be in the event 
of an “ordinary” liquidation procedure.54 The intended trustee and intended 
supervisory judge must ensure that the interests of all affected parties are taken 
into account and this is very significant as unsecured creditors and employees are 
not involved in the process. In addition to the interests of creditors as a whole, the 
intended trustee should keep in mind the “interest of the society as a whole”, which 
could include preservation of employment knowledge and the productivity.55
The Role of Secured Creditors in Prepacks
Secured creditors have a very significant role to play in the prepack process both in 
the UK and the Netherlands. However, neither the Graham Report nor the Dutch 
proposed legislation explicitly examine the role that might be played by secured 
creditors in a prepack.56
It has been argued that it is the degree of certainty and control for the secured 
creditors in a prepack that makes the procedure so attractive and successful.57 It 
could be argued that, as long as key lenders, such as the banks, do not suffer too 
much from the insolvency of the company, they are quite keen on keeping the 
lending in place for the NewCo.58 It stands out that most of the critical literature 
is focused on the lack of transparency or the role of the unsecured creditors and it 
seems that the role played by the secured creditors is relatively untouched.
Contrary to the position in the UK, an out of court appointment of an intended 
trustee is not possible in the Netherlands. This could indicate that there might be 
less influence of the secured creditors on the insolvency practitioner. Moreover, the 
Dutch proposed prepack cannot be commenced by any party other than the debtor 
himself.59 However, this does not necessarily mean that the banks will not have 
influence in the process. The banks in the Netherlands that have security rights 
on the assets of the debtor will have a position as a “separatist” in liquidation 
procedures.60 This essentially means that, at any moment of default, either during 
or outside liquidation, the pledgees and mortgagees may exercise their rights as if 
it there was no liquidation procedure.61 They may exercise these foreclosure rights 
54 Idem.
55 Ibid., at 18.
56 “Secured creditors” and “banks” will be used as exchangeable terms from here on.
57 S. Harris, “The Decision to Pre-Pack” (2004) Recovery (Winter) 27.
58 W. Moojen, “Banken ook bij prepack bepalend voor uitkomst” FD 18 September 2014.
59 It is of course possible that banks will exercise pressure on the debtor to start a procedure.
60 Article 57, DIA.
61 Articles 3:248; 3:268, DCC; Article 57 DIA.
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without having to obtain a court approved enforcement order. This provides the 
secured creditor with a very strong bargaining position, since the debtor and trustee 
will always have the threat of the secured creditor taking recourse at the assets 
when the debtor is in default. The secured creditor thereby has the possibility to 
block the going concern sale of the business.62 Moreover, post-petition financing 
shall only be provided by these banks if they are optimistic about the continuation 
of the business. Therefore, it can be argued that there is in fact little power in the 
hands of the debtor or the trustee.63 It should be noted that the banks are within the 
group that have expressed their support in the development of the Dutch prepack.64
It has been stated that the reason that banks have so much influence is that the 
Dutch as well as the English businesses are often over-collateralised.65 The process 
of over-collateralisation essentially entails the posting of more collateral than is 
needed to obtain or secure financing. Therefore, the banks will have security on 
(almost) everything owned by the debtor and when the insolvency of a debtor 
occurs, it is the secured creditor who obtains almost everything and very little, if 
any, is left for the unsecured creditors. Banks often prefer to provide the NewCo 
with credit when this offers perspective that their full loan will be repaid in the 
future. With the intensive care departments of banks, permanent control is kept on 
the loans and finance of the debtors. It can be questioned what the consequences 
of these high stakes and over-collateralisation are for the influence of the banks 
in the prepack.
An essential part of the prepack in both the UK and the Netherlands is the 
continuation of finance after the liquidation or administration procedure has started. 
It seems that, as long as the banks receive (almost) all of their outstanding credit 
out of the business sale, they are willing to continue financing in the NewCo.66 
Without this new credit from either the secured creditor or a new investor, the 
NewCo will be doomed to fail. It has been argued that, because the banks are 
willing to continue the financing as long as their debts are fulfilled, the purchaser 
will be able to buy the assets at “rock-bottom” value and nothing will be left for 
62 J. Hummelen, “Het verkoopproces in een prepackaged activatransactie” (2015) 2 TvI 14.
63 J. Timmermans, “De curator en het boedelkrediet” in J. Princen and A. van der Schee (eds), De ondernemende 
curator (2011, Kluwer, Deventer), at 68.
64 M. van Vught, “De Nederlandse prepack: time-out, please!” (2014) 1 FIP 26, at 26.
65 Moojen, above note 58.
66 C. Mallon and S. Waisman (eds), The	Law	and	Practice	of	Restructuring	in	the	UK	and	US (2011, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford), at 237-238.
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the unsecured creditors.67 As long as a purchaser is found and the secured creditor 
is satisfied, it is likely that insolvency practitioner will agree with the sale.68
If one compares the position of the separatist in the Netherlands to the floating 
charge holder’s in the UK, it can be argued that the Dutch secured creditors 
have a more powerful position. The Dutch secured creditors may simply ignore 
the liquidation procedure and enforce their foreclosure right without using the 
court or a formal insolvency procedure.69 However, there is the possibility of a 
moratorium for the maximum period of four months ordered by the supervisory 
judge.70 In this period the secured creditors will not be allowed to take recourse to 
the assets of the debtor without the approval of the supervisory judge. In neither 
of the jurisdictions the prepack can be executed without the release of the banks. 
In the UK, the enforcement of the floating charge has to be executed via the 
administration procedure, giving the banks a major degree of leverage in both 
jurisdictions. One could say that the banks in the UK have a major influence on 
the prepack since an out of court administrator is often appointed at the prompting 
of the banks. However, the banks strive to avoid being directly associated with a 
failed company. Therefore, it will most likely be the company or directors that 
appoint the administrator, albeit at the prompting of the banks.
In the Netherlands on the other hand, the banks have a very strong position and a lot 
of influence in the process as separatist. However, the court, intended supervisory 
judge and intended trustee are involved in the procedure to provide the necessary 
checks and balances. However, in general, the blessing of the banks is required 
in both jurisdictions since the secured creditors have to release their assets for 
the sale. Therefore, a prepack seems to be impossible in the UK as well as the 
Netherlands without the blessing of the secured creditors.
It has been argued that the fact that under the proposed Dutch legislation it is the 
debtor, and no one else who can request for the appointment of an intended trustee, 
can be seen as an advantage over the English procedure.71 Where the English out 
of court appointed administrator might create the perception of a bias towards the 
secured creditors or management, the Dutch intended trustee is court appointed 
and subject to control of the intended supervisory judge. This difference in manner 
of appointment and the degree of court control can create the perception that the 
67 Moojen, above note 58.
68 Idem.
69 Article 57, DIA.
70 Ibid., Article 63a.
71 P. Frölich, “Redding en sanering: monomaan of modern paradigma? Over de prepack en dergelijke” (2015) AA 
192, at 197.
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Dutch intended trustee is less biased. However, the secured creditor will always 
be at the table together with the debtor, purchaser and insolvency practitioner.72
Neither in the UK nor in the Netherlands is the position of the secured creditor 
subject to much discussion at the moment. The qualified floating charge holder 
in the UK has an important role to play through the out of court appointment of 
the administrator and the post-petition financing of the debtor. The Dutch secured 
creditors will always be involved at a certain stage of the process since they have 
the possibility to take recourse on the assets at any moment of default. Without 
the consent of the banks, there is no way the debtor will be able to sell the assets, 
let alone the business in a prepack. The first and far most reason being that in both 
jurisdictions the secured creditor has to provide a release in respect of the assets 
being sold.73 In combination with the over-collateralisation, this means that the 
bank will have to provide a release on (almost) all assets of the debtor. Therefore, 
the banks will always be involved in the process.
It seems that it is in fact “he who pays the piper that calls the tune”.74 The prepack 
provides the banks with an assured return and a high level of influence in the 
procedure.75 It can be argued that banks exert significant control over prepack 
sales and it is highly unlikely that a sale could be given effect in the absence of the 
secured creditors’ support.76 Nevertheless, as argued above, although banks have a 
vested interest to ensure that a prepack sale is successfully completed; at the same 
time it is in their best interests to ensure that there is no abuse of process and that 
the legality of the prepack process shall not be questioned. 
A Comparison of the Anglo-Dutch Prepack
The economic crisis has prompted a move towards a more debtor friendly oriented 
insolvency regime in the European Union. The concept of rescue itself is being 
revisited77 and business rescue is ranked at the top of the European insolvency law 
related agenda. The European Commission published a recommendation on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency “to encourage Member States to put 
in place a framework that enables the efficient restructuring of viable enterprises 
72 Hummelen, above note 62.
73 Mallon and Waisman, above note 66, at 232.
74 Davies, above note 28.
75 A. Kastrinou, “An Analysis of the Prepack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area” (2008) Company 
Lawyer 262.
76 P. Walton, “Prepackaged Administrations – Trick or Treat?” (2006) 19(8) Insolvency Intelligence 121.
77 P. Omar, “Upstreaming Rescue: Pre-insolvency Proceedings and the European Insolvency Regulation” (2014) 
25(1) International Company & Commercial Law Review 20.
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in financial difficulty” and to “give honest entrepreneurs a second chance”.78 The 
Dutch have followed this route set out by the European Union and are moving their 
insolvency regime from the traditional “pay what you owe” towards “business 
rescue” by introducing the prepack in their insolvency regime.79 With the prepack, 
the Dutch are introducing a procedure that is already heavily criticised in the 
country of origin.
A prepack procedure in the UK cannot be completed without the involvement of 
the secured creditors, often banks or other financial institutions. The debtor needs 
the secured creditor to provide a release on the encumbered assets or else they 
cannot be sold. The creditors on the other hand need the administration procedure 
to take recourse on their secured assets. Therefore, the secured creditors are always 
involved in the process. A “prepack pool” comprised of independent experts, as 
recommended in the Graham Report, might provide extra checks and balances to 
the process.80
The Dutch prepack is essentially an adapted version of the asset transaction in 
liquidation, also known as a “restart”. In the practice of an ordinary restart, the 
debtor will prepare the sale of the business, together with his own advisors, before 
filing for “faillissement”. In the proposed prepack, the debtor has the opportunity 
to formally involve an intended trustee and an intended supervisory judge in the 
process of preparing the business sale.81 Since the intended trustee and intended 
supervisory judge are involved early in the preparation, they will not be confronted 
with a prepared asset transaction at the moment of the formal appointment as 
trustee and supervisory judge in liquidation.
The Dutch intended trustee is court appointed and therefore it can be argued that his 
independence is guaranteed.82 The appearance of a biased trustee might therefore 
not, or at least to a lesser degree than in the UK, be part of the Dutch procedure.	
However, the Dutch secured creditors do have a powerful position in the prepack 
because of their position as separatist. The secured creditors in the Netherlands 
can take recourse to their encumbered assets as if there is no liquidation procedure. 
To protect the intended trustee and the debtor from the powerful secured creditors, 
78 All the EU member states were invited to implement the principles of the recommendation. In the evaluation 
of this recommendation of the 30 September 2015 the Member States were asked to communicate to the 
Commission, on a yearly basis, data concerning the insolvency procedures. This evaluation can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/evaluation_recommendation_final.pdf (last viewed 22 March 2016).
79 Frölich, above note 71, at 193.
80 L. Conway, House of Commons Briefing Paper (January 2016), at 3.
81 Kamerstukken	II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 7 (MvT).
82 Frölich, above note 71, at 197.
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the Dutch intended trustees are appointed by the court and the secured creditors 
do not have influence on the appointment itself or on the person who is going to 
be assigned as intended trustee. The intended trustee is supervised by the intended 
supervisory judge from the moment of appointment and his appointment can be 
made subject to certain conditions.
Finally, a key difference between the Dutch and the UK prepack is in relation to the 
protection of employment contracts and in particular, the application of the ARD.83 
Although it could be argued that it is difficult to facilitate corporate rescue through 
a prepack and at the same time protect the employees’ interests, one of the main 
justifications in favour of the prepack in the UK is the fact that it often results in the 
preservation of jobs. In fact, SIP 16 statements cite the preservation of jobs as one 
of the primary reasons to prepack. Furthermore, in the early case of DKLL,84 the 
court expressed its support, or at least accepted that there is a legal justification for 
the prepack process, primarily because of its effect on preservation of employment. 
Furthermore, the Graham report85 found that in most cases (almost) all jobs are 
preserved after the use of a prepack.
Although, the prospect of administration or liquidation is rarely well conceived by 
the employees, it might nevertheless be comforting for English employees that the 
prepacks do not constitute insolvency proceedings within the meaning of the ARD, 
effectively meaning that the protection afforded to employment protection rights 
under the ARD, applies to the prepacks.86
The Dutch on the other hand, have taken a different view with regard to the 
applicability of the ARD on their procedure. Although the best practice rules of 
Insolad87 and the explanatory memorandum also point out the possible preservation 
of jobs as a justification for the prepack,88 the applicability of the ARD was subject 
to a lot of discussion in the period of drafting the Dutch legislation. It has been 
argued that the ARD provisions do not apply to the prepack.89 Since what will 
happen to the undertaking (i.e. continuation or dissolution) only becomes apparent 
after the company entered into the liquidation procedure in a prepack procedure, 
83 Above note 38.
84 DKLL Solicitors v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch); [2007] BCC 908 (Ch D).
85 Above note 34.
86 The ARD was implemented in the UK by means of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006 (SI 2006 246).
87 Insolad is the Association of Dutch insolvency lawyers.
88 Kamerstukken	II 2014/15, 34 218, 3, at 27-30 (MvT).
89 Ibid., at 34-37 (MvT).
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Articles 7:662-7:666 DCC implementing the ARD do not apply to the proposed 
prepack procedure.90
A decision has to be reached in the Netherlands as to whether the procedure 
is aimed at liquidation or at the continuation of the business.91 In the English 
administration procedure this distinction only becomes apparent when the 
administrator declares what statutory objects he is following. Since the outcome 
only becomes apparent when the proposals are filed, the Court has opted for 
an “absolute” rather than a “fact based” approach in order to increase the legal 
certainty and ensure the easy approach of the procedure. It was held in OTG 92 that 
the line between the procedures aimed at liquidation and at continuation in the 
UK is a less clear cut than the difference between liquidation and suspension of 
payments in the Netherlands.93
The UK court chose the “absolute” approach because it is otherwise too difficult 
to take a “fact based” approach in determining the outcome of every different 
case. One could argue that such an absolute approach should also be applied in the 
Netherlands and that therefore the ARD should not apply to any case of liquidation. 
However, when one looks at the Dutch liquidation procedure, the “fact based” 
result will be different from the formal goal of the liquidation procedure in many 
cases, especially prepacks. Looking at the Dutch practice and the possibilities for 
a trustee, most of the time the liquidation procedure is the only possibility, within 
the insolvency laws, to truly achieve corporate rescue. The suspension of payment 
procedure has not proven to be a successful restructuring mechanism. This does 
not mean that every time the liquidation procedure is used, it is used to restart the 
company. It is however not uncommon that the liquidation of the company (the 
corporate shell) is the result, but the procedure was in fact aimed at the rescue of 
the business and not the liquidation of the company.
Conclusion
In light of the significantly different treatment of employees’ rights in insolvency 
in the two creditor-friendly jurisdictions, one cannot fail but to consider the 
possibility of whether or not such critical differences shall put the Netherlands on 
the map as a worthy competitor of the traditionally attractive and successful UK 
90 Idem.
91 Idem.
92 OTG	Ltd	v	Barke	[2011] BCC 608.
93 Ibid., at [8.4], where the court refers to the Abels-case, where the Dutch suspension of payments structure was 
held to be aimed at the continuation, but the Dutch liquidation procedure was not.
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prepack regime94 and whether the inapplicability of the ARD in the Netherlands 
will result into more restructurings taking place in the Netherlands and in an 
increase of insolvent companies shifting their centre of main interests there. 
Arguably, it remains to be seen whether or not the Dutch prepack will prove to be 
a key competitor of the UK prepack. Without a doubt, the UK has been proven to 
be a very attractive restructuring destination in the past, so it remains to be seen 
whether the fact that the Dutch prepack enables the debtor to evade the protection 
rights afforded to employees under the ARD, will make the Dutch model even 
more attractive.
94 See for instance Hellas Telecommunications, which resulted in the UK’s biggest prepack administration. 
Interestingly, the forum shopping of big enterprises towards the UK has been identified by the Graham report 
as a source of “inward investment” and, according to Graham, should be perceived as a positive advantage to 
the economy.
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Chapter 12
Companies with Virtual Headquarters –  
One Step to the Insolvency?
Jan Plaček
1. Introduction: The Issue of Virtual Headquarters
Intense public and professional debate has been taking place in the Czech economic 
environment for many years now on two issues, which are markedly connected 
to the problem of enforcing receivables and especially to the area of insolvency 
proceedings. The theme of insolvency mafias and that of so-called bullying 
proposals are at issue. There is, however, yet another theme which deserves more 
careful research, and that is the previously overlooked issue of virtual addresses. 
Yet as we shall prove, there are very serious indices here according to which 
virtual addresses are a clear risk that an entrepreneurial subject will enter into 
insolvency proceedings.
The very concept of the virtual address seems modern and is essentially perceived 
by a clearly inexperienced ear as positive or at least neutral. Yet it would in fact 
be possible to speak equally well of fictive addresses, which would in many cases 
depict reality incomparably more precisely. In terms of value, however, it would 
most certainly shift the entire term to the negative part of the spectrum.
A virtual address is the headquarters of a firm where a given company or 
entrepreneurial subject does not in fact perform any real activity, although it 
is an address recorded in the commercial or trade register. Theoretically, there 
should be a company or tradesman available for “enquiry”. It should be possible 
to arrange a meeting with the firm’s representatives at the headquarters thereof 
and the entrepreneurial subject should accept postal correspondence here (even if 
it were merely in the form of resending it to another address). On this principle, 
numerous projects also utilise a virtual address service (a virtual address is 
sometimes also used). It is, however, often the case that this is the provision of 
an address intended solely for the purpose of making it impossible to seek out the 
entrepreneurial subject.
Needless to say, the whole concept of virtual addresses is not specific to the Czech 
Republic. In fact, most of the countries do not place any special emphasis in their 
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legislation on entrepreneurial subject headquarters. This stems from the fact that, 
given the amount of market participants of various sizes and significances, it is 
impossible in market economies to force abidance of a law which would prescribe 
that company headquarters be identical with the place of its real operation (which 
does not necessarily refer to the place where a service is provided or the place 
where production is carried out, but the place of administration of a legal or 
entrepreneurial person).
Moreover, in accordance with the reality of modern cooperative connections, it is 
assumed that numerous companies exist, for various reasons, merely in the role 
of “vehicles”, i.e. special purpose firms which do not perform any real activity or 
perform it only occasionally, or serve as mediators, accounting units and so forth. 
In such companies, the place where activities (albeit understood as the place where 
such an entrepreneurial person is managed) are performed is thoroughly suspicious.
The first virtual addresses were offered in the United States as early as in the 
1990s by Ralph Gregory in the project Intelligent Office (Colorado). The original 
principle was the offer of a lucrative address, but at reasonable rates. This model 
assumes provision of certain services, hiring of conference rooms for negotiation, 
arranging company postal correspondence and numerous others. The aim was 
to enable the acquisition of headquarters in a trustworthy place even for such 
companies which could not rent real office spaces in expensive areas or for which 
company headquarters are in principle unnecessary (a classic case could be a 
provider of financial services).
Legislative Circumstances in the Czech Republic
The unenforceability of a real company headquarters address was among the 
reasons why the Czech legislation implemented changes in 2009 to the civil code 
in force at the time, which enabled the separation of firm headquarters from the 
place where a firm actually performs its activities or where its bodies are situated. 
Act No. 40/1964 Coll. Civil Code underwent significant changes with the abolition 
of what was then Section 19c paragraph 2, which enjoined legal entities to select as 
their company headquarters spaces in which the administration of the legal entity 
is performed and in which contact between the public and the legal entity could 
take place.
Contrariwise, another change effective as of the beginning of 2015 in the VAT Act 
(Act No. 235/2004 Coll. on value added tax) took place. “Real” headquarters were 
defined here. The place where the company management meets, and especially 
where fundamental decisions influencing the management of the firm are accepted, 
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is considered to be the real headquarters of the company. If entrepreneurs (natural 
persons) do not have another place of business listed, their place of residence is 
considered to be their headquarters. This is a harmonisation of the perspectives on 
this problem with the European Union Legislation (Directive 2006/112/EC on the 
common system of value added tax and especially (EU) Council Implementing 
Regulation No. 282/2011 on the VAT directive). It states that among persons 
required to tax, the mere existence of a postal address cannot suffice for the 
definition of its headquarters (from the perspective of tax obligations and local 
competence to value added tax). In other words, it is inclined towards the real 
headquarters being a place from which the administration of the entrepreneurial 
subject is performed.
Tax laws (generally) expect that a tax audit can be carried out at the company 
headquarters and that an entrepreneur has to be able to present the necessary 
documents to the tax authority at the company headquarters. Now, a requirement 
has been added that the tax administrator has to be able to seek out and have 
ready access to a person required to tax at the place of its headquarters. Yet the 
act does not attempt to limit the existence of a virtual address; it does, however, 
require that if the headquarters of an entrepreneurial subject is different from the 
company’s place of administration, the obliged person is to notify the tax authority 
(tax administrator) in the prescribed manner. This attacks one of the main reasons 
why entrepreneurial subjects in the Czech environment utilise virtual addresses – 
to relocate the company into areas where there is a lower probability of conducting 
a tax audit. This is connected to the fact that in the city of Prague, for instance, the 
probability of a tax audit taking place is almost zero or at least very low in spite of 
the enormous amount of tax subjects.
The Definition of a Virtual Address
There is a certain problem as to how exactly one can define, or more precisely, 
detect a virtual address, for there is no “list” or “register” available of such 
addresses. In fact, such a register would not make even the slightest sense. To put 
it simply, the headquarters of an entrepreneurial subject could be any space where 
the owner has given its authorisation for this. At the same time, one can hardly limit 
the rights of owners to a property in the sense that they could lease it solely for the 
purposes “real physical usage” and could not implement “virtual lease”. However, 
we would then be able to determine with difficulty whether a certain address where 
several dozens of firms may be registered is an office property in which these firms 
truly perform their administration, which means that the firm is actually based 
there and is managed from this place or whether it is a property whose owner 
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merely enables entries into pertinent registers. Moreover, it applies that numerous 
companies, which establish and then sell ready-made trading companies, use their 
own headquarters as the first address of headquarters – in this case it can then occur 
that a truly significant number of firms are registered at such an address. Therefore, 
for the purposes of the survey to follow, we selected an approach in which we 
ranked in the survey such addresses where at least one hundred entrepreneurial 
subjects listed were based in the commercial register. Elimination of addresses 
of business persons with ready-made companies was ensured by random checks 
according to public sources.
In Table 12.1, one is naturally immediately struck by the dramatic dominance 
of the capital city of the Czech Republic in the number of addresses with more 
than one hundred entrepreneurial subjects who state it as their headquarters. As 
is visible from the data, both in the number of addresses and in the number of 
companies registered at theses addresses, Prague reaches a share of more than 
eighty percent, by which the economic influence of the centre clearly surpasses 
that of individual regions. Contrariwise, virtual addresses are entirely absent in 
certain regions (or the use thereof is so small that approximately less than one 
hundred companies are concentrated there, so they do not exceed the limit set for 
this survey).
Table 12.1: The number of virtual addresses according to regions and the 
proportion of the region to the whole of the Czech Republic
Region Number of addresses
Proportion 
of the CR 
(%)
Number of 
firms
Proportion 
of the CR 
(%)
Average number 
of firms per 
address
Prague 205 82.0 49,363 84.5 241
South Moravia 20 8.0 4,436 7.6 222
Hradec Králové 1 0.4 193 0.3 193
Moravia-Silesia 8 3.2 1,535 2.6 192
Olomouc 1 0.4 109 0.2 109
Pardubice 1 0.4 131 0.2 131
Plzeň 9 3.6 2,005 3.4 223
Central Bohemia 4 1.6 515 0.9 129
Ústí nad Labem 1 0.4 148 0.3 148
Total 250 100.0 58,435 100.0 234
Source: own calculation (the data “number of addresses” refers to the number of such addresses in individual regions 
which are stated in the commercial register as headquarters for at least one hundred firms; the first column “proportion 
of the CR” refers to the percentage from the entirety of virtual addresses in the Czech Republic apportioned to a given 
region; the data “number of firms” describes the number of companies with headquarters at addresses from the first 
column, and the second column “proportion of the CR” gives the proportion of such firms to the total number of firms 
with virtual addresses in the Czech Republic).
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Image 12.2: The number of virtual addresses according to regions
Source: own calculation
Image 12.3: The number of virtual addresses according to regions and the 
proportion of the region to the whole of the Czech Republic
Source: own calculation
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Expression of Hypothesis and the Aim of the Survey
The main theme of the survey of virtual addresses which took place at the University 
of Economics in Prague was not an assertion of the fact that this method of firm 
registration really exists, but to ascertain the influence of whether the fact of an 
entrepreneurial subject’s virtual headquarters has an influence on the probability of 
whether insolvency proceedings will be conducted against it, and if this probability 
exists, also to ascertain the influence of the fact of virtual headquarters on the 
standard satisfaction of creditors in the context of such proceedings.
The survey was based on the hypothesis that the location of a firm at a virtual 
address increases the probability of insolvency proceedings (company bankruptcy 
in the given context) and at the same time decreases the probability of creditor 
satisfaction in such proceedings. The results of statistical surveys conducted by 
the Insolvency Research scientific team1 were used for the purposes of comparing 
the course of insolvency proceedings among standard firms with insolvency 
proceedings among firms with a virtual address.
Virtual Addresses lead to a Greater Degree of Insolvency
It was first necessary to ascertain which companies from the “virtual address” 
group appear in the sample of 3,222 entrepreneurial subjects included in the 
statistical outputs of the Insolvency Research team. In this regard, it is necessary 
to define the utilised survey, at least in basic terms. The Insolvency Research team 
surveyed the above-mentioned cases of insolvency proceedings, which took place 
in the Czech Republic during 2008–2015, whilst these were always entrepreneurial 
subjects, always cases which were bindingly closed (or where proceedings were 
at least bindingly closed in the practical sense of the word and only administrative 
motions remained until formal closure) by the end of 2015 at the latest. The survey 
took place in 2012–2014, extending into 2015, and the above-mentioned sample 
of 3,222 cases contained roughly 20 percent of all insolvency proceedings, which 
corresponded to the definition at the given time. It can therefore be said that certain 
values can – with the awareness of significant simplification – be calculated into 
the whole with a simple multiplication by five.
In Table 12.4, we see the number of insolvency proposals against firms with virtual 
addresses, and further, the “bankruptcy index” (labelled “proposals/firms”), which 
states how many firms from one thousand registered at virtual addresses were 
confronted by insolvency proposals in 2014 and 2015 (regardless of whether 
1 Smrčka et al. 2015, Smrčka et al. 2014, complete data available online at: www.vyzkuminsolvence.cz.
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creditor or debtor). To compare data, the number of insolvency proposals in a 
given region per thousand companies regardless of their address, i.e. the “standard” 
state in the given region, is in the last column. This is the methodology used by 
Creditreform in the Czech Republic.
Table 12.4: Insolvency of firms with a virtual address according to regions 
in 2014 and 2015
Region
Number of 
Proposals 
2014
Number of 
Proposals 
2015
Regist’d 
Firms
Proposals/ 
Firms 2014
Proposals/ 
Firms 2015
Proposals/ 
Firms (total)
Prague 348 339 49,363 7.05 6.87 1.33
South 
Moravia 34 35 4,436 7.66 7.89 1.00
Moravia-
Silesia 9 18 1,535 5.86 11.73 0.93
Pardubice 2 0 131 10.27 0.00 0.89
Olomouc 1 2 109 9.06 18.35 0.88
Central 
Bohemia 0 0 515 N/A 0.00 0.88
South-
Bohemia N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0.82
Liberec N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0.79
Ústí nad 
Labem 9 1 148 60.81 6.76 0.77
Karlovy 
Vary N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0.76
Zlín N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0.73
Hradec 
Králové 0 3 193 0.00 15.54 0.69
Plzeň 4 3 2,005 2.00 1.50 0.67
Vysočina N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0.56
Source: own calculation; Creditreform2
The difference between the last two columns is visible at first glance, and it can be 
labelled as rather extreme. In any event, and with the awareness of the exceptional 
nature of the situation in the Central Bohemian Region, one can express the 
conclusion that in places where subjects headquartered at a virtual address appear, 
the standard probability of conducting insolvency proceedings against these firms 
is roughly twice to twenty times higher than with firms with standard headquarters 
at the place where the entrepreneurial subject’s administration is performed. But 
2 Creditreform, Development	of	Insolvency	in	the	Czech	Republic	in	2015, available at: http://www.creditreform.
cz/fileadmin/user_upload/CR-International/local_documents/cz/Presseartikel/Vyvoj_insolvenci_v_Ceske_
republice_v_roce_2015.pdf.
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the most frequent range is a five to ten times probability of insolvency of a subject 
with a virtual address as against other subjects.
In the next survey, we ascertained whether the results of insolvency proceeding 
also differed, i.e. whether it is possible to find differences between:
• The number of cases in which insolvency proceedings are closed prior to 
declaration of bankruptcy and the number of proceedings in which bankruptcy 
is actually declared and a settlement is reached (always using the bankruptcy 
method in this case); and
• The satisfaction that is usually gained by creditors in cases of bankruptcy of 
companies with a standard address and bankruptcy of companies headquartered 
at virtual addresses. 
In the sample surveyed by the Insolvency Research team (3,222 cases making up 
20 percent of the whole at the given time) a total of 256 cases of entrepreneurial 
subjects with a virtual address were found, which is almost eight percent of the 
entire number of surveyed cases. This is truly a significant number and thus 
confirms the previous expectation that insolvency proceedings are truly generally 
more probable among entrepreneurial subjects with a virtual address than they are 
among subjects with a standard address.
Table 12.5: Proceedings with and without bankruptcy among subjects with 
a virtual and with a standard address (comparison with Table 12.1)
Proceedings with and without 
bankruptcy “Virtual” address values “Standard” address values
Number of rulings % Number of rulings %
With bankruptcy 79 30.9 1,750 54.3
Without bankruptcy 177 69.1 1,472 45.7
Total 256 100.0 3,222 100.0
Source: www.vyzkuminsolvemnce.cz; own calculations
The Probability of Proceedings without Bankruptcy
As we can therefore see, it is substantially more probable that bankruptcy will 
not be declared whatsoever among entrepreneurial subjects that have a virtual 
address recorded as their headquarters. In the environment of the Czech Republic, 
this state usually means that continuing proceedings is pointless, for the given 
entrepreneurial subject does not even have such assets that would enable rational 
insolvency proceedings in which it would be possible to expect at least payment 
161
of the costs of the proceedings (in this context it is primarily receivables beyond 
property that are at issue, i.e. the standard insolvency administrator’s fee and the 
defrayal of his or her expenses). One can therefore express the conclusion that 
creditors have a lower probability of satisfying their receivables where debtors 
headquartered at virtual address are concerned, even in the sense that only among 
a third of debtors with a virtual address will it even make sense to conduct 
insolvency proceedings against them and attempt to monetise their assets. Yet in 
the case of debtors headquartered at a standard address, barely a half of insolvency 
proceedings are suspended. In order to confirm this conclusion, it is possible also 
to survey the reasons that lead to the fact that insolvency proceedings do not 
take place.
Table 12.6: Reasons why a debtor bankruptcy was not declared
Standard address Virtual address
Rulings % Rulings %
Number of surveyed 
proceedings with bankruptcy 1,750 54.3 79 30.9
Number of surveyed 
proceedings without bankruptcy 1,472 45.7 177 69.1
Total sum 3,222 100.0 256 100.0
In proceedings without 
bankruptcy
% of 
the 
whole
% without 
bankruptcy
% of 
the 
whole
% without 
bankruptcy
- proposal rejected according to 
Section 144 (for lack of debtor 
property) 
600 18.6 40.8 56 21.9 31.6
- proposal rejected for flaws 
according to Section 128 485 15.1 33.0 73 28.5 41.2
- proceedings suspended 
according to Section 108 
(non-payment of deposit for 
insolvency proceedings) 
149 4.6 10.1 11 4.3 6.2
- proceedings suspended 
according to Section 129 and 
Section 130 – retraction of 
proposal
121 3.8 8.2 15 5.9 8.5
- proposal rejected according 
to Section 143 (legally set 
requirements were not fulfilled) 
79 2.5 5.4 15 5.9 8.5
- other 29 0.9 2.0 6 2.3 3.4
- proceedings suspended 
according to Section 107 (other 
proceedings regarding the same 
matter were in progress) 
9 0.3 0.6 1 0.4 0.6
Source: www.vyzkuminsolvemnce.cz; own calculations
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As we see in Table 12.6, the reasons why proceedings against entrepreneurial 
subjects headquartered at virtual addresses are closed differs slightly in comparison 
with the data for the whole sample (standard address), whilst this divergence is 
given by a change of the positions between rejection for lack of debtor property 
and rejection due to flaws. Rejection for flaws is frequent among debtor proposals 
where the debtor pointedly files an insolvency proposal against itself, yet does not 
truly aim to carry out insolvency proceedings.
Differences in Satisfaction of Creditors
Nevertheless, the result of the process, i.e. satisfaction of creditors where declaration 
of bankruptcy occurs, is a decisive argument for the evaluation of the influence of 
the existence of a virtual address on the circumstances of insolvency proceedings. 
Here, we must declare that the expectation according to which a virtual address 
decreases the probability that the creditor will be satisfied, truly applies; or more 
precisely, there is a clear expectation here that satisfaction will be lower.
Table 12.7: Results of insolvency proceedings among subjects with a virtual 
address and subjects with a standard address
Standard address Virtual address
Registered 
(CZK M)
Satisfaction 
CZK M)
Satisfied 
%
Registered 
(CZK M)
Satisfaction 
CZK M)
Satisfied 
%
Secured 5,130.6 1,445.7 28.2 52.7 9.9 18.9
Non-secured 24,229.2 907.2 3.7 863.9 7.9 0.9
Beyond 
property 1,003.8 859.7 85.7 9.2 5.2 56.9
On a par 765.3 346.4 45.3 6.1 1.8 30.1
Source: www.vyzkuminsolvemnce.cz; own calculations
Table 12.7 gives a clear answer as to whether the hopes of creditors for satisfaction 
is influenced by the fact of a debtor’s virtual address (virtual headquarters) – we 
can consider this expectation to be founded and proved. Among secured creditors, 
the difference is ten percentage points; among non-secured creditors, the yield is 
only a quarter as against those cases where a debtor is headquartered at a standard 
address, i.e. at an address where company administration is truly performed. We 
also see a significant difference among receivables beyond the property, where 
satisfaction clearly occurs only in the administrators’ fees and their expenses, 
which are items that always have to be defrayed (even if at the court’s expense).
Unfortunately, in the present state of research, it is not possible to answer the 
question of the degree to which precisely court (state) funds have participated in 
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covering the costs of these cases, but it can be expected that this state will not be 
entirely exceptional. This occurs relatively standardly also in proceedings against 
debtors headquartered at standard addresses; where debtors at virtual addresses are 
at issue, one can expect a higher frequency of such situations. This is connected 
to the clearly poorer state of their assets. A highly marked visual comparison is 
offered by Image 12.8 and Image 12.9.
Image 12.8: Satisfaction of individual creditors and groups of receivables in 
proceedings against debtors with a virtual address
Source: www.vyzkuminsolvemnce.cz, own calculations
Image 12.9: Satisfaction of individual creditors and groups of receivables in 
proceedings against debtors with a virtual address
Source: www.vyzkuminsolvemnce.cz, own calculations
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Summary
This part of the survey of insolvency proceedings can thus be closed given the 
confirmation of the expectation according to which the relocation of entrepreneurial 
subjects to a so-called virtual address is a step which increases the probability 
for the creditor that its business partner will be confronted with an insolvency 
proposal, and further, the probability that these proceedings will be settled without 
debtor bankruptcy, for its lack of property will transpire, and finally, the certainty 
that even in the event that the proceedings do take place, fulfilment for the creditor 
will be lower than normal. These insights will be important for economic practice, 
for this is a mechanism by which it will be possible to detect certain risks stemming 
from the realisation of corporate connections with entrepreneurial subjects with 
headquarters at virtual addresses.
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Chapter 13
Use of Cross-Border Insolvency Protocols in 
the Banking and Financial Sector
Giulia Vallar
Introductory Remarks
It is widely known that one of the major insolvencies of all the times in the 
banking/financial sector has been that of the Lehman Brothers group, occurred in 
2008. It is also widely known that a considerable part of said insolvency has been 
faced through the conclusion of a cross-border insolvency protocol,1 a tool that had 
been abundantly used, starting from the earlier Nineties, in corporate insolvencies 
and, in particular, with regard to multinational groups of companies.2 As far as 
multinational groups of banks and of financial institutions are concerned, there can 
be recalled at least two cases prior to the Lehman Brothers’ one, in which what 
would nowadays be called a protocol was adopted.
In a mere chronological order, the first is a very old one, as it dates back to 1908, 
and relates to the saga concerning Mr. Patrick Macfadyen and the Arbuthnot bank, 
whereby an agreement on the handling of the proceedings had been entered into 
between the English and the Indian insolvency representatives.3 The second, way 
more recent in comparison, is that concerning the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, whose protocol was entered into in 1991, and that, at that time, was 
operating in more than 71 States.4 In addition, a further insolvency case that can 
be recalled, as it somehow pertains to the “financial sector”, and that has been 
1 Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies (12 May 2009), available at: 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/573/4339.html. All websites, unless otherwise specified, 
were last viewed on 27 January 2016.
2 The huge diffusion of the use of protocols commenced on 15 January 1992 with the one entered into in relation 
to the Maxwell Communication Corporation insolvency. From then on, several protocols have been entered into: 
the website of the International Insolvency Institute used to have a section with around 45 published protocols. 
A database of protocols can be found on the webpage of the “Leiden-Protocol Project”: http://www.tri-leiden.eu/
project/categories/insolvency-protocols-project/.
3 Re	P.	MacFadyen	&	Co,	ex	parte	Vizianagaram	Company	Limited [1908] 1 KB 675. See also the UNCITRAL 
Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, 2009, at 125, available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/insolven/Practice_Guide_Ebook_eng.pdf.
4 See the Global Report on the Liquidation of the BCCI group (1991 – 2012) (16 March 2012), which was available 
at: http://www.bcci.info/pdf/bcci_global_report.pdf (last viewed 6 January 2014). Quite interestingly, within this 
Report the term “protocol” is never mentioned.
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resolved through a cross-border insolvency protocol is the one concerning the 
group of investment companies set up by Bernard Madoff, namely Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities and Madoff Securities International Limited, whose 
liquidation commenced in December 2008.5
The present chapter is divided into four parts. The first will investigate whether 
there are any differences between protocols entered into in cases of financial 
insolvencies and protocols entered into in cases of commercial insolvencies. The 
second and the third parts will discuss two issues, on which there is no uniform 
view among scholars and that concern protocols in general and that therefore are 
pertinent also for protocols related to financial institutions. The one will deal with 
what can be defined as the “legal nature” of protocols. The other concerns what 
can be referred to as the “legal basis” of protocols. I will then conclude this chapter 
restricting again its scope only to financial insolvencies, making an hypothesis of 
what role will protocols play, as far as this subject matter is concerned, within 
the EU legal order, where two hard law instruments addressing the insolvency of 
financial institutions and investment firms have recently been adopted.6
1. Do Cross-border Insolvency Protocols for Financial Institutions have a 
Specific Content?
The first issue that needs to be addressed in this chapter concerns whether there 
are any differences between protocols addressing banking and other financial 
institutions insolvencies on the one hand and protocols addressing corporate 
insolvencies on the other hand. This question needs to be answered for two 
main reasons. First of all, because this is the paper of a presentation that has 
been delivered at a conference specifically devoted to insolvency of banks and 
other financial institutions. Second, because in many legal orders, both national 
and supranational, financial insolvencies are addressed to by specific legislative 
5 Available at: http://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/MadoffSecuritiesCrossBorderInsolvency 
ProtocollOrder.pdf.
6 Reference is made to Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/
EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council (so called “BRRD”) and to Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure 
for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 (so called “SRM 
Regulation”).
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instruments, different from those addressing corporate insolvencies.7 Therefore, 
it could be argued, by analogy, that also protocols related to banks insolvencies 
need to have their own specific characteristics that would make them easily 
distinguishable from those related to corporate insolvencies.
The question at hand should be answered in the negative: being protocols single 
purpose arrangements solutions, it is clear that no specific characteristics of 
protocols concerning banks – if compared to commercial enterprises insolvency 
protocols – can be identified.8 Each protocol will have its own specificities and its 
drafters will take into account, from time to time, the specific needs that are to be 
addressed in each case.9
2. The Legal Nature of Protocols
By “legal nature” of cross-border insolvency cooperation agreements or protocols 
reference is made to the operation consisting in the characterization or qualification 
of protocols, namely in placing them into an existing legal category.
First of all, cross-border insolvency protocols are certainly to be qualified as one 
of the possible realizations of the concept called “judicial dialogue”.10 Recent legal 
scholarship has paid much attention to such a concept, which is, nevertheless, 
still young:
“[i]l y a quelques années, l’idée d’un dialogue entre juges transgressant 
les frontières aurait été considérée impossible: on aurait abordé le 
dialogue entre le juge et les parties – le fameux Rechtsgespräch, mais 
un dialogue entre juges (en dehors des délibérations) paraissait plus 
ou moins impossible: la Cour ne discute que par ses jugements…”.11
7 If we consider, for example, the European Union, we would notice the coexistence, within its boundaries, of, on 
the one side, Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 (that will be replaced by the new Regulation (EU) No. 2015/848) 
and, on the other side, of Directives 2001/24/EC and 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
8 Nevertheless a scholar has identified specific trends in protocol drafting, thereby including a self-standing group of 
protocols related to multinational financial companies: see M. Maltese, “Court-to-Court Protocols in Cross-border 
Bankruptcy Proceedings: Differing Approaches between Civil Law and Common Law Legal Systems” (2013), at 
17, available at: http://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/media/maltese_michele%20submission.pdf.
9 For example, in the Cross-border insolvency protocol for the Bernard Madoff group of companies, the specific 
“nature of the business” is expressly taken into account: see paragraph C.
10 On the preferential use of terms such as “cooperation”, “coordination” or “communication” instead of “dialogue”, 
when relations between private parties, instead of relations between legal orders, are at stake, see S. Menétrey, 
“Dialogues et communications entre juges: pour un pluralisme dialogal” in S. Menétrey and B. Hess (eds), Les 
dialogues des juges en Europe (2014, Larcier, Bruxelles), at 119.
11 B. Hess, “Avant-propos” in Menétrey and Hess (eds), above note 10, at 10.
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Judicial dialogue, in the form of a direct communication between courts 
involved in insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor, represents the 
“culmination of judicial co-operation”12, “le degré supérieur de la coordination 
des	justices	étatiques”.13
As to the effects of cross-border insolvency protocols, they enact what has been 
called a “joint transborder case management”14,
“une intégration informelle […] des procédures nationales au 
sein d’une espèce de procédure supranationale qui en réaliserait 
la synthèse”15,
designing a sort of transnational insolvency norm that otherwise was missing.
From the point of view of the instrument in which protocols are embodied, there is 
no doubt that we are dealing with a kind of agreement.16 Scholars, however, have 
not reached a common position on what kind of agreement is at stake. According to 
some, protocols are ad hoc private international insolvency law treaties,17 “court-
created treaties”18 or “mini-treat[ies]” concluded by courts of different States, 
“regarding each side’s role in resolving the dispute”.19 According to some others, 
cross-border insolvency agreements are the “Lex Mercatoria in international 
insolvency cases”,20 “customary law of international commercial transactions (or 
12 P. Schlosser, “Jurisdiction and International Judicial and Administrative Cooperation” (2000) 284 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Academie de droit international de La Haye 9, at 396. In the same sense, see also M. Laazouzi, “Nature 
juridique des communications entre juges” in Menétrey and Hess (eds), above note 10, 104-105.
13 Laazouzi, above note 12, at 86. On coordination between legal orders see P. Mayer, “La notion de coordination 
et le conflit de juridictions” in E. Pataut et	al. (eds), Les	nouvelles	formes	de	coordination	des	justices	étatiques 
(2013, IRJS, Paris), at 3 ff., in particular at 9.
14 Schlosser, above note 12, at 396.
15 L. d’Avout, “De l’entraide judiciaire internationale au contentieux civil intégré” in Pataut et	al. (eds), above note 
13, at 117; see also at 140.
16 Even if, as it has been noted, “[i]n European continental ears the latter words (i.e. “cross-border agreement”) 
indicate a rather more binding character than many of these “agreements” promise”: B. Wessels, “Cross-border 
Insolvency Agreements: What are they and are they here to stay?” in D. Faber et al. (eds), Insolventie en 
Overeenkomst (2012, Wolters Kluwer, Nijmegen).
17 E. Flaschen and R. Silverman, “Cross-border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols” (1998) 33 Texas International 
Law Journal 587, at 589; “Maxwell Communication Corporation plc: The Importance of Comity and Co-operation 
in Resolving International Insolvencies” in E. Leonard and C. Besant (eds), Current	Issues	in	Cross-border	
Insolvency and Reorganizations (1994, Graham and Trotman and International Bar Association, London), at 44.
18 S. Dargan, “The Emergence of Mechanisms for Cross-border Insolvencies in Canadian Law” (2001-2002) 17 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 107, at 124.
19 A-M. Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts” (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, at 193.
20 B. Wessels, Judicial	Coordination	of	Cross-border	Insolvency	Cases,	Inaugural	Lecture,	University	of	Leiden	
Law	School,	6	June	2008 (2008, Kluwer, Deventer), at 44, who is also critical of the idea of considering protocols 
as customary international law.
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law merchant).21 A further voice has explained protocols as contracts entered into 
by the parties involved in an insolvency proceedings that – as always happens 
with contracts exceeding ordinary administration and that are entered into after 
the opening of an insolvency proceedings – must be approved by the competent 
court.22 In this same direction, even if in a broader perspective, a prominent scholar 
has talked about “unedited forms of ‘contractualization’ of the settlement of 
international litigation”, realizing a model of cooperative process.23
As far as public international law treaties are concerned,24 it is submitted that 
comparing them with protocols would certainly highlight more differences than 
analogies. First, because treaties are entered into by public international law actors 
– States or international organizations – through persons normally authorized to 
represent them in the negotiation or adoption of a treaty, among which liquidators 
or courts are not, generally, included. Second, from the point of view of the subject 
matter of the agreement: protocols do not regulate rights and duties governed by 
public international law.
Also with respect to the lex mercatoria, it is submitted that there exist more 
differences than analogies. First, protocols are ad hoc agreements, while the lex 
mercatoria is supposed to be a set of standard norms, lex generalis, to be applied 
to any pertinent situations. Second, a breach of the lex mercatoria is supposed to 
be sanctioned by a competent court or adjudicatory body, while it seems that the 
same cannot be said as far as an hypothetical breach of a protocol is concerned.
The comparison between protocols and contracts entered into by private parties 
seems to be more convincing. No particular concerns seem to arise as far as the 
subject matter is concerned. It is true that, in principle, a contract governs private 
patrimonial relationships among the parties, while protocols deal, prima facie, 
21 R. Mason, “Cross-border Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation” (2012) 21 International Insolvency Review 
105, at 122.
22 A. Sexton, “Current Problems and Trends in the Administration of Transnational Insolvencies involving Enterprise 
Groups: The Mixed Record of Protocols, the UNCITRAL Model Insolvency Law, and the EU Insolvency 
Regulation” (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 811, at 818. The author criticizes in particular 
Flaschen and Silverman’s view (see above note 17), holding that protocols cannot be deemed to be treaties because: 
(i) they are not binding; (ii) any actor in the insolvency proceedings can refuse to take part to them.
23 L. Cadiet, “Inaugural lecture, Towards a New Model of Judicial Cooperation in the European Union”, available 
at: http://www.mpi.lu/fileadmin/mpi/medien/institute/Cadiet_Inaugural_lecture.pdf; “Conclusion d’un 
processualiste” in Pataut et	al. (eds), above note 13, at 225-226.
24 The Oxford English Dictionary gives another possible – though obsolete – definition of “treaty” as “[a] settlement 
or arrangement arrived at by treating or negotiation; an agreement, covenant, compact, contract.” In this case, 
nothing would change with respect to what will be said with regard to contracts. Curiously enough, the Debtors’ 
motion in the Lehman Brothers case (above note 1) states that the Protocol is a “privately negotiated treaty” and 
that it “is not a legally binding document”, but just “a statement of intentions and guidelines” (see § 18).
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mainly with procedural issues. However, the ultimate aim of such a procedural 
coordination is a substantive one, namely the maximization of the value of assets.25
More concerns, on the contrary, seem to arise with regard to the parties that enter 
into, respectively, a contract and a protocol: courts are organs of a given State and 
liquidators are – together with the courts – organs of the insolvency procedure. 
It is submitted that they do not have much in common with private parties that 
enter into a contract, even thinking of a third-party beneficiary contract. One last 
reflection, strictly linked to this latter point, pertains to the uncertainty related to 
the consequences of an hypothetical breach of a protocol. As a matter of fact, it is 
not clear either by who (Liquidators? Courts? Creditors?) and to whom a complaint 
should be addressed or what legal sanctions could follow such a breach.
Another possibility would be to consider protocols as non-binding instruments, 
a kind of gentlemen’s agreement. If we consider, for example, the Lehman 
Brothers’ protocol, we read a number of clauses that allow us to share this view. 
At paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2. respectively we find the following statements:
“[t]he parties acknowledge that this Protocol represents a statement 
of intentions and guidelines”; and
“[t]his Protocol shall be no legally enforceable nor impose any duties 
or obligations.”
In this same direction, one of the English administrators for the Lehman Brothers 
Inc. Europe declared in an interview that, even if the protocol did not create “a 
legal obligation, it created a moral one”.26 It is true that paragraph 14.1 of the 
Protocol reads as follows:
“[n]othing herein shall create a right for any entity that is not a party 
to the Protocol, and a party hereto shall not be bound by this Protocol 
in its dealings with any entity that is not a party hereto.”
However, it seems that “having a right under the protocol” should not be construed 
as if referring to a legal right but just to the concrete chance of doing something. 
Further, the idea can be put forward that protocols represent a tertium genus, an 
unprecedented category of binding agreements not yet governed by any source of 
law. Such a position has certainly to deal with the circumstances that the formation 
of unprecedented legal categories is not that common in the modern era, it being 
25 See, in this sense, Cadiet, above note 23, at 226. This leads, according to the author, to reconsidering the traditional 
distinction between substance and procedure.
26 See Wessels, above note 20, who quotes the interview, as it appears in (2010) 23 Insolvency Intelligence 32.
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rather more frequent that a legislator regulates new species of an already known 
category, in order to face a new praxis that came into existence within the human 
experience. This happens, for example, when a legislator introduces a new crime 
or a new type of contract.
3. The Legal Basis of Protocols
Coming to the third part of this presentation, the question that needs to be answered 
is on which basis protocols are concluded. In other words, it is to be investigated 
whether a legal norm exists that authorizes the conclusion of protocols.27
Some legal orders can be said to have provided for an explicit legal basis for cross-
border insolvency protocols. A first, notable example concerns those countries 
that have enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law and, in particular, its Article 27(d). 
Among these countries, the United States can be recalled, whose Code, at Title 11, 
Chapter 15 explicitly states that:
“[c]ooperation referred to in sections 1525 and 1526 may be 
implemented by any appropriate means, including — d) approval 
or implementation of agreements concerning the coordination of 
proceedings.”
A further example concerns the European Union legal order and, consequently, the 
legal orders of its Member States. With reference to commercial insolvencies, the 
EIR implicitly allows the conclusion of cross-border insolvency protocols to enact 
that cooperation prescribed by Article 31. This possibility has then been expressly 
foreseen by the European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-
border Insolvency Cooperation.28 Subsequently, the EIR Recast itself, in its Recital 
49 and Articles 41, 42, 56 and 57, contains the word “protocols”.
What about those legal orders where, or those subject matters for which, no 
explicit legal authorization for concluding a protocol is foreseen? First of all, it 
can with no doubts be excluded that the conclusion of protocols could be related 
27 With a slightly different approach to the issue at hand, see also Laazouzi, above note 12, at 106. The Author 
considers whether protocols (“accords de communication directe”) themselves could be deemed to represent the 
legal basis for judicial communications, concluding in the negative. As a matter of fact, according to Laazouzi, 
either courts can communicate between each other irrespective of a protocol authorizing them thereto or, if the 
involved legal orders do not allow such a communication to take place, a protocol will not be a useful tool to 
bypass such an obstacle. See in particular at 105-106.
28 European	Communication	 and	Cooperation	Guidelines	 for	Cross-border	 Insolvency	Developed	 under	 the	
aegis of the Academic Wing of INSOL Europe by Professor Bob Wessels and Professor Miguel Virgós (July 
2007), available at: http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session%205/European%20
Communication%20and%20Cooperation%20Guidelines%20for%20Cross-border%20Insolvency%20.pdf.
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to the existence of a duty contained in a customary international law norm, at 
least because the requisite consisting in the belief that a given practice is legally 
compelled (the so called “opinio iuris ac necessitatis”) is lacking. Three other 
hypothesis could be considered. It can be argued, first of all, that protocols might 
have an implied basis, in the sense that their source should be found in an inherent 
power of the liquidators and of the judges, within the spectrum of their freedom 
and of their procedural initiative aimed at administering justice and at assuring 
a smooth development of the proceedings. Second, it has been argued that a 
“legislative basis” or simply a “basis” for cross-border insolvency protocols are 
those non-binding, soft law instruments drafted by international organizations or 
academic associations, such as, just to mention the oldest one, the 1995 Cross-
border insolvency concordat.29 Third, it can also be put forward that the legal 
basis for protocols is comity30. However, the three hypothesis just mentioned 
are only partially satisfactory. They might be acceptable for common law legal 
orders, while they do not solve anything from a civil law point of view. The reason 
being that they recall abstract principles or soft law instruments, which would not 
generally be accepted as a legal basis in civil law countries.
It follows that, in the absence of an (explicit – tangible – hard law) legal basis 
for protocols, it might not be so easily conceivable for a legal order of a civil law 
tradition to accept that liquidators enter into protocols with foreign colleagues 
and that courts approve them.31 This could explain why, as it has already been 
mentioned, civil law countries are, in general, more reluctant than common law 
ones toward the conclusion of protocols. Bearing in mind that, in some cases, such 
29 Committee J, Section on Business Law, International Bar Association, Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, 17 
September 1995, available at: http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/396/1522.html. See, in the 
sense above, A. Kamalnath, “Cross-border Insolvency Protocols: A Success Story?” (2013) International Journal 
of Legal Studies and Research 172, at 176; J. Farley et	al., “Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-border 
Insolvency Cases, First Annual Insolvency Review Conference” (6 February 2004), at 6; P. Zumbro, “Cross-
border Insolvencies and International Protocols – An Imperfect but Effective Tool” (2010) 11 Business Law 
International 157, at 165.
30 See F. Dialti, “Cooperazione tra curatori e corti in diritto internazionale fallimentare: un’analisi comparata” 
(2005) Il diritto fallimentare e delle società commerciali 1010, at 1015; UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, at §175; UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cooperation, at 38. See, also for further references, holding that comity is “the principle … which justifies 
the enactment of protocols”: E. Canuel, “United States – Canadian Insolvencies: Reviewing Conflicting Legal 
Mechanisms, Challenges and Opportunities for Cross-Border Cooperation” (2005) Journal of International 
Business and Law 8, at 15; Kamalnath, above note 29, at 176. In the sense that comity is not a sufficient basis for 
the conclusion of protocols, see Dargan, above note 18, at 120. In the sense that comity cannot be taken as the 
basis for protocols, see A. Briggs, “The Principle of Comity in Private International Law” (2011) 354 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Academie de Droit International de la Haye 65, at 69 ff.; E. Warren and J. Westbrook, “Court-to-court 
Negotiation” (2003) American	Bankruptcy	Institute	Journal 28, at 28 and in note 3; J. Westbrook, “International 
Judicial Negotiation” (2003) Texas International Law Journal 567, at 569.
31 In this sense, see for example Zumbro, above note 29, at 158 (note 3). For the opposite attitude of common law 
countries, see e.g. Farley et	al., above note 29, at 7: “the working philosophy in those jurisdictions was that if 
something was not forbidden and it made sense to do it, then it was judicially permitted.”
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a reluctance could turn into a real impediment for relevant courts and liquidators 
to enter into such protocols, it is believed that providing a proper legal basis for 
the conclusion of protocols could facilitate their use even in those countries where 
no judicial initiative could be undertaken outside the boundaries of what is stated 
by relevant norms.
More in general, it is believed that another concern which is often put forward in 
the pertinent scholarship regarding protocols could be usefully addressed through 
the provision of a legal basis for them. Notwithstanding the fact that the initiative 
undertaken by liquidators and judges, in order to find a way to bypass territorialism 
inconveniencies, is, without doubt, to be appreciated, also considering that the 
ultimate benefit will be for the creditors of the insolvent group, it could be useful 
to investigate whether there are and, if so, what are the limits for courts and 
liquidators to create ad hoc (international) procedural norms, even if they act 
in the exclusive interest of creditors. In particular, reference is made here to the 
need to protect, within insolvency proceedings coordinated through the use of a 
protocol, fundamental rights of the parties and, most of all, that to a fair process.32 
It is submitted that a legal basis could help in assessing these limits and ensuring 
their protection.33
In the light of the above, it would be without doubts advisable to promulgate 
legislation that expressly authorizes the adoption of protocols.
32 See S. Jackson and R. Mason, “Developments In Court To Court Communications in International Insolvency 
Cases”, (2014) 37 UNSW	Law	Journal	507, at 519 ff., referring to an address of Justice R. I. Barret of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales delivered at the 22nd Banking and Financial Services Law Association Annual 
Conference, Cairns, 6-7 August 2005. See also Dargan, above note 18, at 124, raising the issue of whether a 
protocol would stand up to scrutiny by the US Supreme Court in case it would be challenged by some dissatisfied 
creditors for an alleged violation of the US Constitution. On the protection of human rights and of procedural 
rights of the parties within proceedings that have a cross-border dimension and that are jointly administered by the 
involved judicial authorities, see also B. Hess, “Justizielle Kooperation/Judicial Cooperation” in P. Gottwald and 
B. Hess (eds), Procedural	Justice.	XIV.	IAPL	World	Congress/XIVème	Congès	mondial	de	l’AIDP.	Heidelberg	
2011 (2014, Giesking-Verlag, Bielefeld), at 431 ff.; C. Kessedjian, “L’avenir de la cooperation judiciaire 
transfrontalière” in Menétrey and Hess (eds), above note 10, at 353.
33 On cooperation and conclusion of protocols in international insolvency cases see further S. Bufford, “Coordination 
of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A Proposal” (2012) 86 American	Bankruptcy	Law	
Journal 685; I. Fletcher and B. Wessels, “Shaping Rules for Cooperation in International Corporate Insolvency 
Cases through Dialogue” (2010) European Company Law 149; B. Leonard, “Managing Default by a Multinational 
Venture: Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvencies” (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal 543; “The 
Developing Use of Protocols in Major Cross-border Filings” (1999) 18 American	Bankruptcy	Institute	Journal	
12; “The Way Ahead: Protocols in International Insolvency Cases” (1998) 17 American	Bankruptcy	Institute	
Journal 12; P. Omar, “Cross-border Assistance in the Common Law and International Insolvency Texts: An 
Update” (2009) 20 International Company and Commercial Law Review 379; B. Wessels, “EU promotes Judicial 
Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases” (1 July 2013), available at: http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/eu-
promotes-judicial-cooperation-in-cross-border-insolvency-cases; J. Westbrook, “The Duty to Seek Cooperation 
in Multinational Insolvency Cases” (2004) Annual Review of Insolvency Law 6.
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4. The Role played by Protocols within the New EU instruments regulating 
Banking and Financial Insolvencies
The last part of this presentation considers whether cross-border insolvency 
protocols will continue to play a role in the future within the insolvencies covered 
by the two new instruments enacted by the European Union in the banking and 
financial fields, namely Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
While, as already recalled, the recently adopted EIR Recast (Regulation (EU) No. 
2015/848) explicitly mentions protocols in Recital 49 and Articles 41 and 42, as 
far as the coordination between main and secondary insolvency proceedings is 
concerned, and in Articles 56 and 57, as far as the coordination of more proceedings 
related to more members of a same group is concerned, the same cannot be said 
with regard to the regulation and the directive recalled above dealing with the 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. It is submitted that this 
silence derives from the fact that, under the directive and the regulation, there is 
apparently no need for entering into cross-border insolvency protocols.
The two legislative instruments foresee institutionalized cooperation fora, 
respectively the resolution colleges and the Board, where group level 
resolution authorities and national resolution authorities in the first scenario and 
representatives of national resolution authorities and the other members of the 
Board in the second scenario are supposed to cooperate to achieve a successful 
resolution of the pertinent insolvent group. On the one side, resolution authorities 
shall be, according to Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, public administrative 
authorities entrusted with public administrative powers and, on the other side, 
the Board is, according to Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014, “a 
Union agency”. Therefore, even if it cannot be excluded that, within said bodies, 
cooperation could be enacted through the drafting of formal agreements that could 
even be named “protocols”, said agreements would anyway be different from the 
cross-border insolvency protocols which we are used to, at least under the point of 
view of the actors that are called upon to enter into them.
Therefore it seems that a minor, if not any, role could be played by cross-border 
insolvency protocols under the recently enacted directive and regulation.
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Chapter 14
Insolvency Law and Investment Protection 
Treaties – A Conflict of Laws and Jurisdictions 
to be Addressed
Axel Flessner
I. Introduction
Insolvency law is concerned with protection of investments and investors – of 
creditors having contributed money to businesses, and of business owners having 
put money into their own business. The protective feature of insolvency law is to 
collectivize the enforcement of claims and the disposition of the debtor’s assets. 
Originally, the protection was meant to serve only the creditors – by preserving and 
enhancing the overall value of the property available for the satisfaction of their 
claims. Nowadays, with rescue proceedings forming a normal part of insolvency 
law, the protection includes the investment of the owners of the business.
During the last 50 years or so, investment protection has become the subject 
also of international treaties, mostly bilateral ones between individual states. It 
is a different kind of investment protection. While insolvency law is to protect 
investors at the instance of debtors’ economic difficulties, the aim of the treaties is 
to protect investors against governmental action in the foreign country where the 
investment has been made. Originally, the investment protection treaties had been 
invented for developing countries wishing to attract foreign capital without having 
a reliable domestic legal system to protect foreign investors against expropriation 
and other unwelcome political action.
Meanwhile, investment protection treaties have been concluded, or are about to 
be concluded, between states with legal systems beyond reproach, that is, with 
systems that can be trusted to protect the expectations of investors, domestic and 
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foreign.1 The most prominent ones of this kind are the envisaged treaties between 
the European Union and the United States of America (called Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership – “TTIP”) and between the EU and Canada (called 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement – “CETA”).
Insolvency law is about owners and creditors, both being investors, the 
international treaties are about investors and governments. Where, then, is the 
conflict to be addressed? The conflict emerges from the ambition in the treaties 
to protect foreign investors comprehensively, that is: against governmental action 
of any kind – legislation, executive and administrative action, judicial action, and 
thus also against insolvency laws and proceedings. The conduct and the results of 
an insolvency proceeding may be questioned by individual investors invoking the 
protection promised by the treaty. That is the conflict to be explained here.
First, the typical investment protection treaty and its possible impact on insolvency 
law and practice will be described. The conflict will then be illustrated by three 
prominent insolvency cases, with the lesson we can draw from them. Finally, 
an assessment of the treaties will be given with an outlook on what stand the 
insolvency and restructuring law profession can take towards the investment 
protection treaties oncoming in Europe – TTIP and CETA.2
II. Investment Treaties and their Impact
The typical investment treaty traditionally provided investors of the contracting 
states with free access to their domestic markets and with an assurance of equal 
treatment with the nationals of the respective state. Modern investment treaties, 
however, go further. They give a promise of the treaty state to the protected foreign 
investors of generally not to disturb the investment indecently. The promise is 
usually framed as an express obligation to accord investors of the other state “fair 
and equitable treatment” and further by a provision against expropriation of the 
investment unless it is made for a public purpose, under due process of law, in a 
non-discriminatory manner and against prompt compensation.
1 Major works on the field in English: M. Bungenberg et	al. (eds), International Investment Law (2015, Nomos, 
Baden-Baden); R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd ed) (2012, OUP, 
Oxford); H. Muchlinski et	al. (eds), The	Oxford	Handbook	on	International	Investment	Law	(2008, OUP, Oxford); 
M. Sornarajah,	The	International	Law	on	Foreign	Investment, (3rd ed) (2010, CUP, Cambridge); in German: J. 
Griebel, Internationales Investitionsrecht (2008, Beck, München); M. Krajewski, Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht (3rd 
ed) (2012, C.F.Müller, Heidelberg); A. Reinisch, “Internationales Investitionsschutzrecht” and “Die Beilegung 
von Investitionsstreitigkeiten”, §§ 8 and 18 in C. Tietje (ed), Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (2nd ed) (2015, de 
Gruyter, Berlin/Boston).
2 The negotiated English draft of CETA is available at: www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/
tradoc_152806.pdf. It is now being revised and translated into all official EU languages and is likely to be 
submitted for ratification in 2016.
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In modern treaties like CETA, the cases of unfair and inequitable treatment are 
exclusively listed in the treaty. In CETA, these cases are:
1) Denial of justice;
2) Fundamental breach of due process;
3) Manifest arbitrariness;
4) Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race 
or religious belief;
5) Abusive treatment of investors such as coercion, duress and harassment; or
6) any other treatment the contracting parties may have later agreed under the 
treaty to constitute such unfair and inequitable treatment.3
The salient feature of the treaties is that impairment of an investment by measures 
of the host state not compatible with the treaty entitles the investor directly, not 
only the other contracting state, to claim damages or compensation against the 
host state at an arbitration tribunal set up for the case under the treaty rules; the 
decision of the tribunal is then binding on the defendant state and it is enforceable 
internationally. In other words: The treaty places the enforcement of its investment 
protection into the hands of the investors themselves providing them with 
readily enforceable money claims against the state in breach. Complaints can be 
made against any governmental “measure”,4 whether the measure is one of the 
legislature, of the executive branch or the judicial branch of government. Measures 
of the judicial branch include, of course, insolvency proceedings. They can be 
challenged and given a price tag by binding awards of money compensation to 
complaining investors.
III. Illustration
The working of such treaties is here illustrated by three prominent insolvency 
cases, partly real, partly hypothetical.
1.	Suhrkamp
The first case is the Suhrkamp insolvency. Suhrkamp is one of the most prestigious 
book publishing houses in Germany. It publishes highbrow literature and has 
been called a pillar of literary and intellectual life in the German speaking world. 
3 The typical contents of such treaties are described in the general works cited above note 1.
4 CETA, Chapter 10 Article 3 – measure.
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With its program it has for long times been at the head of intellectual moods 
and developments.
Suhrkamp was owned and run by a limited partnership of two, the one partner 
being a foundation with a 60% share of the capital and the votes, the other partner 
being a Swiss holding company, with 40%.5 In truth, the actors in the drama were 
two natural persons. On the side of the foundation, there was the widow of the 
former majority owner of the business who had left his share to the foundation 
and made his widow, a former theatre actress, the foundation’s president. On the 
Swiss side stood a German art dealer, grandson of a famous German sculptor, who 
had bought his minority share from a Swiss family who had been on friendly terms 
with the business which they had wanted to support by investing and taking that 
minority share. The widow and the art dealer soon got into a permanent and bitter 
war over management and policy. Over the years, they fought against each other 
in numerous law suits.
The war escalated when one year the parties argued about the distribution of profits 
which he minority partner wanted to be distributed and the majority partner to be 
retained in the business. The minority partner sued the partnership for her share 
and got a judgment in her favour. The majority partner thereupon had the managers 
of the partnership file for a restructuring proceeding in the insolvency court, the 
petition alleging that the partnership lacked the liquidity to satisfy the enforceable 
judgment and that insolvency was consequently imminent.
The insolvency court opened the proceeding, in which then the debtor partnership 
presented a reorganization plan (in German Insolvenzplan), which provided for full 
satisfaction of the creditor claims and for the conversion of the partnership into 
a stock company in which the existing partners would be shareholders of, again, 
60 and 40% respectively, but with a restriction on the transfer of shares and with 
a bar to a subscription of new shares at an envisaged increase of share capital. In 
other words: While partners under general commercial law have a voice also in 
the management of the business and while, in this case, the minority partner had 
by separate agreement had secured to herself special co-management rights, the 
partners by the plan were now going to be made mere shareholders in a company, 
the minority shareholder thus losing any influence on the management and facing 
the risk of her shares being watered down by a future increase of capital and with 
no right to freely sell the shares allotted to her by the plan.
5 To be precise: it was a limited partnership with the general partner being a private company limited by shares 
(a GmbH), such limited partnerships (GmbH & Co KG) being a legal construct in wide use, originally for tax 
reasons. In this case, the limited partners were also the shareholders in the GmbH, their general partner.
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The plan was approved in the creditor groups and by the majority partner, and 
the insolvency court confirmed it. The minority partner, the Swiss company, had 
fiercely opposed the plan and twice appealed against its confirmation up to the 
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof). It alleged an abuse of the insolvency 
proceeding as such and particularly of the insolvency plan provisions of the 
Insolvency Act, because, in her view, they were used not for a restructuring of 
debt at an insolvency – the debts were indeed to be satisfied in full – but solely for 
fettering, annoying and eventually squeezing out a tiresome partner in the business 
without a showing of real insolvency.
On the first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the appeal court 
below for procedural reasons,6 on the second appeal the Supreme Court denied 
further review on the ground that the court below had now based its decision 
on a special provision in the Insolvency Act (§ 254 para. 4) the application of 
which, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, was not subject to appeals.7 The Swiss 
company has now lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) alleging abuse of proceedings, denial of justice, 
unlawful expropriation and violation of the freedom of association.8
The case is pending. It touches upon an investment made. To make it illustrate 
international investment protection, it is now made a hypothetical one. Assuming 
the investor to be not a Swiss company but a company coming from Canada, the 
case would come within the scope of CETA, the investment treaty between the 
European Union and Canada which is awaiting ratification. And further assuming 
that the Constitutional Court dismisses the complaint, in other words: approves of 
the insolvency proceeding and its results. Can the Canadian company then invoke 
CETA to make Germany or the EU liable in damages for this proceeding?
It is clear from the outset that insolvency proceedings, as any other governmental 
activity, are covered by the treaty – which attaches a possible financial state liability 
on any “measure”.9 There is no exemption for the judicial branch of government in 
any investment treaty. Indeed, the very gist of those investment treaties is a general 
distrust towards national judges and their treatment of foreign investors. So, in the 
supposed case, we have to look to the standards CETA is going to establish for 
the EU and Canada.
6 BGH 7 July 2014 – IX ZB 13/14, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht – ZIP 2014, 1442.
7 BGH 17 Sept 2014 – IX ZB 26/14, ZIP 2014, 2040.
8 BVerfG, file number (Aktenzeichen) 2 BvR 1978/13. The proceeding as of December 2014 has been extensively 
reported and commented upon in various law review articles; ZIP 2015, 83, ZIP 2015, 1208; Deutsche	Zeitschrift	
für	Wirtschafts-	und	Insolvenzrecht	(DZWIR) 2014, 331, 440, 577; 2015, 1, 125; Der	Betrieb	(DB) 2015, 538. 
9 CETA, Chapter 10 Article 3 – m.
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Is there a risk of the Suhrkamp proceeding to be regarded as unfair and inequitable 
or as an unjustified expropriation under CETA? When we look at the catalogue 
of instances of such behaviour mentioned in the beginning10 we find exactly those 
charges that have been addressed by the minority shareholder company to the 
German courts – denial of justice, lack of due process, abusive treatment of an 
investor, expropriation. To be sure, all German courts, in the assumed case, have 
held the charges to be unfounded. But the three arbitrators far away in Washington 
DC or somewhere else might think differently and may thus impose financial 
liability on Germany or the EU for what the arbitrators think to be a misbehaviour 
of the German courts – and that would be the final word in this case. The possible 
conflict between German insolvency law, as applied by the German courts, and 
the treaty standards, as applied by the arbitrators, would be obvious, it is a conflict 
of laws and of jurisdictions.
This is not the place to comment on this hypothetical conflict or on the actual 
Suhrkamp case. The next illustration is the case of the Austrian Hypo Alpe 
Adria Bank.
2.	Hypo	Alpe	Adria
With a daring strategy since the nineties of last century, this bank grew from a 
small state-owned mortgage bank in Carinthia, a state in the Austrian federal 
system of government, into one of the 5 or 6 big banks in Austria, benefitting from 
close links to party politics. After the opening of the East of Europe, it expanded 
heavily in South Eastern Europe. Beginning with the financial crisis of 2008 and 
later, it got into troubles with many of its investments and loans that decreased 
sharply in value or failed altogether. In 2009, the Austrian government felt the 
need to come to help. They bought all the shares in the company, among them 
a majority of 70% held by the Bavarian State Bank, they invested a good EUR 
5 billion into the bank over the next five years, and then concluded in 2014 that 
the prospects were hopeless, the business untenable. They could have sent the 
bank into a normal insolvency proceeding, but for various economic and political 
reasons, the government decided to liquidate the business by their own hands. The 
bank was renamed and converted into a winding up institution (what one often 
calls a “bad bank”), and legislation was passed to liquidate its assets smoothly and 
slowly and with support of the liquidation process by government funds.
One of the government’s concerns was to protect the winding up institution against 
insolvency until it had assembled liquidity sufficient to satisfy claims when falling 
10 Above notes 1 and 3.
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due. They thought that roughly five years of liquidating would be needed to yield 
the funds necessary for regularly serving claims on maturity. So, provisions were 
enacted in 2014 that declared lower ranking claims to be extinguished which would 
fall due before a fixed date in 2019, that is: 5 years later. The bank had incurred in 
its former business a good number of lower ranking liabilities within its total debt 
of about EUR 10 billion. The lower ranking claims hit by this law made up about 
EUR 800 million.
The whole legislative winding up scheme was attacked in the Austrian 
Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) by a group of dissenting members 
of Parliament big enough to have standing in the court, and by a regional civil 
court of first instance (Landesgericht) in Carinthia where an insurance company 
tried to recover under bonds that were subject to that special law. On 29 July 
2015, the Constitutional Court rendered its decision.11 It held that the purported 
extinction of those claims was an arbitrary expropriation of the creditors, being 
incompatible with the property guaranty in the Austrian Constitution, and the Court 
consequently invalidated the whole legislative scheme. It expressly acknowledged 
the power of the legislature to impose sacrifices on creditors of a bank of systemic 
relevance, and it particularly noted that in any ordinary liquidation at insolvency 
the junior creditors like the ones affected here carried a special risk of being wiped 
out because of their lower rank. The Court did not, however, accept that within the 
lower ranking class the law could make a difference between claims according to 
their date of maturity, with no regard to the nature and origin of the claims but with 
the intent only of getting the liquidation under way.12
When we look at the scheme, it was an insolvency proceeding for all intents and 
purposes, to be sure not under general or banking insolvency law, but having all 
the ingredients of a legal insolvency measure, that is: an insolvent debtor and 
its creditors, with no hope of the debtor’s survival, a statutory mandate for its 
liquidation – albeit a slow and smooth one – and a cutting off of creditor claims 
to help the process achieve its aims. And the Constitutional Court intervened with 
classical insolvency law arguments, although dressed in constitutional terms, by 
pointing to creditor ranks deserving respect and to the equality of creditors within 
a given rank.
If we now look to whether the affected creditors could have been protected under 
a given investment treaty, the Constitutional Court in this case, to be sure, has 
11 Available at: www.vfgh.gv.at under “Ausgewählte Entscheidungen” > G 239/2014.The facts stated here and the 
decision are taken directly from the judgment. A press release in English is available at the website under “Medien”.
12 Ibid. at paragraphs 249-296.
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rendered the treaty irrelevant by providing by itself the looked for protection. But 
what if it had decided otherwise? The arguments of the Austrian government for 
imposing that sacrifice were by no means far-fetched or utterly mistaken.13 In 
case they had persuaded the Constitutional Court to dismiss the complaint, the 
arbitration tribunal under the investment treaty could be seized and the Republic 
of Austria would again  had to defend itself against the arguments that had been 
rejected previously in its constitutional court. Again, the potential conflict between 
the statutory insolvency treatment and the investment protection mechanism is 
coming into sight here.
In Austria, the conflict is actually not even safely averted in the Hypo case. 
Austria has meanwhile enacted a new Bank Reorganization and Resolution Act 
in accordance with European Union prescriptions.14 Under the new Act, the 
lower ranking creditors in this case – this time all of them – have been set under a 
moratorium until 2016. This moratorium, of course, is also open to an attack under 
the constitution or under the assumed investment treaty. Whether it would stand 
constitutional or – alternatively – investment treaty attacks is by no means certain. 
3.	Yukos
The last illustration case is the Yukos saga. Unlike Suhrkamp and Hypo Alpe 
Adria, the conflict between the investment treaty and insolvency law is here not 
hypothetical but has been very real. The case has been widely covered by the media, 
but mostly with regard to the criminal proceedings in Russia against the controlling 
shareholder of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was roughly treated by the 
authorities and was twice sent to jail for a number of years. But part of the story 
was an insolvency proceeding through which Yukos was eventually dissolved and 
which subsequently resulted in an investment protection claim against Russia in 
an arbitration organized by the Permanent International Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague in the Netherlands. The arbitrators have rendered their judgment on 14 July 
2014. The report here of the case is taken exclusively, no media in between, from 
the facts stated in that judgment, and will focus on the proceedings against Yukos, 
not on the criminal charges against Khodorkovsky.
Yukos was formed as a joint stock company by the Russian government after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was to run a number of the formerly state-owned 
oil and gas fields. In the mid-nineties, under President Yeltsin, large parts of the 
economy were privatised, and so were the shares in Yukos. They were sold by 
13 Ibid., at paragraphs 128-146.
14 Directive of Council and Parliament No. 59/2014 of 15 May 2014 on Bank Recovery and Resolution (“BRRD”).
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auction, Khodorkovsky and some associates acquired about 70% of the shares. 
He had been a high ranking leader in a communist youth organisation in Soviet 
times, later he became vice-minister in a government under President Yeltsin. This 
background may have enabled him to marshal the funds needed for the successful 
bid at the auction. Under the management of Khodorkovsky, Yukos flourished. 
By the turn of the century it had become the biggest Russian oil company, also 
a worldwide player with an estimated market capitalization of USD 33 billion, it 
was engaged in negotiations with Exxon and ChevronTexaco for a merger or other 
form of combination.
In 2003, the Russian authorities held a field tax audit at Yukos. They discovered 
what the aforementioned arbitrators later called a huge tax evasion scheme 
with taxes of hundreds of millions of Dollars withheld, what Yukos called a 
tax optimization scheme, and the Russian authorities simply called wilful and 
persistent tax fraud. Russia had established in the nineties a number of low tax 
areas where investments were to be especially encouraged. Yukos used mailbox 
firms in those territories and also a subsidiary in the republic of Cyprus, with which 
Russia had a double tax agreement, to avoid taxes by clever in-group selling and 
pricing, the technique so familiar to many in the corporate world. Khodorkovsky 
was arrested and twice convicted for long prison terms, and the tax authorities 
reassessed Yukos for the years 2000 to 2004 with taxes and interest amounting 
to a total of USD 16 billion. They added fines for the tax fraud in the amount of 
USD 8 billion, so that in 2006, when the last assessment had been made, Yukos 
had a tax liability of USD 24 billion. Yukos appealed against the assessments up 
to the highest court, but without success. When the assessments were not paid, the 
authorities enforced them very quickly with freezing assets and then seizing and 
selling by auction the core production facilities of Yukos for USD 9 billion. The 
asset basis of Yukos was thereby reduced to 40% of the previous level.
Now, at last, comes the insolvency proceeding. Yukos had, in 2003, taken up a 
loan of USD 1 billion from a syndicate of Western banks. After the aforementioned 
auction of the greater part of its assets, Yukos failed to serve the loan. The 
syndicate obtained a judgment against Yukos in the High Court in London and 
they tried to enforce it in the Netherlands where Yukos held its foreign assets. The 
enforcement failed because the assets had been rashly placed in two newly formed 
Dutch foundations that held them for the controlling shareholders of Yukos. 
The syndicate then achieved recognition of the London judgment in Russia and 
eventually petitioned for an insolvency proceeding which was opened in 2006. 
In the proceeding, the tax liabilities left over after the previous auction made up 
70% of the admitted claims. Yukos offered a restructuring plan, it was rejected in 
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the creditors’ meeting, and liquidation of the remaining assets followed in several 
steps with a total yield of USD 31 billion, USD 9 billion in taxes remaining unpaid. 
In 2007, Yukos was struck from the company register.
Already in 2005, the controlling shareholders of Yukos sought investment 
protection against the Russian Federation by starting mediation and then arbitration 
under the Energy Charter Treaty. That treaty is a consequence of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and of the political opening of Eastern Europe. Governments 
were now concerned about the continuance of oil and gas supplies from the former 
Soviet territory, the successor states were concerned about the flow of money from 
the export of oil and gas and they wanted to attract western capital to modernize and 
expand their production. So, a treaty, called the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), 
was concluded in 1994, came into force in 1998 and has been ratified meanwhile 
by 51 countries, mainly European, and by the European Union. Russia has signed 
the treaty, but has not ratified it, and has meanwhile formally declared to be no 
longer willing to ratify.15
Because of its aim to foster capital export to energy producing countries, the treaty 
has also an investment protection chapter. It is modelled after the many other 
investment treaties, that is, it obliges the treaty states to fair and equitable treatment 
of investors from other treaty states and it prohibits unjustified expropriation. 
Violation of these provisions entitles the investor to seek compensation, enforceable 
against the guilty treaty state by arbitration.
This investment protection was sought against Russia by three shareholders of 
Yukos, that is, two holding companies in the Republic of Cyprus and one on the 
Isle of Man. Together they were holding about 70% of the Yukos shares, and each 
was under the control of Khodorkovsky and his associates through a sophisticated 
chain of holdings and trusts leading to Gibraltar and the Channel Islands. They 
claimed that all the legal measures of the Federation of Russia against Yukos were 
not simply measures of tax assessment and judicial enforcement, but were all part 
of an overarching strategy of the Russian government to destroy Yukos, to get 
back into the hands of the state its extensive oil and gas facilities, and to get rid 
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky – he was allegedly suspected to become a dangerous 
political opponent to President Putin.
15 The facts on the ECT are taken from Wikipedia,	“Energy Charter Treaty”, and from the judgment cited below 
notes 16 and 17. See also T. Roe and M. Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter 
Treaty (2011, CUP, Cambridge) and, with regard on the special relationship of the EU and Russia, S. Pritzkow, Das 
völkerrechtliche	Verhältnis	zwischen	der	EU	und	Russland	im	Energiesektor (2011, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg).
187
A giant arbitration proceeding developed before a panel of arbitrators formed 
with the services of the Permanent International Court of Arbitration. The three 
arbitrators were a renowned judge and advisor in international law disputes from 
the United States, Stephen	M.	Schwebel, an Avocat from Geneva, Dr.	Charles	
Poncet, and a professor and practitioner from Canada, The Hon Yves Portier, the 
chairman. They called themselves “The Arbitration Tribunal”.
The tribunal had first to decide on its jurisdiction, after Russia has not ratified the 
treaty. In 2009, in an interim judgment of 200 pages, they decided against Russia, 
on the basis of Russia having signed the treaty without objecting to its provisional 
application which the treaty expressly declares to follow from such signature.16 
After a busy further five years, the tribunal gave its final judgment on 14 July 
2014. The judgment, an impressive document of more than 600 pages, holds the 
Federation of Russia liable for a violation of the Energy Charter Treaty and orders 
it to pay the claimants a compensation of USD 50 billion.17
For our subject, two aspects are remarkable:
The tribunal did not deny the measures taken by the Russian authorities to have 
been permissible under Russian law, and it did not dispute the compatibility 
of the laws applied with the treaty. It emphasized, instead, the harsh and rash 
procedures against Khodorkovsky personally and against Yukos and it concluded 
from this “big picture”18 and all the circumstances that the claimants had proven 
their allegation, that is: that the Russian government under President Putin had 
conceived a plan to destroy Yukos and to appropriate its assets to the state in 
the first place, and that it exploited the tax evasion scheme as a welcome trigger 
for the execution of that plan. In the tribunal’s view, the insolvency proceeding 
was only the concluding part of an ongoing, carefully orchestrated expropriation, 
lasting from the tax audits in 2003 to the elimination of Yukos from the company 
register in 2007.
The other remarkable aspect is how the tribunal arrived at the amount of USD 
50 billion of compensation.19 It had assessed the losses suffered by the claimants 
at about USD 70 billion. It then held the claimants and their shareholders liable 
for contributory fault because of their extensively practised tax evasion system 
16 The judgment is available at the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: www.pca-cpa.org, under “Recent 
Activities > more > Final Awards Issued in 3 Arbitrations between Former Shareholders of Yukos and the 
Russian Federation > Hulley Express (and others) v. The Russian Federation > Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility of 30 November 2009”.
17 Ibid., substituting as the final link > “Final Award of 18 July 2014”.
18 Ibid. at 366 (paragraph 1144).
19 Ibid., at 500-509.
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that had made them, in the view of the tribunal, vulnerable and had opened the 
way to the eventual destruction of Yukos. The tribunal claimed wide discretion in 
weighing the parts played by both sides and in attributing the shares to be taken, 
and it came to the conclusion that 25% of the loss should be borne by the claimants 
themselves, which makes for about USD 50 billion left for their compensation.
IV. The Lesson
It would be useless here to comment on the judgment. We must rather take it, and 
the other illustration cases, as an indication of the potential of judicial review of 
insolvency proceedings the investment treaties hold in store. What do investment 
treaties like TTIP and CETA mean to insolvency law? It appears that the review 
potential is enormous. The treaties allow judicial imposition of state liability 
to individual investors caught in insolvencies on the basis of circumstances far 
back in time and high up in politics, brought together under some guiding idea, 
and they allow the arbitrators wide discretion in comparing and evaluating the 
behaviour of the participants involved. As to the range of circumstances possibly 
to be considered, the treaties are “comprehensive” in the widest possible sense. 
No such reaching out into the factual and legal surroundings would be allowed, let 
alone be possible, in a normal national insolvency court. This discrepancy of what 
an insolvency court and what the investment protectors are allowed and able to 
consider, is the primary source of the potential conflict between the fields.
But the conflict will not be limited to spectacular instances like the aforementioned 
cases; it can rather eat itself into quite normal issues of insolvency practice. In a 
case reported only recently, the Republic of Hungary was held liable, under an 
investment treaty with Portugal, for its insolvency court denying a Portuguese 
investor a hearing on a debt restructuring proposal in an ongoing liquidation 
proceeding over its insolvent Hungarian subsidiary. The court had demanded 
additional supporting documents and, when they were not forthcoming, allowed 
and encouraged the appointed liquidator to proceed with the sale of the subsidiary’s 
production plant. The arbitrators under the treaty found that Hungarian case law and 
doctrine allow the courts to demand, if “necessary”, information and documents 
additional to those expressly required in the bankruptcy statute, but they thought 
that the court’s demand was unwarranted by the facts and unreasonable under the 
circumstances, and they branded it as a violation of the rescue chance the plaintiff 
under treaty standards should have had in the insolvency proceeding.20
20 The judgment of 24 August 2015 in the case of Dan	Cake	(Portugal)	SA	and	Hungary is available at the website 
of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank: https://icsid.
worldbank.org, under “Cases > ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9”, with the reasoning of the court at 24-48.
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We can conclude from these cases that an investment treaty is apt to control 
and censure insolvency practice in cases whether high or low, sensational or 
inconspicuous, and that it may lead the arbitrators to penetrate deeply even into the 
fact findings of an insolvency court, to examine closely its legal conclusions and 
set them aside. This means that in every country bound by an investment protection 
treaty, the insolvency statute automatically carries a general reservation saying: 
“This law is subject to full legal review under an applicable investment treaty.” 
Practically, the reservation can be invoked in every case where the investment 
concerned is worth the costs of the arbitration under the treaty. That is the lesson.
V. Legal and Policy Assessment 
The proponents of investment protection in the business world, in governments 
and in the European Commission praise it with the well-known arguments 
for free trade generally, that is that investment protection by treaties, too, will 
enhance further economic growth. Politically, the driving motive is a protectionist 
one. Governments, often driven by their economic “constituency”, strive to 
shield foreign investments of their home industries against unwelcome foreign 
state action. However, whether economic welfare optimists, stakeholders or 
governments: It is obvious that for their treaty projects they are demanding a price.
The constitutional price is increasingly debated in Europe21 – it is the impairment 
of democracy, the surrender of governmental sovereignty, the evasion of existing 
state liability rules, the interference with the power of Parliament over the budget, 
the outsourcing of judicial power to para-state instances. There is also a price in 
terms of international law – the sovereign states are to accept private investors as 
legal equals, equipped with enforceable compensation claims, in the structuring 
and management of international relations.22
The focus here is on the contribution demanded of insolvency law. It is to yield 
on three central issues. The first issue is firmness of means and results. Insolvency 
proceedings are there to sort out with the strong hand of the state a troubled 
economic situation and thereby to put investors – debtors and creditors – on a 
21 See A. Flessner, “Investitionsschutz durch völkerrechtliche Verträge wie TTIP und CETA – ein Fall für das 
Verfassungsrecht!” (2015) Recht	 und	Politik	 (RuP) 149; J. Kleinheisterkamp, “Financial Responsibility in 
European International Investment Policy” (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 449; L. 
Ankersmit and K. Hill, “Legality of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) under EU law – Legal Study“ 
(22 October 2015) with ample further references at 4 (note 5), available at: www.ClientEarth.org using links > 
Publications > Publications Archive > 19.10.2015.
22 Leading critique: G. van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2006, OUP, Oxford); see 
also J. Kleinheisterkamp, “Investment Treaty Law and the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and 
Solutions” (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 793 with further references.
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new and firm legal footing, by liquidation of assets, restructuring of debt, or both. 
The results of an insolvency proceeding should be final, but they are not when 
they can be later challenged, if indirectly, by any unhappy investor with a claim 
for compensation.
The second issue is equality. Insolvency must respect ranks but it must not make 
a difference within ranks, equality insofar is one of its hallmarks. The investment 
treaties allow inequality, they benefit only the investors of the other treaty state, not 
domestic investors and not the foreign investors of other than treaty states. To be 
sure, the compensation to protect investors is available only after the conclusion of 
the insolvency proceeding, but the hope for, or apprehension of, such compensation 
will of course influence the participants and courts before.
Thirdly, international insolvency law can be disturbed. The ideal attitude in this 
field is to give international recognition and assistance to an insolvency proceeding 
that has been conducted in an appropriate forum in an appropriate manner. This 
liberal attitude is a concern of many international instruments, for instance of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.23 Where recognition, however, threatens to bring the 
recognition state into a conflict with its obligations under an investment protection 
treaty, we can no longer safely expect it to follow the internationally accepted ideal.
And then, we have a special problem here on the European level. The Insolvency 
Regulation requires the member states to give legal effect to insolvency proceedings 
opened and conducted wherever in the Union.24 So, if the Union would make an 
investment treaty like TTIP and CETA, all the member states, not only the one with 
the proceeding, but all the others where its effects are realized, may become liable 
to Canadian or American investors under the respective treaty. Was the Union 
really empowered to make an insolvency regulation with member state liability to 
North-American investors automatically attached? Or, to put it reversely, would 
a member state be entitled to deny recognition under the Insolvency Regulation 
if such recognition might trigger such a liability? We can see here, that even 
in insolvency law investment treaties like TTIP and CETA can raise European 
constitutional questions. Such questions have apparently not been addressed by 
the negotiating teams of the European Commission.
23 See R. Mason, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law and Insolvency Meet”, Chapter 
2 in P. Omar (ed), International	Insolvency	Law:	Themes	and	Perspectives	(2008, Ashgate, Aldershot) at 27-60.
24 Regulation No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Procedures (“EIR”).
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VI. Embrace, Tolerate or Oppose?
All in all, the contribution asked of insolvency law for the envisaged investment 
protection treaties is substantial. The insolvency law community ought to consider 
whether to oppose the projects or to subscribe to them or just to take them easy. To 
be sure, investment protection under such treaties opens a field for legal services 
with ample rewards – although not for everybody; the arbitrations are highly 
demanding in manpower and time so that only big players in the legal profession 
can confidently manage them. But the price, in insolvency law currency, appears to 
be very high. Representatives of the insolvency profession would do well in their 
homelands to approach their governments with the problem, make them aware 
of the built-in threat to their insolvency procedures and ask them how they are 
going to sustain them against the treaty obligation. And INSOL Europe should 
give the problem close attention and place questions to the European Commission, 
particularly to its directorate in charge of European insolvency law. It seems 
that the negotiators for the Commission have as yet not seen the full legal and 
institutional implications of their treaty projects.
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Chapter 15
An Insolvency Trajectory
Paul Omar
Address
Dear Friends, Colleagues and Guests,
I am not here for praise from others, as kind as the words at this conference 
have been, nor am I here to sing my own praises. I shall let my works speak for 
themselves. What I will do though is to thank all those whose help has enabled me 
to do my job well and who have contributed to my standing here today.
In first place, a word for our sponsors, Shakespeare Martineau, whose sponsorship 
has enabled the holding of the annual lecture that we have just heard, by Professor 
Flessner, on an intriguing and original topic, very inspiring indeed. That 
sponsorship has, more importantly, enabled a number of younger academics, both 
early career researchers as well as doctoral students, attend and present at this 
conference. This is exceedingly important, given that they are the lifeblood and 
promise for the future of this organisation.
Next, some words of thanks for INSOL Europe, our parent body, and particularly 
for Marc Udink, whose idea it was to begin an Academic Wing in 2004, later 
the Academic Forum we know now, and to have asked Bob Wessels and me in 
2007 to relaunch it, leading to the organisation it now is. I thank also the superb 
organisation team behind the conferences, most particularly Caroline Taylor and 
her team (Wendy Cooper, Florica Sincu, Paul Newson and others), without whom 
the conferences simply would not happen and whose hard work and dedication 
have considerably lightened my task as Secretary.
In this light, a word of appreciation also for the Technical Officers, Emmanuelle 
Inacio and Myriam Mailly. Myriam is on secondment to Brussels, though she is 
much missed and I hope she will soon return. Both Emmanuelle and Myriam have 
been stalwarts of the Academic Forum, first attending conference in Monaco 2007, 
the first event I helped organise after taking up the role of Secretary. Without them, 
none of the essential administration of the conference would happen. Also to be 
thanked are the “invisible”, but essential staff, the audio-visual guys, who assist at 
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the INSOL Europe and INSOL International events, following us around the world 
and, of course, the hotel conference and catering staff, without whom conferences 
would not be as comfortable as they are.
I would like to thank the panel chairs and speakers for making things run smoothly 
and for delivering some inspiring and amazing papers. A special mention goes to 
the Young Academics’ Network in Insolvency Law (YANIL), both its old guard: 
Emmanuelle Inacio, Myriam Mailly, Rolef de Weijs, Giulia Vallar and Anthon 
Verweij, as well as the new generation: Jenny Gant and Jochem Hummelen, for 
the part they have played in the running of the dedicated YANIL session as well 
as their contribution to the general programme.
Of course, I could not leave without mentioning the audience, without whom there 
would be no point in being here. Many have come from afar: Australia (Rosalind 
Mason, Anil Hargovan) and South Africa (Anneli Loubser, Kathleen van der 
Linde, Juanitta Calitz, Leonie Stander, Adam Harris). Perhaps from not as far, 
but also deserving of mention, is Waiswa Abudu Sallam from Uganda, the 2015 
Richard Turton prize winner and student on the LLM (Distance Learning) at the 
Nottingham Law School.
Ladies and gentlemen, friends and colleagues, in coming to the end of my term 
as Secretary, I am minded of the debt I owe the many people who along the way 
helped guide my “insolvency trajectory” to bring me to the place I am now.
Pride of place goes to Harry Rajak, now Professor Emeritus at Sussex, who asked a 
callow and young LLM student whether he would be interested in pursuing a PhD 
and whose guidance has been invaluable throughout my academic career. Next 
comes Anker Sorensen, then of Borloo Saigne, now of Reed Smith, who invited 
me to Paris to help him write a book and who helped found my continuing interest 
in French insolvency law.
I would also like to mention Ian Fletcher, former Chair of the INSOL International 
Academics’ Group, and Rosalind Mason, his more than worthy successor, for 
the parts they played in giving me my first academic conference outings in 
2005 in Sydney and Brisbane respectively. I am minded also that they were also 
instrumental in offering me some of my earliest publication opportunities in the 
journals they respectively edited: the International Insolvency Review and the 
(Australian) Insolvency Law Journal.
It was at the Brisbane conference that Bob Wessels first appeared, as the proverbial 
Dutchman coming in from the rain. His words at that event inspired the “Brisbane 
Initiative”, which has led to many international collaborations, not least the INSOL 
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International Global Insolvency Practice Course (or “Fellowship”) on which quite 
a few of us teach. I have had many occasions over the years to work with Bob, 
from the CoCo Guidelines in 2006 to the most recent JudgeCo Principles in 2014. 
His influence has been instrumental in many a career here, not least through his 
idea to found the YAN (later YANIL) group in 2009.
Bob’s words have also led indirectly to the cooperation between the Nijmegen 
and Nottingham Law Schools that has seen the establishment of a “Dual LLM” 
programme, one of whose first cohort, Stef Vullings, has presented at this conference 
jointly with Alexandra Kastrinou on work arising from his LLM dissertation 
supervised by her. The calibre of the students on this programme has been of the 
highest and we are justifiably proud of their achievements. Thanks also to Michael 
Veder, who has not only been a fellow Management Board member in the Academic 
Forum, but more importantly is Joint Course Leader of this inspiring programme.
It is to work that we will all return after this conference. I would like to mention, 
at the Nottingham Law School, my colleagues David Burdette, Rebecca Parry, 
Adrian Walters (on secondment in Chicago), Paula Moffatt, Alexandra Kastrinou 
and Jenny Gant, the last three of whom have presented here in Berlin. Jenny Gant 
is, of course, the new YANIL Chair, but her real distinction is in having been the 
best doctoral student I have ever had. At the Nottingham Law School, not only are 
they all dear colleagues, but also good friends, and it is a real pleasure to be able to 
go to work each day in such good company. It is a little like having a work-family, 
as well as a home-family.
The Academic Forum has also been such a family, with many of you here not 
just colleagues, but also friends of long standing. The Academic Forum has been 
fortunate in being guided by its Chairs: Bas Kortmann (2004-2007), Bob Wessels 
(2007-2010), Stefania Bariatti (2010-2013) and Christoph Paulus (2013-present). 
My fervent wish is that it continue to benefit from such excellent leadership and 
that long may it flourish. Floreat! Floreat! Floreat!
In handing over to my successor, Anthon Verweij, I am minded of the words of 
Paul Valéry (1871-1945), the French poet and author. As paraphrased by Auden:
“A [work] is never finished, it is merely abandoned.”
In this work, that is the life of the Academic Forum, I have written my chapter. 
I now leave it to you, the audience, to take it and to write your own chapters in 
this story.
Over to you, Anthon.
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